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This project seeks to bring a deeper understanding of non-western, authoritarian
economies to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature. Many of the most stunning practices
of post-Soviet Russia, such as corporate takeovers, the virtual economy, and informal sector jobs
find their roots in Soviet practices that were originally implemented to avoid an inefficient and
overcontrolling centralized government. Culturally, some of these institutions have roots in
historical institutions of patronage and self-interested giving. As such, Russia’s particular version
of capitalism as it presents today makes sense historically when the evolution of its institutions
are taken into account. Further, instead of characterizing Russia based on patrimonialism and
state-ownership in the economy, this project suggests that Russia’s economy is more multi-polar,
with individuals and businesses using the strategies available to them to navigate a familiar
problem: an often inefficient and overcontrolling centralized government. Anthropological
understandings of corruption lend further support to this argument, due to the history and nuance
of the practices identified.
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CHAPTER I: THE INFORMAL-AUTHORITARIAN GAP
Authoritarianism has long been of interest to political scientists. Whether investigating its
unusual resiliency (Yom and Gause 2012), its political and economic origins (Moore 1966), or
how dictators mobilize resources in order to take and retain power (Levitsky and Way 2010),
these regimes have provided no shortage of interesting research opportunities. And for good
reason; the world has become significantly more decentered as “the rest” has caught up with the
West and the presumed unipolarity of the world has been slowly giving way to an increasing
degree of multipolarity (Buzan and Lawson 2014). As a result, studying nondemocratic regimes
has seldom been more important.
Political economists have also given authoritarian regimes some welcome consideration.
For example, Wintrobe (1998) discusses the Dictator’s Dilemma, which is where the autocrat
cannot know what his subjects are thinking, and so must decide whether to increase repression or
take measures to increase the loyalty and support of followers, the former of which actually
increases the risk of being overthrown. He then demonstrates through the use of game theory
how this problem affects various institutions, like redistribution and strategies implemented in
and on the economy, therefore identifying some unique coordination problems to authoritarian
regimes.
Unfortunately, not all researchers of political economy have yet appreciated the
importance of understanding the unique problems of authoritarian economies. Varieties of
Capitalism is one such literature; researchers working within this tradition focus on how
enterprises coordinate their actions differently based on the institutional arrangements of their
respective state economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). Buzan and Lawson (2014) have recognized
this deficiency, but their analysis is still overly Western oriented, using state-ownership of
1

enterprises in order to show how different varieties of authoritarian capitalism can be understood
on a scale that relates them to democratic economies. Such a characterization barely scratches
the surface of the unique problems of coordination in authoritarian economies. Buhr and
Frankenberger (2014) have approached a more nuanced theoretical framework for understanding
authoritarianism within the Varieties of Capitalism perspective, but like Buzan and Lawson it
also contains weaknesses. Few other studies exist that look at some of these unique countries,
and those that do tend to be “idiosyncratic” and theoretically disorganized, an issue that Buhr and
Frankenberger themselves use to describe the state of the literature. It is my intention to conduct
my investigation within their framework and begin providing an organized body of empirical
work, starting with Russia, that tests and modifies (if necessary) their typology.
In order to bring authoritarian capitalisms further into the Varieties of Capitalism
literature, I plan to examine the informal institutions that characterize the way Russia operates
today (Ledeneva 2006) as well as bring in insights from studies of political corruption. Both
literature circles would benefit from exposure to each other through an appreciation for the
integral role that “political corruption” and patrimonialism plays in some economies, particularly
in Russia. These literatures are parallel to each other in many ways, grappling with tensions
between universal paradigms of economics and concerns that recognize the uniqueness of
different societies.
Therefore, my investigation into Russia’s political economy will endeavor to understand
its unique contemporary institutional configuration through a historical-comparative lens while
contributing to the theoretical frameworks of the political corruption and Varieties of Capitalism
literatures.
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Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Corruption
In my investigation, the framework of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) will be the
dominant theoretical structure organizing my writing and research. However, it is rife with
problems, such as a bias towards democratic countries and a lack of appreciation of informal
practices, such as corruption and patrimonialism. My paper, seeking to fill these gaps, makes use
of a new framework for understanding authoritarian economies, developed by Buhr and
Frankenberger (2014). This model, being just recently developed, lacks much of an empirical
foundation and a full appreciation of informal institutions despite addressing Russia, one of its
paradigm cases of Patrimonial Capitalism. Russia has been characterized not only by its
patrimonial structure, but also the informal practices that dominate its economy and politics,
such as rampant double bookkeeping and political blackmailing (Ledeneva 2006). In my
research endeavor, part of my strategy for elaborating on these practices involves bringing the
political corruption literature into my analysis in order to sensitize the VoC framework to the
nuances and cultural relativity of supposedly corrupt practices.
The VoC and political corruption literatures are similar in many ways. The idea of
capitalist variety was reborn around the end of the Cold War through resistance to neoclassical
theories of convergence, which assumes that there is only one way to organize an economy
(under the neoliberal model) and that all countries will eventually converge on this practice.
Similarly, the literature on political corruption is split between two camps that I characterize as
based on “hard-line” vs. “soft-line” definitions of corruption. Hard-liners, like convergence
theorists, believe that all states operate on similar universal assumptions that demonize the
various practices that Western theorists associate with corruption, summarized as any private
abuse of public office. Soft-liners, like the VoC crowd, appreciate national differences,
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recognizing that cultural-historical precedence complicates the idea of corruption being a societal
evil.
By reviewing both literatures, I will address their weaknesses and open them up to
comparison by detailing the state of their current research programs. First I will review VoC and
talk about the small number of studies that cover the gaps I talk about. Then, I will discuss the
theoretical side of the political corruption literature before concluding with a few studies with
overlap between VoC and political corruption.

Varieties of Capitalism and the Origin of Capitalist Diversity
Theories of capitalist diversity can be traced as far back as the 19th century, starting with
theorists such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Gustav von Schmoller. These authors took part in
a theoretical debate concerning whether to give greater weight to empirical insights and
inductive investigation or formalized, abstract theorizing, which has impacted the way we
investigate nations and their institutional structures to this very day (Hodgson 2001). The
differences between the contemporary frameworks of neoclassical economics and capitalist
diversity do well to characterize the differences in the application of these social science
methods. Neoclassical economic thought would have us believe in a pure, perfect, abstract notion
of capitalism, observable in the American model of free markets, the hallmark of what true
capitalism looks like. At the lowest level of analysis, individuals act according to personal
interests and rational games that maximize the utility of decisions (Streeck 2011). Theories of
national diversity would have us believe that it is in a nation’s best interest to pursue economic
objectives that support their own unique institutional patterns, resulting in different strategies,
objectives, and interpretations of economic organization, and therefore in different capitalist
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structures. Individuals in this context are products of their own institutions, making decisions
based on more than just utility maximization, such as culture filters and political considerations
(Streeck 2011).
However, capitalist variety has only recently seen academic resurgence in Economic
Sociology and New Institutionalism. Similar academic trends existed before the interwar period,
but were effectively put to rest by a “gentleman’s agreement” between Talcott Parsons and
Lionel Robbins in the 1930s, who agreed that economics would study “rational choice of means
to serve given ends” while sociology would study “the explanation of those values and ends”
(Hodgson 2001: 197). The methodological proclivities of these influential theorists would result
in ahistorical, overly functionalist studies that would dominate the disciplines until the 70s and
80s, when various insurgent trends began to grow in influence. Nevertheless, society and
academia together took a “right turn” in the 80s with the increasing influence of Reagan and
Thatcher, despite growing academic dissent with the way economics was theorized (Block
2012). Experiments with liberalizing markets were considered successful in Latin America in the
80s; however, when similar hyper-liberal shock therapy was applied to post-Soviet transition
states, it resulted in largescale “transformation recessions,” due in part to the uncritical and
ideologically dogmatic commitment to the tenets of the Washington Consensus and the
supposedly universal vision of capitalism it supported (Nuti 2013).
While the failure of neoliberalism in the post-Soviet states did not start the conversation
around national economic diversity, it dealt a heavy blow to the neoclassical economic account
and the accompanying theory of economic convergence, consequently supporting authors
arguing for capitalist variety. VoC as a modern academic trend finds its origins in reactions to
the theory of convergence, which posited that nations and their respective economies would
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converge and “harmonize” around similar organizational structures, ranging from policy to
quality of life to the very organization of production processes (Dore and Berger 1996). Again,
although many authors began this conversation earlier, at the end of the 20th century (Dore and
Berger 1996; Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck 1994; Orrù, Biggart, and Hamilton 1997),
Hall and Soskice (2001) are credited with coining the term “Varieties of Capitalism” and in
general bringing together the elements of the argument under one theoretical framework. They
developed a new form of institutional analysis that conceptualizes enterprises as actors and uses
game theory to provoke more conversation between business and political economics literatures.
The approach is called “strategic interaction,” and it takes into account relationships that firms
need to cultivate, as well as coordination problems they need to overcome. Coordination issues
are conceptualized into five institutional spheres: industrial relations (union bargaining,
productivity, etc.); vocational training/education, mostly dealing with the labor market; corporate
governance; inter-firm relations; and a firm’s own internal structure (management, hierarchy,
etc.). Through these five spheres, and the ways in which firms solve coordination problems,
comparative capitalism can take place. Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal
Market Economies (LMEs) each handle these spheres through various mechanisms, such rational
games, policy, historical trends, customs, etc. They are on two sides of a sliding scale,
representing paradigmatic cases that may or may not exist in their purest expression; however,
they act as an ideal-type heuristic for understanding how competing capitalisms can differ.
Out of Hall and Soskice’s seminal publication, discussions of capitalist variety erupted as
authors framed their research on one of the myriad gaps in their work. Some of these problems
included a lack of diversity of cases (Amable 2003), that it was too static or does not convey
change well (Streeck 2009), and that it is overly Western-oriented (Bohle and Greskovits 2012).
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Other issues include its functionalism, institutional determinism, over-simplistic formulation,
manufacturing bias, and that it does not consider the role of the state (Hancké, Rhodes, and
Thatcher 2009). As a result, there has been great deal of work published in this field since Hall
and Soskice first released their dichotomy.
One way to understand how authors have written about capitalist variety is best described
by Streeck (2011), based on different basic understandings of capitalism and the processes by
which it develops. These can be typified into four distinct models: Rationalist-Functionalist,
Power-Resource, Historical-Institutionalist, and Social-Embeddedness. While this typology is
perhaps overly reductionist and an inaccurate way of describing some studies, it is nonetheless
useful in understanding the breadth of studies produced and the various topics they cover.
The rationalist-functionalist model follows a more economistic logic, seeing divergent
national economies as the product of a search for market leverage through a rational quest for
comparative advantage (Streeck 2011:430-31). This model is the one adopted by Hall and
Soskice, who stress the efficiency-producing effects of strategic interaction, as described above.
In many ways, this model reflects a more Marxian definition of capitalism, in particular the
expanded Wallersteinian conception. Here, nations are situated in a competitive economic worldsystem defined by the extraction of surplus value, a theory thus laden with the same problems of
economic determinism and lack of historical institutional development that pervades Hall and
Soskice’s work (Block 2012).
The power-resource model places a great deal of emphasis on political process; through
collective representation, social policy and anti-market laws are capable of being advanced in a
process that resists the commodifying tendencies of the market (Streeck 2011:428). It is apparent
that this model follows a distinctly Polanyian logic, which stresses the importance of the political
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double-movement, best understood as the interaction between two “organizing principles,”
economic liberalism and social protectionism, the latter of which has been “a reaction against a
dislocation which attacked the fabric of society” (Polanyi 2001 [1944]: 136-8). An example of a
publication that makes heavy use of this logic is Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery by
Bohle and Greskovits (2012), who expand on Polanyi’s basic schematic for capitalism to explain
diverging developments in Eastern European countries.
The historical-institutionalist model focuses on the historical legacies of institutions that
are particularly “sticky,” in that national trajectories evolve along pathways that are set by preexisting norms and structures, of which labor and collective interests tend to represent a very
salient tradition in many countries (Streeck 2011:429). While this model also seems at first blush
to follow along with a Polanyian logic, it can be said that Weber’s tendency for holistic historical
process and institutional path-dependence (Collins 2011) better characterize this model.
Wolfgang Streeck is one of the central authors using this model, having emphasized complex
institutional changes that other models are often blind to (Streeck 2009; Streeck and Thelen
2005).
Finally, the social-embeddedness model focuses on the persistence of cultural traditions
unique to the nation under investigation, usually pointing to systems such as Japan’s Keiretsu to
demonstrate how these traditions effect modern institutional organization (Streeck 2011:427428). Studies within this type appreciate the importance of societal ties in constituting the
backbone of particular modern economies, thus resulting in a deeply embedded economy that
thrives more so on cultural incentives (like status, honor, and decency) over material incentives
(like class and income) (Streeck 2011:428). While not necessarily adhering to any single
definition of capitalism, this conception of its evolution exhibits more anthropological tendencies
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in the works that use them, seeing economic institutions as the result of patterned interactions in
society (Orrù, Biggart, and Hamilton 1997: 11-12). An excellent example of this kind of work
can be found in Nicole Biggart’s (1997) discussion of traditional patrimonial influences on
Korea’s chaebol, a unique form of economic organization that is similar to the Japanese keiretsu
because of inter-firm collaboration, though is different because of more autocratic decisionmaking by a leading patriarch. This model is somewhat difficult to disaggregate from the
historical-institutional model, however, since both concentrate on understanding historical
traditions and the path-dependency that they result in; it is challenging to find more
contemporary examples (Biggart wrote before Hall and Soskice published their 2001
publication) because of these close similarities and the potential recent evolutions in each type
(though Streeck published in 2011).
In fact, all of the models do not always strictly follow their given logics: historicalinstitutional authors have incorporated socio-cultural elements in their analysis, power-resource
authors have taken historical institutional development into account, etc. What sets them apart
are the basic assumptions they make about capitalism, traceable to the definitions they work
from and the traditions they more closely appear to follow; yet they cross over even here in
several key assumptions, such as Weber and Polanyi’s attention to historical process, Marx and
Polanyi’s recognition of the contradictions inherent to capitalism, and Marx, Weber, and
Polanyi’s conception of capitalism as inherently conflict-based. Further, it is important to
remember that all of the authors working within the VoC tradition recognize the importance of
institutions and their diversity from state to state, continuously critiquing yet closely following
the legacy set by Hall and Soskice.
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Despite the evolution of the VoC literature and the many issues that have been addressed
(Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher 2009), many problems remain extant. VoC often escapes claims
of ethnocentrism because of its interest in East Asian countries, like Japan and Korea. However,
much of the world has been continually neglected, with only a small number of studies
examining more peripheral places such as Eastern Europe (Bohle and Greskovits 2012) and
South Africa (Nattrass 2014). Meanwhile, less democratic countries have arguably received even
less attention, such as China (Peck and Zhang 2013) and Central Asia (Makhmadshoev, Ibeh,
and Crone 2015), despite their relative stability and admission into the international marketplace.
Filling this gap is important for proper representation of non-western, authoritarian states,
particularly since most studies of authoritarian political economy can be characterized as
idiosyncratic case studies (Buhr and Frankenberger 2014).
Buzan and Lawson (2014) approach a typology of authoritarian capitalism, thus
addressing the democratic bias in the literature; but their model is incomplete at best. They posit
an addendum to Hall and Soskice’s CME/LME scale, adding the authoritarian-based competitive
authoritarian capitalism and state bureaucratic capitalism (see Figure 1). The former is
characterized as being semi-democratic hybrid authoritarian regimes with some enterprises under
state control. This means that there is some direct involvement in the economy (more than
CMEs) and a lot more involvement in the political regime. State bureaucratic capitalism takes
China as its paradigm case, and represents heavy involvement in both the economy and political
process. The layout of their scale is represented under Figure 1, and is organized as a sliding
scale along which several ideal types lie.
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Figure 1: Buzan and Lawson (2014) Varieties Scale

Source: reproduced from Buzan and Lawson 2014: 76.

Although the model does well in addressing the authoritarian gap in the literature, it
suffers a lot of weaknesses. For one, it imports wholesale the Hall and Soskice model of
capitalist variety, a model that has already been shown to exhibit a large number of problems (for
examples see Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher 2009). However, it also groups authoritarian and
semi-authoritarian regimes into a single category defined by state ownership, despite the fact that
Latin American capitalism has a tendency to exhibit the qualities of an LME, with the exception
of having an authoritarian political regime type (Wintrobe 1998: 134). Even though their
typology is more flexible, taking the form of a sliding scale, it would still problematize this,
since moving closer to democratic capitalisms puts a case closer to the CME paradigm before the
LME paradigm. Buzan and Lawson can be forgiven, though, because their intentions were not to
create a model to be used in the VoC literature; the bulk of their work argues a point concerning
diversity in the world economy and the importance of cooperation under a new and emerging
world order, particularly amongst those that have developed stable, non-democratic states.
The task of creating such a full and formal model of authoritarian capitalisms is set upon
by Buhr and Frankenberger (2014), who identify a new, authoritarian ideal type they dub
“Incorporated Capitalism.” Incorporated Capitalism is defined by an unusually heavy role of the
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state in the economy, using coercion and co-optation as methods of governance. Both formal
laws and informal norms are utilized in co-optation and which is preferred to coercion because of
its damage to legitimacy and the risks it poses to the leadership. All autocracies have some
elements of both, though which institutions are relied upon most heavily depends on the subtype.
Patrimonial Market Economies (PMEs) make stronger use of clientelism and personal ties as a
strategy to co-opt economic elites (informal norms), while Bureaucratic Market Economies
(BMEs) make stronger use of bureaucratic structures, co-opting entire enterprises and
organizations into the state (formal law). Their respective co-opted coalitions are important to
both generating funds and legitimacy for the state.
This model, while much more refined and theoretically informed than the one developed
by Buzan and Lawson, still overemphasizes the role of the state in the economy while leaving
out informal institutions. While the role of the state in these economies is of course important,
there is more to these economies than simply a big, coercive government. Entirely left out of the
analysis are those firms that are not incorporated into the state hierarchy. What are the strategies
implemented by those businesses that manage to thrive in such a stacked environment? How do
people get jobs when they are not handed to them in co-optation efforts by the state?
Additionally, while the theoretical arguments in this article are thorough and robust, the
empirical portion leaves a lot to be desired. Four cases (China and Singapore representing BMEs,
Russia and Saudi Arabia representing PMEs) are discussed over the course of about nine pages,
and includes discussions about institutional complementarities. This leaves a gap in the literature
to be filled by more in-depth qualitative studies, a need that Buhr and Frankenberger themselves
acknowledge (2014: 423).
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Another problem with the VoC literature is that, when discussing state-led capitalisms,
and in particular those of authoritarian states, researchers tend to overemphasize the role of the
state to the point of using its involvement in the economy as one of the only unique features of
its markets, or else look at the economy from a strictly top-down perspective (for examples see
Boyer 2001; Li, Cui, and Lu 2014; Musacchio, Lazzarini, and Aguilara 2015). Because of the
more opaque nature of their economies and the increased capacity for them to participate in
shadier practices through an apparatus of repression (Wintrobe 1998), authoritarian regimes
make for an excellent set of cases in the pursuit of understanding informal institutions in stateled capitalisms. There is much at work in authoritarian economies beyond merely how many
enterprises the state owns and how much the state coordinates its own markets. There are
complex structures of crony capitalism, state capture, rentierism, clientelism, etc. that pervade
these states and vastly affect how they function (for examples see Cammett et al. 2015;
Sharafutdinova 2010; Wintrobe 1998).
Despite Hall and Soskice’s (2001) claim to examine informal institutions, they have
repeatedly seen neglect outside of more culturally-inclined studies. Some countries, such as
Mozambique, have an informal sector that makes up as much as 75% of the labor force, whereas
only 8% work in a formal context, possibly warranting the creation of an entirely new
classification of capitalism, such as the “Informally Dominated Market” (Dibben and Williams
2012). Of course, corruption also exists in democratic countries; as a resident of Illinois, I can
attest to this claim (“of Illinois' last seven governors, four have ended up in prison” [ABC
2013]). However, informal networks of this kind are not necessarily as widespread and important
to the basic functioning of these states, whereas in other places informal sectors and practices
make up a sizeable amount of economic coordination. Russia is another excellent example given
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that there is a significant degree of government evasion among non-governmental firms, such as
the common practices of setting up shell companies and bartering between firms, among others
(Ledeneva 2006). In-depth qualitative studies of particular cases can reveal some of these
alternative coordinating processes that are more pervasive in less democratic states, although
such extreme cases can perhaps provide insights into how informal networks operate in more
developed democratic countries.
In particular, corruption is an informal practice that has received scant attention in the
literature, despite the parallels between researchers in the VoC literature and more culturally
sensitive researchers working within the corruption literature.

Political Corruption and the Universalist-Relativist Divide
Discussions of political corruption can find its roots as far back as the ancient writings of
Plato and Aristotle, and discussions have continued in both religious and legal contexts
throughout history (Genaux 2004). In recent years, however, there has been a renewed interest in
the study of political corruption. A massive amount of publications was generated during the
1990s and early 2000s, severely complicating the process of reviewing the literature (Walsh
2005). Definitions abound, and there is little consensus on how corruption should be
operationalized and measured. The most common definition in use is offered by Transparency
International: “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (2016). While popular, it is often
targeted by critics for not appreciating the difference between the public and private sectors, for
covering actions not commonly understood as corrupt, or for not being applicable to cultures
with different social arrangements, among many other reasons (for examples of critiques, see
Ledeneva 2009; Philp 2015; Werlin 2002). Other definitions focus on distributional justice
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(Kurer 2005), public perceptions/popular agreement (Heidenheimer 1989 [1970]), or even forgo
attempts at precision for multidimensional theoretical discussions (Alemann 2004).
After searching through the literature for regularities, I have recognized that a very crude,
ideal type dichotomy can be observed, which I argue as being between two poles: “hard-line”
and “soft-line,” universalist and cultural relativist definitions. Unfortunately, this conception of
the literature is immediately subject to problems. In particular, many of those who would be
considered “hard-line” understand and appreciate the gray nature of corruption, particularly
when it comes to the vague implications behind terms like “abuse” and “entrusted power.”
Setting strict definitions can be troublesome, but is oftentimes necessary for reasons of
operationalization and measurement. As a result, the stance an author takes and the works they
cite can frequently betray their theoretical leanings; discussions of political corruption centers on
the discipline of political science, though is very interdisciplinary as researchers bring their own
perspectives into the conversation.
Softer definitions can be understood as having a more anthropological or sociological
leaning, emphasizing cultural diversity and the difficulty this creates in applying a single idea of
corruption across different societies. Arnold Heidenheimer is often referenced in works that take
this flexible stance; and if not, researchers engaged in this position would perhaps see
Heidenheimer as their intellectual predecessor. Credited with reinvigorating the academic
discussion of corruption (Genaux 2004), Heidenheimer developed the concept of white, gray,
and black forms of corruption using anthropological studies to make his case (Heidenheimer
1989 [1970]). Context is very important, and can therefore fall prey to similar arguments against
cultural relativism. However, there are very good reasons to acknowledge regional peculiarity,
since more universal definitions of corruption are typically based on Western assumptions of
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governance, among other critiques (Philp 2015). Many theorists in this vein tend to defend
flexible definitions, and so write treatises defending cultural approaches to investigations of
corruption, thus allowing for anthropologically-minded political scientists to investigate
corruption free of bias (for examples see Ledeneva 2009).
Harder definitions can be understood as having a more economic or law-based leaning,
emphasizing universality and capacity for measurement, though some authors within this
paradigm still recognize the difficulty of operationalizing the concept. Operability of the
definition is very crucial to researchers who expound definitions in this vein, citing various intercontinental surveys that make claims of similarities in perceptions of corrupt acts across cultures
(Kurer 2015). A well-known author of this kind of work is Susan Rose-Ackerman, who supports
the claim that corruption in any state can lead to significant distortions in society and serious
economic problems (and is frequently cited in more hard-line works, perhaps along with Tanzi
1998 or some work by Klitgaard). The solution to corruption is in political reform, typically
through various democratizing projects like checks on power, public outlets for
complaints/discussion of the government, transparency and accountability, with help from
international institutions beneficial to keeping states on the right track (Rose-Ackerman 1999).
Again, though, we run into the problem of the hard-liner ideal type: Rose-Ackerman
acknowledges cultural differences in behaviors of gift-giving and tipping, and also recognizes
that plans for reform should be executed with cultural and historical peculiarities in mind.
Studies of political corruption that come from economics journals similarly recognize
that corruption is a difficult concept to pin down. Theoretical discussions of corruption
understand that definitions are oftentimes foggy and imprecise, making it a difficult concept to
pin down quantitatively (Svensson 2005; Holmes 2006; Kuncoro 2006). As such, theoretical
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discussions on the connections between corruption and economy are vivid. One of the central
debates concerns the impact of corruption on economic growth, with a minority of apologists
believing that corruption can “grease the wheels” of an inefficient bureaucracy and facilitate
deals that might not have otherwise occurred (Aidt 2009). Perhaps the most crucial aspect of
corruption theories is the impact it has on the structure of economic modeling, prompting
researchers to take into account factors such as history or institutional strength when conducting
investigations (Aidt 2003). As such, research on the relationship between corruption and the
economy is associated with the New Institutional Economics (Danon 2011).
Nevertheless, operationalization typically follows from the resources available to the
researcher, most often using data from Transparency International (Egger and Winner 2006;
Kalyuzhnova, Kutan, and Yigit 2009) in addition to other locations, such as the World Business
Environment Survey (Aidt 2009) or any institutions local to the country of interest (Kuncoro
2006). This raises questions about corruption and measurement, an admittedly difficult thing to
do considering corruption is usually hidden from view. Transparency International attempts to
solve this problem by collecting data on corruption perceptions from various experts and
institutions, using no less than 12 different sources from 11 different institutions (Transparency
International 2015). It then takes this data and aggregates it into a single score on a scale of 1100. Transparency International composes several different indices; the one just discussed was
the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), but they produce others such as the Bribe Payers Index
and the Global Corruption Barometer. Many other indices from other organizations exist, such as
the Public Integrity Index and the Control of Corruption Index, the latter a facet of the World
Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.
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Unfortunately, such indices are typically plagued with many problems. For example, the
CPI’s aforementioned reliance on perceptions tends to leave much open to the interpretation of
the “experts,” who may have different ideas of what “moderate” and “severe” are, and who tend
to come from more business-oriented positions in Western countries. More general public
opinion surveys also don’t tend to line up with reported experiences of corruption, as is apparent
in the example given by Heywood (2015: 138) where Eurobarometer studies report an average of
74% of citizens seeing corruption as a “major problem” in their country. Aggregated indicators
can be so disparate that, when combined, may actually render the final product theoretically
unintelligible (Heywood 2015). Finally, since there is no commonly agreed upon definition of
corruption, indices tend to reflect the interpretation of the concept set by the institution: “Often
the only thing that seemingly redundant measurement tools have in common is some
combination of the words ‘governance’, ‘corruption’, ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’, or
‘democracy’” (Heywood 2015: 148). This is reflected in significant differences between
corruption scores from different sources, which has implications in statistics-driven studies
(Hawken and Muncke 2009). More accurate research might utilize disaggregated, qualitative,
and local data sources, though there is also nothing particularly wrong with using aggregated,
quantitative indices; the key is to understand what the data represents and what the implications
of using it are (Heywood 2015).
Whether quantitative or qualitative in methodological disposition, based on hard or soft
definition in theoretical inclination, corruption has remained a popular topic discussed by
researchers conducting investigations around the world. Outside of more theoretical or cut-anddried discussions of corruption in general, corruption goes by many names and includes many
practices, problematizing the process of neatly reviewing such a body of literature. Such terms
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include: bribery, graft, clientelism, patronage, collusion, conflict of interest, state capture, crony
capitalism, extortion, embezzlement, fraud, nepotism, informal institutions/practices, debarment,
solicitation, the list goes on. It is perhaps more instructive to delve into a case in order to better
understand its workings and functions.
Very few VoC studies examine the connection between corruption and economic
coordination. Buhr and Frankenberger (2014), discussed above, do well in acknowledging
corruption as an integral governance process in authoritarian economies. However, Šečkutė,
Giedraitas, and Rastenienė (2014) more explicitly discuss it, investigating whether a particular
variety of capitalism (limited to LMEs and CMEs) correlates to the incidence of corruption.
Using the “Knell, Srholec (2005) methodology” to determine which type a country falls under
and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in a regression analysis,
the authors conclude that, the more coordinated an economy is, the less corruption it is
associated with. While interesting, the study is replete with problems, stemming particularly
from an ignorance of the theoretical debates around the Hall and Soskice model and the
methodological problems associated with the CPI. It would perhaps be better to suggest that
perceptions of corruption are correlated with economic type, since indicators reflect the
perceptions of experts with potential ethnographic and theoretical biases (Heywood 2015).
Rather than directly address the issue of corruption, though, other studies typically focus
on the prevalence of generally informal institutions, touched on briefly above (with the case of
Mozambique). Of course, these institutions include corrupt practices such as predatory states,
crony capitalism, and nepotism, but also include informal networks and unwritten norms. These
have been found to be particularly important in Asian countries, and is one of several main
reasons why these countries do not fit well into the VoC framework (Witt and Redding 2014).
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For example: in South Korea, family-controlled business groups called chaebol are dominated by
a single patriarch, with relations between the groups being competitive and potentially even
hostile (Biggart 1997); in China, guanxi is a system of kinship networks that both make up for
formal institutional weaknesses and allow for the economic elite to amass fortunes in what can
be described as “crony communism” (Peck and Zhang 2013); and in the Philippines, remittances
constitute the second largest source of export revenue at $18.3 billion (and potentially more if
informal remittances were included), essentially making the state a major “exporter of people”
(Kondo 2014). Indeed, much research has been done on Asian countries by VoC theorists (see
Witt and Redding 2014a for more examples).
Other studies that examine informal institutions tend to be as “idiosyncratic” and
theoretically disorganized as the literature surrounding authoritarian capitalisms (Buhr and
Frankenberger 2014). Some exceptions exist, such as Dibben and Williams (2012) discussion of
“Informally Dominated Markets” (IDMs) and the case of Mozambique. Russia has also been
noted as a state where the economy is dominated by corruption and informality, resulting in a
“Weberian Political Capitalism” based on a weak, predatory state and a low-trust business
environment (Hanson and Teague 2007). Other studies, such as Nattrass’ (2014) discussion of
South Africa, place greater emphasis on macroeconomic indicators and formal institutions, such
as trade policy and labor legislation, relegating informal institutions to a less prominent (if not
problematic) role in the economy.
It is clear from this discussion that there is still work to be been done to address the
democratic bias and lack of informal institutions in VoC. Considering the large number of
underdeveloped countries without democratic institutions, there should be more than just these
idiosyncratic accounts. Bringing in the literature surrounding political corruption could do much
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to bridge these gaps, a process which is facilitated by similarities between the two research
bodies.

Summary
Based on my review of the literature, there are clear gaps in VoC research concerning the
impact of authoritarian political-economies and informal institutions on capitalist institutions.
Informal institutions have played a heavy role in the economies of several different countries,
such as Russia (Buhr and Frakenberger 2014) and Mozambique (Dibben and Williams 2012), but
can be difficult to study. This begs the question: what is the role of informal institutions in
demonstrating variations in capitalism and its practice, and is corruption part of that? Further, are
these informal mechanisms important to the functioning of centralized, overbearing political
structures? It is paramount that researchers address the impact of informal institutions on
economic coordination, an endeavor which has potential implications concerning the functioning
of both authoritarian- and democratically-oriented countries.
Therefore, my research project addresses the overly formal, democratically biased, topdown approach in the VoC literature by examining Russia in a single-case study. I ask: how have
Russian informal institutions been promoted by inefficiencies in the state apparatus or Russian
traditions of social organizations? How have these institutions developed over time and come to
characterize Russia’s modern-day business climate? And what can this teach us about capitalist
variety?
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CHAPTER II: CONSTRUCTING THE CASE: A COMPARATIVEHISTORICAL RESEARCH DESIGN
Russia adequately proves itself as not only a unique capitalist society, but also one that
lies outside the mainstream as an authoritarian state with features typically ignored by VoC
researchers. By examining its myriad informal institutions and the way they impact the economy,
I hope to prove that Russia is a thought-provoking case for comparative capitalist analysis. Far
from a failed state, Russia continues to push forward despite the challenges it faces. Whether or
not its institutional structure formalizes and democratizes depends on whether it can continue its
political and economic strength and stability.
As previously stated, my research project addresses the overly formal, democratically
biased, top-down approach in the VoC literature by examining Russia in a single-case study. I
examine Russia’s history, first providing context through a brief discussion of Imperial Russia
before looking at Russia over the course of the 20th century with an emphasis on Soviet and postSoviet institutions, using Putin’s Russia as an endpoint. Russia has been characterized by
pervasive informal institutions throughout both Soviet (Guseva 2007) and post-Soviet (Ledeneva
2006) societies, conditioned in part by the patron-client relations and autocratic tendencies of
pre-Soviet Russia (Hosking 2011). It has also been given a rating of 29/100 on Transparency
International’s (2015) Corruption Perceptions Index, making it an excellent candidate for
understanding the role of corrupt practices in the national economy. Below, I describe my
methodological approach taken throughout the course of the project, as well as how the project is
structured and what perspectives I bring to the conversation on capitalist variety.
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Methodological Overview
I apply comparative methods and logics in this study, even though it only consists of a
single case. This is possible due to the within-case set-theoretic implications of the study (Ragin
and Rubinson 2009), comprised of observations broken into multiple categories, such as
Imperial, Soviet, Transition, and post-Soviet Russian economies. Although only post-Soviet
Russia can be considered capitalist (see the Definitions section below for further details), precapitalist observations are crucial to understanding the path-dependency of Russia’s modern-day
informal institutional configuration. This study pays particular attention to the continuities
between Soviet and post-Soviet periods in an attempt to show continuities in informal
institutions between these two historical periods in particular; however, context is also provided
in discussions regarding imperial and transition eras in Russia.
Observations take place over time, and possibly correspond to a large number of data
points: formal and informal political and economic institutions under Lenin during War
Communism and NEP; under Stalin both pre- and post-WWII; under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and
Gorbachev; under Yeltsin throughout the many stages of transition; and under Putin through the
modern day, etc.. As such, this research can be best described as a single-case, diachronic
investigation (Gerring 2007). This tendency to organize Russian history based on changes in
leadership, often considered “disgracefully unfashionable,” reflects the impact that individual
leaders have had on the country, who tend to break significantly from those who came before
them (Hanson 2003: 4). Indeed, this tendency is one that can possibly be traced back as far back
as Imperial or even Kievan Russia: “Having to improvise structures often urgently and in
adversity, [Russia] has tended, therefore, not to create enduring laws or institutions, but rather to
give official backing to existing personal power relationships” (Hosking 2011: 5).
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External to the case, it is also possible to understand it in comparative context with the
literature and the theoretical framework of Buhr and Frankenberger (2014). This logic relies on
understanding Russia as a potential “deviation from [the] theoretical construct” to understand
what makes the case unique and a possible negative-case to previous typological categorization
(Arthur 2011: 179). However, the theory is more so extended and revised rather than rejected as
a result of my work, because what Buhr and Frankenberger say is very theoretically informed,
merely lacking in terms of empirical evidence and meso-/micro-level understandings of the
Russian economy.
I have hypothesized that the formal and informal institutions present under Soviet Russia,
conditioned by pre-Soviet historical tendencies, effected the economic organization of
contemporary Russia, which altogether has led experts to see the post-Soviet Russian
transformation as a failure. I have investigated the mechanisms that have led from the Soviet to
the post-Soviet context, as well as their similarities in function. Because of this, the perspective I
adopted here is the aforementioned historical-institutionalism, understood in terms of a Weberian
tendency towards holistic historical process and institutional path-dependence. However, I also
adopted the perspective of the social-embeddedness model, since institutions in my investigation
are understood in a more general sense to capture both formal and informal institutions.

Definitions
As a result of the flexible methodological approach my research called for, an equally
flexible definition of institutions was also necessary. In my study, I made use of the general
definition that Streeck and Thelen (2005) establish as a foundation to their more precise and
formal version:
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“[Institutions] represent socially sanctioned, that is, collectively enforced
expectations with respect to the behavior of specific categories of actors or to the
performance of certain activities. Typically they involve mutually related rights
and obligations for actors, distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate,
‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ actions and thereby organizing
behavior into predictable and reliable patterns” (9, original emphasis).
This definition is appropriate in one respect because of the equally anthropological, soft-line
conception of corruption taken in this study, which does not presume immediate negative
connotations associated with any form of corrupt behavior; while perhaps not entirely equitable,
the patrimonial organization of society and the obscure methods of interacting on the black
market represent pervasive social traditions in Russian society, and can be seen as compensating
for the multiple inefficiencies of the state. In another respect, however, only examining the role
of formal institutions excludes a significant number of coordinating behaviors observable in
developing nations and authoritarian regimes that govern via “rule by law” instead of “rule of
law.” In other words, stricter definitions run the risk of ethnocentrism.
One consequence of these broad definitions is that, moving out of the realm of strict
investigations into civic society and strictly political economies, the perception of Russia as
being a capitalist society can be questioned. However, Buhr and Frankenberger (2014) set much
of the groundwork in their theory which demonstrates an authoritarian nation’s qualification and
usefulness in studies of comparative capitalism. The definition of capitalism used here is the
same as the one used by Buhr and Frankenberger (2014: 397), who start with Weber’s
conception of it as the “pursuit of profit and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous,
rational, capitalistic enterprise” and extend it by understanding the state as an entrepreneur. In
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this way, the modern concept of state capitalisms is applied, with the added caveat that property
rights under “incorporated capitalisms” (i.e. authoritarian capitalisms) are exclusive instead of
universal. Perhaps more basic than this, though, is the fact that Russia’s economy is heavily
dictated by international markets, although the state controls various internal strategic levers in
the financial and natural resources sectors (Kretzshmar, Simpson, and Haque 2013).
Perhaps more problematic is the fact that one of the major subjects of investigation,
Soviet Russia, was organized around the tenets of communism, an economic regime almost
entirely antithetical to capitalism. However, one of my basic assumptions is that 70 years of
institutional organization are not completely severed over the course of a several year transition,
in this case from communism to capitalism. This is the basic understanding of path dependence,
which “characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into
motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic patterns” (Mahoney 2000:
507), though it is typically more inertial than deterministic, perhaps better understood as
“blinders” that narrow the number of accessible organizational options. This assumption is
apparent in the phrasing of my hypothesis; though while it is expected to be important to
Russia’s changing economy, hypotheses are always subject to falsification.
Common understandings of path dependence can be problematic in several ways, calling
for a more nuanced and holistic understanding of institutional change. Many scholars tend to
view large, sudden changes in institutional organization as the result of mostly exogenous
“critical juncture” events that establish periods of punctuated equilibrium, while associating
small, incremental changes with endogenous changes that reproduce equilibrium (Streeck and
Thelen 2005). Instead, Streeck and Thelen (2005) argue that this is not an accurate reflection of
real institutional change that unnecessarily forces researchers to conform their findings to this
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limited view. A more holistic way of thinking about these processes of institutional change can
be observed in Figure 2. Streeck and Thelen also argue, in the context of the book they edited,
that incremental institutional change can occur in a wide variety of ways, whether by adding new
elements, having actors contest rules to suit their own interests, or even by slowly withering
away. It is clear that there are many ways that institutions may change, and I plan to remain
sensitive to these possibilities.

Figure 2: Streeck and Thelen (2005) Institutional Change Table
Result of Change
Continuity
Incremental
Process of Change
Abrupt

Discontinuity

Reproduction by

Gradual

Adaptation

Transformation

Survival and return

Breakdown and
Replacement

Source: reproduced from Streeck and Thelen 2005: 9.

In identifying Russia as a capitalist authoritarian society, it is important to outline the
features that would qualify it as one. I demonstrated earlier through the work of Buhr and
Frankenberger how the post-Soviet economy is appropriately capitalist, as well as why the Soviet
tradition is important despite its antithetical economic organization. However, while
contemporary Russia has been accurately described as a kleptocracy (Dawisha 2014), it also falls
under Levitsky and Way’s (2002) criteria of a “competitive authoritarian,” hybrid regime. Under
these regimes, various democratic institutions exist in four main “arenas,” namely electoral,
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legislative, judicial, and media. While these institutions exist and give the impression of
democracy, they are typically bent to the will of the current regime to heavily favor the
incumbent, making elections anything but democratic. This is apparent in Russia’s various
political contests, such as those for the legislative Duma, the executive president, and the
gubernatorial elections. Despite the complications inherent in the presence of democratic
institutions, Putin has held a very strong, authoritarian grasp on the country through a variety of
mechanisms: his carefully engineered “vertical of power” (Dawisha 2014); electoral domination
by the state-approved party, United Russia, or else a secondary party, like Just Russia (Gel’man
2008); his tight control over the key levers of the economy through crony capitalism
(Sharafutdinova 2010); and his general consolidation of political institutions (Levitsky and Way
2010).
The other variable important to my sample, the informal economy, has historical roots in
the USSR and demonstrates what essentially amounts to a “culture of corruption” from a more
hard-line perspective. In order to make up for the various inefficiencies of the states, people have
had to engage in an informal system of “kinship and reciprocity networks”, also known as the
“second economy,” in order to gain access to deficit goods, which was informally legitimized
under Brezhnev (Millar 1985) and which sees a modern equivalent in the form of blat (Ledeneva
2009). Officials in the upper echelons of the Soviet hierarchy were engaged in an extensive
system of patronage known as the nomenklatura, and basically constituted an exclusive, partyendorsed, elite class in society; this legacy likely sees its continuation today in Russia’s infamous
“Oligarchs,” and more generally in the system of state capture/crony capitalism that has evolved
in the post-Soviet economy (Sharafutdinova 2010). Finally, the nomenklatura system, second
economy, and the Soviet inter-enterprise social hierarchies and collusion have all contributed to
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the current informal practices of bartering, double accountancy, and general “financial
scheming” that dictate how enterprises coordinate in the Russian economy (Ledeneva 2006).

Scope and Sources
In the interest of restricting the scope of my research, a smaller number of informal
institutions will be the subject of my investigation based on their relevance to the political
economy. Specifically, I shall focus on the patrimonial structure, semi-legal/illegal financial
scheming, and systems of blat. All three of these institutions overlap and can be said to generally
characterize the Russian economy, as well as throw into question the dominant view of Russia as
operating in a predominantly top-down fashion. Indeed, the “patrimonial structure” established
under Putin is very different from the one that existed during Yeltsin’s tenure: Yeltsin’s Russia
can be better described as dominated by a business elite (“state capture”) while Putin’s Russia is
more top-down, centralized, and controlled (“systemic corruption”) (Sharafutdinova 2010: 140145). This difference in governance styles demonstrates that patrimonialism is perhaps more
flexible in Russia, and even capable of reversing direction given a change in leadership.
Likewise, blat – systems of personal networks and mutual influence – and financial schemes
reveal how firms and even individuals can operate in restrictive and convoluted systems
established by Russian rulers to obtain scarce goods and make profits (Ledeneva 2006). This
similarly demonstrates that the economy is not entirely dominated by the government, given that
economic actors are capable of fulfilling their needs through legislative loopholes and personal
ties with individuals and organizations in different sectors of the economy.
The three targeted informal institutions can be observed in Soviet Russia as well.
Factories occupied their own place in an unofficial social hierarchy that allowed them
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differential access to parts, materials, and food based on their connections (Hosking 2011: 545);
they underreported and overreported production numbers in order to obtain the benefits of
meeting Gosplan, which finds modern equivalents in tax avoidance and capital flight schemes
(Ledeneva 2006); and individuals and firms alike sought access to deficit goods and services
nalevo (“on the left,” i.e. by questionable means) via an “underground” private market that made
extensive use of state property with the tacit approval of government agents and workplace
managers (Millar 1985). These institutions, albeit modified to fit their modern, capitalist context,
represent an indelible aspect of the Soviet legacy, an argument made by previous authors in other
fields (e.g., Guseva 2007; Ledeneva 2006). However, repackaging the argument to fit an
economic/political-economic audience only serves to strengthen its interdisciplinary impact.
As such, one of my primary goals in this study will be to draw these historical
connections in detail by constructing a social-historical narrative. Due to language restrictions,
however, no primary/archival sources were used; I instead relied exclusively on secondary
sources. This form of data collection can be limiting because of the reliance on the analyses of
other academics, replete with their own inaccuracies and biases. However, Arthur (2011) details
four ways of ensuring this bias does not negatively affect the analysis, which will be
incorporated in the study to minimize this problem: carefully choose sources based on how
convincing the approach is, attempt to explain variations between sources, triangulate between
sources, and be clear/transparent about why certain choices of sources were made. The
Appendix is an account of such considerations, providing analysis regarding the major sources
used throughout the course of this project.
The research for the Soviet and post-Soviet periods have been organized similarly,
utilizing the same basic research structure. In the Soviet period (chapter 4), two authoritative

30

sources were used to cover a given institution in great detail, as well as to structure the narrative
of the section. In the post-Soviet period (chapter 6), three authoritative sources were used due to
the narrower focuses of the contemporary literature. My criteria for these sources involved using
books (not articles) that covered as much of a given institution as possible, and written by
authoritative names in the relevant literature. These sources reinforced each other with much
information overlap, and thus acted as cross-references to each other. Because the grand majority
of statements reflect information retrieved from one or both sources, they are cited sparingly to
decrease clutter and avoid repetition. A treatment of these major sources can be found in the
Appendix of this project. Meanwhile, to further substantiate claims and information made from
the main source material, various books and articles have been used as cross-references to
increase the validity of the research. These citations constitute the bulk of those seen in every
section, although I have cited the main source material on occasion as well.
Included in this project are also several chapters that seek to provide
institutional/historical context, which serve the purpose of providing important
background/contextual information as well as establishing continuity in the institutions of
interest in this project. In particular, chapter 3 discusses Imperial Russia and the formal
institutional context moving into the Soviet period, while chapter 4 discusses the transition from
communism to capitalism as well as some formal context for the post-Soviet period. These
contextual chapters do not employ the same level of rigor as the methods employed in the Soviet
and post-Soviet periods; regardless, some details regarding how these chapter were constructed
can also be found the Appendix section.
The sources that I have collected for the Soviet period have publication dates that range
from as early as 1956 to as recently as 2015. Both older and newer works have their respective
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benefits, the former boasting temporal proximity to the phenomena in question and the latter
having access to Soviet archives, which remained unreleased until the end of the Soviet period,
in 1992. As such, a mix of both sources have been used and cross-referenced to obtain the
highest level of accuracy possible. Additionally, perspectives from as many fields of study as
possible have been collected for similar reasons of accuracy and cross-referencing. This includes
economics, history, anthropology, etc. Temporal proximity may hardly seem like a beneficial
attribute considering the notorious information barrier known previously as the “Iron Curtain;”
however, it can be argued that most (if not all) national governments are guilty of some degree of
information control, making the Soviet case hardly unique (Morton 1967). Further, starting with
Khrushchev, the Soviet Union was increasingly open to domestic economic debates that often
reached the ears of Western analysts (Juliver and Morton 1967). Finally, while official statistics
were frequently the subject of ideological tampering, the basic structure of the USSR could be
witnessed and understood with some degree of ease, of which the latter is more critical to the
present investigation than the former.
Although an absolutely accurate account of the Soviet period is perhaps impossible due
to information inaccuracy issues that plagued the system generally (Hanson 2003: 16-18) and the
inherent difficulty of collecting data on illicit activities, there is enough evidence to draw
comparisons between behavior during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. One result of this
situation is that I shall resist the temptation to give quantitative figures claiming to measure the
size of the second economy and the prevalence of other informal institutions, despite the wealth
of sources attempting to do so (for examples, see O’Hearn 1980; Schroeder and Greenslade
1979; and Sokolov 2014 [1989]). Accuracy problems carry over into the post-Soviet period as
well. Instead, qualitative descriptions and relative measures concerning general increases and
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decreases in the prevalence of informality will be used. Additionally, insider research and reports
make up a sizeable share of sources used in this project. Even though these sources risk bias
based on their negative experiences in the USSR and beyond, they much more frequently discuss
the institutions of interest while Western observers tend to be less capable of accurately
representing its structure (Shlapentokh 2001: 9-11; Voslensky 1984: 70).

Structure of the Project
I begin in chapter 3 with a brief overview of the era of Russian imperialism. Although
this covers a significant period of time (approximately 350 years), a brief review should suffice
for the purpose of providing historical-institutional context. Accordingly, the most relevant
institutional details will be highlighted, including some analyses from other authors who have
remarked on the more unique and persistent trends and institutions that have impacted Russia’s
political-economic history. This should demonstrate deeper continuity between institutions
spanning the imperial and Soviet periods, thus strengthening my historical argument: that the
informal institutions of Russia in general and the Soviet Union in particular have had a strong
impact on the way Russia operates in its contemporary context. Next, I discuss the basic
structure of the Soviet economy, providing the groundwork for understanding the problems that
bureaucrats, managers, workers, and citizens alike had to deal with on a day-to-day/plan-to-plan
basis, in addition to the formal context in which the informal institutions operated.
With the context set and the setting outlined, I discuss Russia’s Soviet period in chapter
4, structuring my narrative around my three institutions of interest (respectively): patrimonialism
and state corruption; enterprise survival through schemes and influence; and the pervasiveness of
blat and bribery throughout the system. These institutions have been defined broadly to include a
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wide number of behaviors connected more or less specifically to different groups. In the first, I
discuss the different informal behaviors which party elites use to control their political
environments and benefit themselves personally to both the detriment and benefit of the public.
In the second section, I discuss the ways in which managers of Soviet enterprises informally
overcome the challenges of the economic plan and the expectations that officials have set for
their behavior. Finally, the third section primarily discusses the ways in which the Soviet
citizenry operates in an informal capacity. These three sections, although distinct theoretically,
inevitably tie into and influence one another’s operation, and so should be taken as a whole when
trying to understand the informal system.
The next half of the project largely mirrors the first, with chapter 5 supplying context for
the second important period of interest (post-Soviet Russia) by discussing the Russian transition
and privatization. I begin the chapter with a brief discussion of the collapse of the Soviet Union,
a huge moment in history that provides historical-institutional context for the next section of the
chapter, which goes into detail about the privatization process. Due to the way privatization was
carried out, many of the wealthy nomenklatura found themselves keeping (and even adding to)
their wealth as capitalism was being implemented. Considering this, as well as the continuity of
enterprise management between systems, provides evidence regarding the likely mechanisms by
which the informal institutions persisted across economic systems. The chapter ends with a brief
discussion on some of the formal institutional structures conditioned the structure of the informal
structures.
In chapter 6, I discuss Russia’s post-Soviet period, which are again structured around my
three institutions of interest: patrimonialism and state corruption; enterprise survival through
schemes and influence; and the pervasiveness of blat and bribery throughout the system. These
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institutions discuss the same three groups mentioned in the prior period (chapter 4), albeit
modified to fit the modern context, looking specifically at oligarch and political elites, the
business class and enterprise management, and ends with a discussion centered on workers and
average Russian citizens. Both of the major periods of interest have been organized in this way
in order to facilitate comparison, while also demonstrating the continuity of informal institutions
by virtue of the narrative itself in a style intended to be reminiscent of the cliché “history repeats
itself.”
The final chapter, chapter 7, wraps up the project by directly comparing the Soviet and
post-Soviet periods and drawing conclusions that have theoretical implications on how the
Varieties of Capitalism literature should be addressing autocratic capitalisms. This includes: a
discussion of corruption and informality; how we might take the lessons from the project and
apply them to new conceptualizations of capitalism; and proposals for future research agendas.
Without the benefit of an analysis of at least one other authoritarian country, the opportunity to
craft my own typology is not possible. Regardless, the lessons learned from Russia, which is one
of the foremost autocratic states in the world (as well as paradigmatic in some VoC studies), can
be readily applied to future research on more centralized political-economic forms of capitalism.
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CHAPTER III: IMPERIAL RUSSIA AND SOVIET FORMAL STRUCTURE
Before diving into the Soviet Russian period, it is important to provide some context.
Societies do not develop in a vacuum, and Russia has an extensive history filled with interesting
practices and developments that ultimately conditioned that which is found in later permutations
of the country’s economic and political structures. There is something to be said about the
institutional inertia provided by the hundreds of years of cultural development during Russia’s
Imperial age, and it is in this chapter that I attempt to bring some of this to bear. Indeed, the
informal institutions discussed over the course of the Soviet period are sometimes reminiscent of
the informal institutions discussed here, even if they may defy direct translation. After discussing
history, I then provide a crash course of how communism works at a high level. Much of what is
discussed below takes place from a birds-eye view out of necessity; distilling so much
information in the span of a single chapter has proven quite challenging. Regardless, it lends
strength to my argument that the institutions of Soviet Russia were able to persist despite
massive changes in society. Metaphorically, one can liken the Russian institutions discussed over
the course of this project as a ball rolling down a hill, and by starting from the imperial era, I aim
to show just how tall the hill is that provides the inertia.
The structure of this chapter relies on several core books, as mentioned in the
methodology. In the sections “Imperial Russia: Formal Context” and “From Imperialism to
Communism,” I relied heavily on Russia and the Russians by Geoffrey Hosking (2011) and A
Concise History of Russia by Paul Bushkovitch (2012). Further, in the section “Basic Structure
of the Soviet Economy and State,” I relied heavily on Soviet Economic Structure and
Performance: Fourth Edition by Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart. For a brief treatment of these
texts, please see the Appendix.
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Imperial Russia: Formal Context
The following seeks to summarize, in brief, the history of Russia from the first Tsar, Ivan
the Terrible, to the second-to-last Tsar, Alexander III. The last Russian Tsar is discussed in a
subsequent section, as his reign was deemed more relevant to the context of the transition from
imperial to Soviet Russia. In attempting this monumental task, I have without a doubt excluded a
number of very important historical points. Regardless, I have attempted to highlight those
developments that seemed most relevant to my project, paying particular attention things like
economic expansions, administrative developments, and the status of feudalism in general and
the serfs/peasantry in particular. These institutions provide historical context for various formal
Soviet structures, such as industry, agriculture, and the administrative state. These formal
structures form an important context for any discussions of informal institutions, seeing as how
the informal are often ways and means of circumventing the formal, or otherwise making up for
the formal’s weaknesses.
The emergence of the geographical territory of Russia as we know it today can be traced
back to the reign of Grand Prince Ivan III (1462-1505), who annexed the Novgorod region in the
name of Moscow and declared himself “Sovereign of All Rus,” uniting two of the largest regions
of territorial Russia. His heir, Grand Prince Vasilii III, would unite the remaining areas up to the
Eastern Siberian Khanate and the Southern Kazan and Crimean Khanates. Kazan and Astrakhan
to the south, whose origins lie in the breakup of the Golden Horde, would be later claimed by the
first Tsar, Ivan IV (reign 1547-1575), or “Ivan the Terrible” as he is later known. The title of
Tsar itself was a namesake taken from the kings of the Old Testament in a move to put Russia’s
leaders more directly on par with the Sultans and Emperors of the time.

37

A number of significant developments occurred up through the 17th century, including the
full onset of feudalism, and the growth of various administrative practices, such as tax collection,
record keeping, and the administration of justice; however, Peter the Great (reign 1682-1725) is
responsible for far more radically altering the structure of the state, putting in place a more
modern, bureaucratic, impersonal, and rational state system that stood as a firm foundation for
the evolution of the Russian administrative state. Yet his reforms primarily impacted the elite
and not as much the rest of the population, taking power from the Boyar while moving away
from the informal system of royal courts and personal rule. Some of the foremost reforms
included the establishment of a senate and a series of administrative colleges, splitting the state
into several large provinces run by personally selected governors, and the formalization of the
rights, rules and positions of the administration. He also abolished the system of succession
based on genealogy and separated the church from the state, in the latter case establishing a
synod and declaring himself the church’s “protector.” Yet there was still much to be said about
Russia’s economic situation, since agriculture was still technologically stagnant and statesponsored entrepreneurship was based primarily on systems of patronage and kinship, an
institution which later proved problematic in industrialization efforts, a demonstration of its
persistence despite attempts to modernize the state.
Catherine the Great (reign 1762-1792) is also well known for her administrative reforms,
which built upon the legacy of Peter the Great. She did this with the help of a legislative
commission comprised of representatives from every major group in the country (excluding serf
peasants in Russia and the Baltics, about 50% of the population). The Commission deliberated in
subdivided committees on suggestions for laws centered on the basic principles that Catherine
established in her enlightenment-heavy publication Instruction, which acted as the general
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guideline for discussion. Catherine could choose whether to follow the suggestions or not;
however, they served well as a crash-course to the interests of the population.
The result was a series of intermediary institutions and local governments that filled in
the administrative holes left by Peter the Great, accompanied by the systematization of the
complicated and contradictory decrees put in place by him and the other leaders who came after
him. Catherine the Great’s reforms divided the state into about 40 new provinces (gubernii)
consisting of 5-6 smaller regions (districts or uezdy) with the strongest local figures being
provincial governors. At lower levels, the communities of nobles and free peasants retained
power, though they were granted specialized courts that dealt with their particular social groups
(i.e. noble-specific courts, peasant-specific courts, etc.), complete with elected judges and
locally-sourced resident assistants, thus establishing a well-functioning local government system.
Various groups and assemblies were also determined that dictated business and elite interests in
towns and cities, and charters of basic rights were compiled, which included laws from Peter the
Great in addition to new ones. Among these was the official designation of the landed nobility as
a corporate body.
In contrast to trends throughout the rest of Europe, the number of people living in cities
declined during this time (between the 18th/19th centuries). While unaided by the sheer size of
Russia and the comparatively few cities the dotted the landscape, living in the countryside as a
serf at the time was typically a better arrangement than living in the cities (Hosking 2011: 219231). Indeed, peasants were assured a plot of land and a minimal income in safer industries
(agriculture and cottage industry) than in manufacturing and urban commerce. Additionally, new
food supplies from recently acquired land to the south freed up resources to allow peasants more
flexibility, as landlords were willing to change labor dues to dues in money or in kind. Thus,
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peasants would set up artels, or worker communes, which would sell their collective services to
employers while the workers lived together, making their way off the estate when given
permission. Even more incredibly, landlords would sometimes finance and give proper land and
trade accommodations for serf-entrepreneurs, contributing to some small local industrialization.
Successful peasants were even able to purchase their freedom and the land on which their new
business ran. This industrializing effect was positive for its time, though it quickly reached its
limits and only put further drag on later industrialization attempts.
Additionally, peasant communities were characterized by introversion, egalitarianism,
risk minimization, and a reliance on patronage, making them generally quite inimical to change.
Thus, these communities became almost increasingly “primitive” (in a Western sense) while the
highest classes of imperial nobles (rossiiskii) became increasingly “modern.” Perhaps a better
way to understand this, from my own perspective, was that the institutions of the peasantry were
becoming deeply entrenched while those of the highest classes were changing and adapting
based on political trends.
Although Catherine the Great was very successful in her administrative reforms and
throughout her many military campaigns, she could not prevent the spread of revolutionary
fervor and French Jacobinism before her death in 1796. Her response of widespread censorship
was almost the only point she and her successor, her son Paul, agreed upon. Paul would be
succeeded by his son, Alexander, in 1801, who recognized the need for reform, yet did not wish
to weaken the power of the autocracy, resulting in careful yet steady reform efforts. He relaxed
censorship somewhat, gave the recently annexed country of Finland a constitution, and replaced
the administrative colleges with ministries supported by a new legal culture of freshly trained
lawyers, a development not yet seen in Russia even though it already existed across Europe.
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However, Russia itself would continue without a constitution, and remained trapped in a feudal
economy.
When Alexander died in 1825 and his brother Nicholas was to take the throne (due to
Alexander being childless), many in the military sought to put a constitutional monarchy into
place; but loyal troops put an end to the rebellion in bloodshed. This rocky start to Nicholas’
reign resulted in the creation of the Third Section, a ministry dedicated to rooting out political
dissent. They did so with the help of a secret police, though it wasn’t very effective, relying
mostly on denunciations. Nicholas was very interested in keeping the crown strong, and so made
use of censorship while sponsoring various pro-government publications, in addition to
centralizing control and codifying a new set of laws. Nonetheless, plenty of progress did occur
during his rule. The beginnings of industrialization sprouted during this time with steampowered factories, the creation of a railroad, and the founding of several new technical institutes.
Vivid discussions concerning the ideas of Hegel also began to crop up in salons all over the
country (which were spied on by the government), and the first traces of a Russian intelligentsia
saw its genesis during this time in Vissarion Belinskii, a prominent pro-westernizing literary
critic. Nicholas died in 1855 near the end of the Crimean War, in which Russia demonstrated its
incapacity to keep up with the other world powers. The military was sorely in need to
modernization, and was also overextended trying to defend an immense western border. Further,
economic disadvantages from the persistence of feudalism in the context of a rapidly
industrializing world contributed to Russia’s defeat in the war, although the untimely death of
the Tsar didn’t help either.
In short, Russia needed to modernize, which required getting rid of serfdom once and for
all. Alexander II, son of Tsar Nicholas I and unofficially “Alexander the Liberator,” relaxed the
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previous regime of censorship to allow for limited conversation about the “peasant question,”
warning the upper classes to heed his reforms or else risk peasant revolts. Nevertheless, the
gentry was very much against reform and resisted the efforts of the Tsar and his reform
committee. In the end, he went against the wishes of the gentry, freeing the peasants with land.
However, the emancipation still came with serious costs for the peasantry, keeping them in a
renewed state of dependency. About a third of the land was retained by landlords, and peasants
had to pay for the land they kept in the form of “redemption payments,” where in both cases the
affected peasants considered them violations of God’s law. Additionally, the newly emancipated
serfs were still barely mobile and could not obtain credit for several decades, as the state held
back on most reforms due to fiscal prudence.
The reforms in general (emancipation and otherwise) were slow to take place, and many
argued that they weren’t enough; radical reform was difficult in the disastrous post-Crimean War
fiscal climate. Many liberals agreed with the reforms, while conservatives were understandably
hesitant, yet those who were angered by the pace of reform came to occupy more radical liberal
circles and even a massive radical underground, consisting mostly of students and youth around
the country. For one, many wished for more representative government. Tsar Alexander would
eventually permit the creation of new intermediary administrative bodies called zemstvos. The
zemstvo system was comprised of local administrations where elected officials made decisions
on local projects like roads and schools. Zemstvos came to function as political outlets and
forums for discussion amongst liberals, though strict autocratic oversight prevented any major
actions from being taken. It was intended to be representative of landowners, city dwellers, and
peasants, who made up their voting base, but it ended up being dominated by the landed nobility,
with the peasantry seeing the lowest representation in these bodies. Regardless, they provided
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local experience with policy-making at the provincial and district levels, and made a difference
in terms of education and healthcare in more peripheral communities that were far away.
As dissent grew in the country, and revolutionary terrorism became increasingly active,
Tsar Alexander II continued to slow the pace of reform and to ramp up censorship efforts.
Revolutionaries, being largely youths, lived in communes in university cities spreading
revolutionary manifestos and reading the work of Nikolai Chernyshevsky, the leading radical
author of the generation. These revolutionaries were given the greatest attention from the Tsar
and the Third Section, but liberals and conservatives were also beholden to censorship laws,
oftentimes being exiled because of their critiques of the autocracy. The liberals were most
typically members of the intelligentsia, while most of the gentry was conservative, although
many conservative groups were divisive and hostile to one another. Despite the plethora of
political dissent, only the revolutionaries could be counted as true political actors, even with
liberal activists trying to make waves in the courts and zemstvos. Revolutionary groups came to
commit increasingly frequent acts of terrorism, steadily concentrating further on the
assassination of the Tsar himself.
On March 1st, 1881, Alexander was killed by bombs thrown by two suicidal
revolutionaries. His son, Alexander III, would succeed him, and he put a firm halt to the reform
process and clamped down on autocratic control by declaring an “emergency rule” that basically
gave the government the right to close publications and educational institutions, dismiss officials,
search people’s property at will, and arrest anyone without taking them to court, among other
measures. Originally meant to be temporary, the emergency rule stayed in effect until 1917.
Though none of the changes enacted by the previous regime were retracted, economic and
cultural change went unsponsored by the state, which instead focused on nationalism, official
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anti-Semitism, and the Russification of the provinces, all conservative ideals steered by a very
conservative court. However, the state was able to quietly administer some subsidies for the new
Trans-Siberian Railroad as well as other infrastructure projects, which were crucial for the
resulting economic boom that helped turn St. Petersburg into a bustling trade center.
The economic boom during this time cannot be overstated. Railway mileage increased
sevenfold during the 1860s, and doubled from there during the 1870s, permitting the exploitation
of untouched economic resources in Siberia and beyond. It also boosted communications with
countries like China and Korea, and trade with Persia and the Ottoman empire. Industry
benefitted as well, now that heavy machinery (and the outputs of said machinery) could be
moved more easily around the country; industrial output increased dramatically during the late
19th/early 20th centuries due to the abrupt way industrialization was pursued, aided as it was by
technological innovations that had already been happening across Europe. More people (men in
particular) went to the cities to work in factories, although they were seldom able to take their
families with them. There they rented bunks in crowded barracks and dormitories, where
acclimating to city life was a jarring experience in itself. Much of the development that happened
in society during this time was largely funded by foreign credit and private capital because of the
stretched state budget following the Crimean War and the compensation of nobles following
peasant emancipation. In 1860, a state bank was also created to improve Russia’s credit rating,
and investors became even more confident in the country when it put the ruble on the gold
standard in 1897.
Unfortunately, sizeable amounts of the rural landscape remained untouched by the effects
of modernization. Agriculture was unable to keep up with this rapid societal transformation, and
smaller settlements remained culturally and technologically stagnant. Farming practices had
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largely stayed the same, and peasants met changes with a great deal of skepticism and resistance.
Disease and poor education was even worse in these places, as well as rampant alcoholism that
negatively affected administrative and religious functions. Even though much machinery existed
to help make farming more productive, this was primarily witnessed on wealthier estates. Indeed,
for the most part, Russia was a “sea of backward agriculture dotted with larger or smaller islands
of modern industry and society” (Bushkovitch 2012: 222).
Nevertheless, Russia was experiencing significant levels of development and an
economic boom that propelled its people into the modern era, assisted in part by the government
and in part by the distinctly capitalist market economy that had developed. But modernization
was not always seen as beneficial by the Russian state; indeed, the autocracy – before the
Crimean War – often saw industrial development as a potential challenge to its power, and so
generally refrained from serious industrialization efforts (Gregory and Stuart 1990: 28). But the
forces that propelled the economy in the direction of capitalism were being put into place long
before the country shed the weight of the burdensome feudal system. Evidence of Russian
factories can be traced as far back as the 17th and even late 16th centuries, although they were
primarily financed by foreign capital and run by immigrants to the country (Fuhrmann 1972).
Unfortunately, substantial industrialization efforts still took off late in Russia compared to other
countries, and in the interim the goods produced by existing industry were not of reputable
quality. By Western standards, Russia was behind and not doing a very successful job catching
up.
At this point, much of society had taken on a unique character independent of the
autocracy, which made it increasingly difficult for the Tsar to control change. The most he could
do was slow it down or censor that which deemed most threatening to his authority. Any
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attempted changes were contradictory to the powers established by the emergency rule, thus
undermining the monarchy and threatening the equilibrium of the state. Indeed, throughout much
of Russia’s history up to this point, an overcontrolling crown consistently tried to keep the state
from fully modernizing, or otherwise implemented reforms incrementally, cautiously, or
partially. Censorship was often implemented in order to keep the Tsar’s order, embodied in part
by the establishment of the Third Section and a secret police under Nicholas I. Even when
massive state modernization projects were attempted, such as those undertaken by Peter and
Catherine and Great, traditional ways of doing things continued to persist. The conservative
interests of the landed nobility and the gentry did not help in any of the above matters. This did
not stop society from continuing to modernize; however, development often had to occur in spite
of an overcontrolling center, and not necessarily as a result of it. As such, private capital and
foreign trade were often primary movers of economic modernization.
Meanwhile, the peasantry developed their own strong set of institutions separately from
and often in opposition to the state. Even though there were occasional instances of serfs
participating in industry, most peasant communities remained technologically stagnant and
culturally isolated. Even when serfs were “freed” by Alexander II, little changed due to the
required “redemption payments,” which only continued to keep them in place. All of this was
unaided by the lack of opportunities in the cities, as well as poor conditions for workers, which
ended up aiding the cause of Soviet forces in the late Imperial era. Indeed, bans on worker’s
unions ended up making the working class a valuable recruiting ground for revolutionaries.
While some of the more pertinent peasant institutions are discussed below, it is important to note
for the time being that institutional stagnation among the peasantry effectuated over an extensive
period of time (literally hundreds of years) provided strong inertia leading into the Soviet period.
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Imperial Russia: Informal Context
Having discussed the more formal (and general) economic and administrative
developments in imperial Russia up to Tsar Alexander III, I now turn to some of the relevant
informal institutions from this time. These institutions, such as bribery and joint-responsibility,
should be kept in mind when reviewing the Soviet period over the course of the next chapter; the
Soviet institutions of interest are, at times, reminiscent of the context provided here, albeit the
culture and practices had been shaped to fit the formal context of the communist system as
effectuated by its leaders.
Some of these imperial institutions are immutable, tied as they are to the very geography
of Russia itself. Geoffrey Hosking (2011) details several of these institutions, such as difficulty
with communications (both with foreign bodies and domestically) and with mobilizing resources,
human or otherwise. These difficulties arise due to Russia’s sheer size, which necessitates an
extensive system of infrastructure that the Russian economy simply has not had the capacity to
build, a problem which is touched on at various points throughout the history laid out above.
Further, Russia’s open borders to the West and the South has made invasion easier for other
countries, although its size offers plenty of space to retreat, regroup, and strike back, a keen
demonstration of its ability to come back in the face of overwhelming odds. These features have
also worked to reinforce the patrimonialism and centralized hierarchy that characterize Russia to
this day. Indeed, Hosking explains that, “having to improvise structures often urgently and in
adversity, [Russia] has tended, therefore, not to create enduring laws or institutions, but rather to
give official backing to existing personal power structures” (Hosking 2011: 5).
Although we have seen the development of a rational, impersonal state through the
reforms of Peter and Catherine the Great, the country has nonetheless continued to be judged as
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“backwards” by Western commentators, a characterization that has continued to persist
throughout length of the country’s history. An oft cited example of this in the imperial era was
the persistently lagging agricultural sector, an issue that has carried over as famines and failed
experiments in the Soviet era. Another includes how late Russia has typically been to pick up on
historical trends, such as the abolition of feudalism or large-scale industrialization. Further,
pervasive bribery and corruption plagued administration early in Russia’s history, particularly in
the further provinces and the governors who administered them. Clark (1993: 30-38), citing
evidence found by other authors, discusses anti-corruption measures can be traced back to the
1600s, when sparse commentaries also describe a country which was difficult to operate in
without handing out bribes. Corruption in this case was potentially the result of poorly trained
state employees and the inadequate salaries offered for their undesirable work; nevertheless,
despite developments in administration over time, its extensive and prolonged practice
normalized corruption in such a way that punishment tended to be sporadic and uneven.
Just as the academic discussion concerning definitions of corruption is complicated, the
definitions, practices, and legal implications of corruption in Russia were not nearly as cut and
dried as Clark might imply. For one, the “normalization” of bribery may have been because of
the ever-evolving and ambiguous differences between words for bribery, legal payment, and gift.
Legal documents from both early and late imperial Russia demonstrate different uses for the
same words, which can be seen applied to both value-neutral payments or gifts in addition to
bribes, and in both secular and religious contexts, where they were also applied in distinct ways
(Potter 2000). Indeed, early practices of self-interested gift-giving and mutual aid only
complicates things; institutions surrounding tipping, superstition, and collective survival (i.e.,
“joint-responsibility,” discussed below) (Kelly 2000). In this context, it is perhaps better to
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inquire about when bribery became looked down upon, instead of asking why it happens. Legal
contexts also evolved with changes in administrative structures. For example, pre-Petrine
Russian officials were often granted certain administrative positions for the purpose of being
able to extract rents from local economies, known as “feeding” (kormlenie). This practice lost
formal legitimacy during Peter the Great’s administrative reforms, but regardless continued to be
traditionally sanctioned (Volkov 2000), and continued to exist through the late 18th century
(Hosking 2000).
Regardless of the ambiguities, though, imperial Russia no doubt experienced quite a fair
amount of corruption consistent with western conceptions of the practice. Various bribes and
gifts were issued for all manner of reasons throughout history: by peasants and serfs to avoid
burdensome taxation; by those called to serve via the “recruit levy” (i.e., a military draft), which
paid for substitutes; and in the administration of justice, whether to speed up the process or, after
1775, as the only means of engaging in the appeals process (Hartley 2000; Korchmina and
Fedyukin 2019). Corruption also plagued the lucrative vodka industry (which the government
also had a vested interest in), at least until tax farming was banned in 1863 (Christian 1987).
Catherine II herself proclaimed that “Justice is sold to the highest bidder, and no use is made of
the laws except where they benefit the most powerful” (Hosking 2000: 308). Clearly, bribery had
negative effects on the ability of the Russian government’s ability to administer law and justice.
Legislative efforts from the 18th century through the 20th century to define and punish bribery
demonstrates this concern (Kelly 2000).
Patronage as a form of corruption was also very strong institution often associated with
Russia’s history. Imperial Russian patronage was granted using a variety of mechanisms, but was
primarily conducted via the following: proximity to the crown, kinship connections, physical
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proximity (where in the country officials were stationed), and administrative position (Orlovsky
1983). These mechanisms all persisted up to 1917 at least; however, the dominance of any
particular mechanism changed throughout the course of history. Some studies suggest that these
mechanisms even persisted beyond 1917, serving throughout the course of the revolution and
well into the Soviet period (Hosking 2000; Kaplan 2013; Rigby 1998).
One final institution bears mentioning, and that is the concept of “joint-responsibility”
(krugovaia poruka), mentioned earlier. Joint-responsibility was a rural value that emphasized
community solidarity, since conflict and division could easily endanger communities in an
environment that was frequently hostile to human settlement, and in political contexts often rife
with corruption and inefficiency. It existed for hundreds of years, and has served extensively in
administrative matters since the time of Mongolian Russia, when clans would pay warrior groups
for protection, until becoming codified into law over the course of the 15th-17th centuries, before
being legally abolished in the late 19th to early 20th centuries (Ledeneva 2006: 91-99). In its most
basic official function, it was used to extract taxes from peasant communities at the community
level, essentially setting the village as an independent taxable unit; and as long as the
government received their tribute, there would be no problems. A community therefore would
collectively gather taxes at a group level, permitting them to manage their own tax affairs. This
way of administrative organization, however, ended up causing problems for the Russian
government over time. If too many individuals were in arears, the entire community was
essentially delinquent, and strength in numbers would keep the village protecting themselves.
However, when force was used to extract the tax debts, it all too often triggered a collapse in
peasant livelihood. As such, the institution was officially abolished by January 1, 1907
(Ledeneva 2006: 99).
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Therefore, joint-responsibility was a set of informal institutions embedded in a formal
structure. Communities distributed tax burdens informally amongst themselves, although
police/officials may come by to coerce the community into making sure their tribute was ready
(Hosking 2011: 15-19). Other ways this institution was practiced involved communities
providing a local safety net that allowed those who had slipped into poverty a chance to survive.
Russians working the land had short windows of time where they needed to work incredibly
hard, embodied in the term strada (suffering). Any setbacks, such as illness, injury, or fires,
could have an outsized impact on survival for the household, making pomochi (emergency
mutual aid) an important function of stability (Kelly 2000). Joint-responsibility also was the
principle by which peace (mir) in the community was maintained; i.e., by communal decisionmaking on important matters that centralized structures were too far away to mediate, such as
settling disagreements, building/maintaining infrastructure, and the use of common lands
(Hosking 2011: 15-19). This ties in with observations made earlier regarding the problems
produced by Russia’s vast geographic makeup.

From Imperialism to Communism
As previously described, during the late 19th/early 20th centuries, Russia was undergoing
a massive amount of development during a short period of time. The final tsar was Nicolas II,
who succeeded Alexander III upon his death in 1894, and whose tenure was beleaguered by the
drama that accompanied the 1905 revolution, World War 1, and the second revolution in 1917.
These events would lead Russia into the end of the age of the Tsars, and us into the Soviet
Russian era. I will also provide some considerations on how the informal institutions of Imperial
Russia might have made their way into Soviet society.
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Nicholas II was a poor ruler, largely ignorant of the issues of the people as he tended to
his family and tried to keep out of range of assassination. Repression and censorship only got
worse during his reign as his government attempted to retain power and legitimize the autocracy.
This, in addition to the fact that he was practically invisible to the people of Russia, only further
empowered dissident groups, including the Marxists, The Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries
(SR), and the liberal Union of Liberation. Tension, instability, and a sudden war with Japan led
into the 1905 revolution, but the event that truly kicked it off was “Bloody Sunday,” a protest
that went horribly wrong, ending in over 100 dead workers in front of the Tsar’s Winter Palace.
Russia practically exploded as hundreds of thousands of workers around the country went on
strike, in addition to uprisings from peasants and ethnic nationalists in Russia’s various
provinces, all supported by revolutionaries and the liberal intelligentsia. The war with Japan
worsened, and Nicholas was forced to call a truce. Peasants (provoked by an ostensibly
uninterested and weak Tsar) burned lands and attacked noble households, military units began to
mutiny in solidarity with workers, and banditry flourished amidst the chaos.
The 1905 revolution forced the tsar to compromise and form a more representative
government, albeit one that was still quite centrally administered. This included a representative
legislature (the Duma) and a constitution, both of which were quite weak and conservative, a
development quite in line with the conservative reform tendencies of prior Tsars. Nevertheless,
the political situation of Russia had been altered considerably, as political parties which were
previously inactive began participating and various permutations of alliances and party
formations cut across class lines and between provinces. The situation often proved unwieldy for
the Tsar, causing him to dissolve the Duma twice and put a new prime minister in place, the
repressive yet reform-minded Petr Stolypin. With an overwhelmingly conservative Duma in
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place, the prime minister began attempting to implement his plans of reform in 1906. However,
the conservatives found his reforms too extreme, while the reforms that made it through were too
conservative to appease society. Indeed, further alterations to the members of the government
resulted in a stalemate, with no reforms or repression being successfully implemented. The only
real result was further disillusionment with the government amongst the population, unaided by
the scandal that was Rasputin.
Before World War I broke out in 1914, Russia’s developed areas underwent massive
economic development, punctuated periodically by continued strikes and protests led by the
remaining socialist and Marxist groups. However, once war had been declared, the country
erupted in patriotism, which even saw government officials temporarily abandon their posts to
help with the war effort (seeing political deliberation as unneeded for the time being). The only
ones in dissent were the Bolsheviks and a handful of Mensheviks. The Mensheviks compromised
with the greater international socialist party by neither condoning nor opposing the war. Lenin,
however, called for an armed revolution during the war, thereby catching Russia at its most
vulnerable. This position found many Bolsheviks killed or imprisoned; however, a well-timed
worker’s riot in 1917 played to the advantage of the communists, which started as a women’s
protest over long bread lines and longer work hours, but snowballed into a movement that even
inspired local troops to mutiny. The Bolsheviks were further aided by the Tsar’s decision to
become more directly involved in the war effort, wherein the tsar consolidated power and
decided to try his hand at commanding the army, leaving St. Petersburg to do so. By the time the
tsar returned in 1917 at the behest of panicked communications from his administration, he was
forced to abdicate the throne, marking the end of the Romanov dynasty and the age of the
Russian Tsars.
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But the country was not easily won by the Bolsheviks. While their leadership returned
from exile, two parallel governments formed, one around the Duma and another around
spontaneous workers’ Soviets, in addition to threats by conservatives who wished to see the
crown restored. In time, many of the active parties found their bases moving to side with the
Marxists, and after months of spontaneous grassroots revolutionary actions, their skilled
organizational efforts proved effective. As soon as they were able to seize the government with
confidence, a counter-revolutionary force quickly assembled, known as the Whites (because of
their opposition to the “Red” Bolsheviks). The multiple fronts of this civil war proved
challenging to the new rulers, but their army was comprised of large numbers of angry workers
and peasants, as well as some imperial military officers. As the conflict progressed, the
government enacted War Communism as rampant inflation effectively destroyed much of the
previous system of formal institutions. War Communism focused on survival, and so the
Bolsheviks either bought massive amounts of grain for low, fixed prices or otherwise forcibly
seized it from the peasantry, which had the negative effect of decreasing food supplies. This led
to a food crisis which spawned a black market and the infamous “bagmen,” who smuggled food
into towns and cities while charging exorbitant prices for their foodstuffs. Further problems were
created by invasions due to WWI, necessitating the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty so the
Bolsheviks could concentrate on the civil war, which resulted in the loss of a significant amount
of Russian land in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.
The civil war ended in Russia in 1921, giving the government a chance to finally put its
own policies into place, although a lot of progress was made before the war “officially”
concluded due to sporadic resistance from the Whites between 1921 and 1923. Some of the
progress made includes the initial development of the centralized hierarchy that is described in
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the following section. Reform efforts were led by Lenin, and because Marx did not leave a
detailed blueprint of what communism was supposed to look like, a degree of improvisation was
required. An unfortunate side effect of this was a political monopoly on the part of the
Bolsheviks, who struggled to retain power after taking it and which they secured with an iron
fist, an impulse that is very much in line with how Russia has been ruled previously. Despite this,
as the civil war wound down, the government ended War Communism and began the New
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921 in an effort to encourage industrialization and avoid more
famine. The NEP was a temporary turn to free markets, which encouraged peasants to sell their
product on the market and helped return industrial production to pre-WWI levels. Despite some
of its issues (long-term problems in agriculture, harsh working conditions, massive
unemployment, etc.), the program could be considered successful in solving some of the
country’s most glaring problems.
Lenin died in 1924, and five years later Stalin became the official leader of the Soviet
Union. During those five years, Stalin outmaneuvered his two co-leaders, Zinoviev and
Kamenev, because of his position as General Secretary, which put him in control of
appointments and personnel files. He could put individuals loyal to him into important positions
of power while removing those who opposed him, establishing the Nomenklatura system in the
process, the “most extensive and tightly controlled system of patronage the world had ever seen”
(Hosking 2011: 447). He would later be credited with putting into place some of the final formal
institutions that comprised the Soviet system.
In 1927, Stalin published the first 5-year plan, which called for an unheard of 20% annual
increase in industrial production. This required a massive in-migration of people and vastly
increased levels of food production, unaided by the food crisis in 1928 and the harsh
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winters/hardcore droughts of 1931-2. The latter caused widespread famine, while the former
inspired Stalin to further speed up production to keep the kulaks (wealthy and presumed-wealthy
peasants) in check and, therefore, capitalism at bay. In short, the agricultural and industrial
sectors of the economy underwent an enormous makeover in a very short period.
Collectivization was a series of agricultural reforms under Stalin that sought to aggregate
farming into state- and collective-run cooperatives, and was designed to support industrialization
efforts. Though reform efforts began slowly, it picked up momentum and resulted in a lot of
suffering. The kulak class was exterminated via arrests, executions, and deportations north and
east while peasants were gathered into communal living quarters at a very rapid pace. The
peasants slaughtered a large amount of cattle before they pooled their lands and resources, and
this coupled with the 1931-2 weather ended in a very significant number of peasant deaths across
the USSR. Additionally, despite the poor harvest, Stalin demanded that production increase, and
those villages that couldn’t make the quota had their stores closed and were cut off from trade.
Afterwards, the pace of collectivization slowed, and the kolkhoz (collective farm) system came
to replace the commune. While these farms were intended to be the primary suppliers of state
foodstuffs, private plots ended up supplying more than 40% of produce and 66% of meat, despite
constituting only 4% of kolkhoz land.
Industrialization was seen by the Soviets as the cornerstone of their new economy,
necessitating the full-throated pursuit of heavy industry. Because of the “backwards” nature of
Russia’s economy and its continued status as an economic laggard, though, industrialization
trends during the late imperial era had to be intensified significantly in an attempt to catch up
with the West. Rapid industrialization also necessitated rapid urbanization, and this had the
effect of breaking up rural, peasant communities. The sudden surge in populations in urban
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centers led to a housing crisis, as well as the breakout of diseases like typhus. Shortages on
metals to create the machines that would power the economy ended up creating “shock
construction” sites where young people worked the mines in terrible conditions, which were
designed to be new industrial/urban centers that dotted the landscape. Those sites that suffered
from labor shortages, particularly those in Siberia, saw kulaks forcibly imported to make up the
difference. Indeed, “the new construction sites were largely peopled by peasants driven from
their villages, sometimes at gunpoint, sometimes out of hunger and desperation, or, in many
cases, leaving out of genuine enthusiasm to see the cities” (Kotkin 1995). These construction
sites made heavy use of Fordist assembly line methods in order to keep them as efficient as
possible.
The war scares of the late 1920s prompted Stalin to put all energies into the military
sector, privileging workers there with food and consumer goods over the lighter industries during
times of shortage. This went on until 1934, after which consumer goods became less scarce,
although military spending increased right before WWII. The Supreme Economic Council was
also replaced with a series of People’s Commissariats who oversaw production in particular
industries. Finally, the GULAG proved to be a major backbone of the economy, loaded as it was
with both criminals and victims of political purges who worked the land and participated in
projects considered too costly for regular labor.
Despite the sudden and radical transformation of the state that followed the Soviet
reforms, many of the informal institutions of the imperial age likely continued to persist, even as
the formal structure underwent a dramatic make-over: “The very completeness of the destruction
probably impelled people to seek security in familiar social patterns, not only resuscitating but
also reinforcing them as the only source of stability in a chaotic world” (Hosking 2011: 416).
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Already noticeable was the tendency of an overcontrolling center that sought to eliminate
political dissent with the strength of force. Further, the establishment of the Nomenklatura
system, which is discussed in greater depth below, appeared to be a modern, bureaucratic
permutation of traditional patronage systems.
Some of the peasant institutions described above may have also found their way into
Soviet culture. Stalin’s violent purges of elites, such as the liberal intelligentsia, wealthy
entrepreneurs, and the kulaks, resulted in many lower-class workers and peasants finding
themselves in important career positions in the government and economy. According to
Voslensky (1984), early appointments to the Soviet government’s hierarchy were made out of
the peasantry, seeing as how peasants comprised a significant amount of the Russian population.
Further, the image of working-class roots continued to be an important aspect of the ideological
image of the average party official, which incentivized hiring those with such a background (8990).
Later, we will see that the qualities that early on characterized peasant communities – that
of inclusivity, reciprocity, risk-minimization, and a reliance on patronage – seem to also
characterize the way in which business was conducted and informal connections were
maintained during the Soviet period. Alena Ledeneva (2006: 99-114) suggests that peasant
institutions, or at least the culture that supported them, were persistent through the transition
from Imperial to Soviet Russia. One example she gives is how officials during the Soviet era
protected each other from punishment and criticism; if a scandal broke out surrounding one
official, they might find their case dropped in court and their post moved somewhere far away,
thus avoiding accountability. These benefits were dependent upon cultivating relationships and
playing by the informal rules that governed these groups, making serious infractions more
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accidental; consistently problematic individuals were far less likely to find themselves saved by
their superiors.
While it is tempting to give precedence to historical institutions, though, the massive
disjuncture that occurred between the imperial and Soviet periods cannot be overstated, and
undoubtedly had a strong effect on the various historical institutions discussed above. Guseva
(2007) discusses the impact on trust (and, subsequently, the impact on the prevalence of informal
institutions) effectuated by Stalin’s purges in particular and the totalitarian tendencies of early
Soviet life in general. Further, the intense pace of collectivization and industrialization under
Stalin resulted in the sudden breakdown of peasant communities as discussed above, which was
further exacerbated by tactics that often deliberately sought to break these bonds. For example,
peasants would often arrive at the new construction sites detailed above in groups called “artels”
that were led by village elders who commanded absolute loyalty among their followers. These
alternative power centers were problematic for Soviet leadership, however, resulting in concerted
efforts to break up these groups using tactics like promoting younger peasants to positions that
outstripped their peasant ranks, as well as making inroads into the groups using unions and the
Komsomol in order to drive a wedge into the middle of these communities (Kotkin 1995: 89).
The effects collectivization and industrialization eviscerated the social order, and did it over the
course of a very short decade or so.
However, it is my position that the informal institutions of the Russian Imperial era
cannot be so readily erased given hundreds of years of entrenchment, and many of the behaviors
described in the Soviet period are often reminiscent of these institutions. Indeed, quite in line
with the counter-argument mentioned above by Guseva, Ledeneva argues (2006: 100-101),
citing Vladimir Kozlov, that joint-responsibility can actually be understood as a “defensive
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response” against the denunciations of Stalin’s purges, functioning as a way of deflecting
criticism and avoiding responsibility by means of various practices that revolved around mutual
aid within patronage networks, which is arguably comparable to the mutual aid that could be
found in imperial Russian peasant communities. Again, many of the informal institutions
discussed over the course of the next chapter are often reminiscent of those discussed during the
imperial period; at worst, these institutions may not find direct translation into the Soviet period,
but nonetheless have found there way into communism after being filtered heavily through the
dramatic social, political, and economic changes implemented by early Soviet leadership.

Basic Structure of the Soviet Economy and State
The way the Soviet economic and political system operated was significantly different
from the way Western Capitalism did. As such, before going into the Soviet period, I will briefly
explain some of the basic way the system was structured, touching on all three levels of society
addressed in both Soviet and post-Soviet periods: high-level elites, mid-level managers, and lowlevel households. Understanding the way informal institutions operated in the Soviet era relies on
a baseline understanding of formal communist institutions, given the nature of informal
institutions as a way of circumventing or otherwise making up for the weaknesses of formal
ones.
The Soviet Economy, which was (and still is) referred to as “USSR Inc.” by economists
due to its resemblance to an enormous corporation, can be formally described as a “planned,
socialist economy” (Hanson 2003: 10). The workings of the economy were governed from above
via plans produced largely by the government agency Gosplan, whose instructions were sent
down the bureaucracy’s chain of authority until it reached the individual productive enterprises
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responsible for carrying it out. Everything from physical to liquid capital was owned by the state,
except private goods like food and furniture. Of course, there were exceptions to this: many lived
in public housing complexes, and savings were capable of being tampered with under the muchdespised currency reforms, which gained notoriety after Stalin’s confiscation of savings (in
excess of more than 3,000 rubles) in 1947 (Hanson 2003: 41).
The economy was monitored, regulated, and dictated by two parallel hierarchies: the state
and the party. However, disputes within or between the two entities were always resolved in
favor of the party, since it was the “driving engine” (Spulber 1969: 4-5) or the “leading and
guiding force” (Shlapentokh 2001: 88) of the entire USSR. As such, many of those working at
the top administrative bodies of the USSR held parallel appointments in the party and state
structures. Agencies at the top of each respective hierarchy were replicated at lower levels of
organization, more specifically the republic, provincial (oblast), local (raion), and even city
(gorod) levels. As such, there were state and party committees at nearly every level, councils of
ministers for every republic, etc. It must also be mentioned that there was a significant amount of
power informally centralized in the party, and in particular agencies over others. Although this
section is meant to be an overview of the formal structure, with the informal structure and norms
to be discussed in later sections, some of the relationships between different state and party
bodies are so ingrained that they might essentially be considered formal. More detail on this
relationship will be covered in the next chapter.
The highest authority (nominally) in the state hierarchy was the Supreme Soviet, a
congress that convened very infrequently, and even then, usually just to automatically ratify laws
drafted by the party. While the Supreme Soviet was adjourned, the Presidium, which was elected
by the former, carried out their work. Also elected by the Supreme Soviet was the Council of
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Ministers, which was (de facto) the highest authority of the state economic bureaucracy, or in
official terms, the head executive/administrative body of the state (Spulber 1969). It was
comprised of the various heads of the ministries (described below), the chairmen of republiclevel councils of ministers, and the heads of other agencies with ministerial status, and whose
head (chairman) occupied the most powerful position in the state hierarchy. Below the Council
of Ministers were the various commissions, committees, and ministries that governed the myriad
branches and functions of the economy.
The party was very similar in structure to the state hierarchy. The highest authority of the
party hierarchy (or CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and most powerful individual
of the USSR was the General Secretary, the head of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Nominally, however, the highest authority was the Party Congress. Like the Supreme Soviet, this
body also met very infrequently, and was composed of delegates from every level of the
hierarchy. Perhaps their most important task was to elect the Central Committee, which found
organizational equivalence with the Council of Ministers of the state hierarchy (and functional
equivalence in no other agency, being de facto the highest authority in the union) (Simis 1982:
25). In turn, the Central Committee appointed the Politburo (of the Central Committee of the
CPSU), the most important policy-setting body of the Union whose power was second only to
that of the General Secretary (Shlapentokh 2001: 81). The Central Committee also had its own
departments that mirrored the various ministries on the state side, which in turn supervised and
coordinated with their respective ministries.
Indeed, the two hierarchies were very similar in structure, although they differed in
function and performance. Party agencies mirrored those of the state at every level, except that,
from the bottom-up, there was much more significant centralization of power; while agents of
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the state needed to report to the next highest link in the chain of command, party representatives
were able to report directly to Moscow. Additionally, while the party was primarily responsible
for planning, supervising, and appointing members of the state hierarchy, it was the latter that
held the responsibility of actually implementing the plans. Behind this relationship was a balance
of power that overwhelmingly favored the party, wherein the individual ministries could do
almost nothing without the express approval of their corresponding department in the Central
Committee (Simis 1982: 25-26).
Enterprises (predpriiatie) occupied the lowest position of either Soviet hierarchy, and
their organization was similarly hierarchical. At the top of the management ladder was the
director, who had his own high-level management staff that included the deputy director, chief
engineer, chief accountant, chief economist, and chief technologist. Within the productive
enterprise, sub-production units called shops (tsekhy) organized labor based on more precise
activities, like smelting or pressing, and were run by shop chiefs who had their own team of
assistants. Each shop was like its own microcosm within the firm, operating based on its own set
of interests and incentives (Berliner 1957). The lowest level management position was the
foreman, several of whom were in charge of the shop workers.
The production output for the firm was determined by a centrally prescribed economic
plan, called the techpromfinplan (technical-industrial-financial plan). Perhaps the most important
aspect of the Soviet economy, the techpromfinplan literally dictated life in the Soviet productive
enterprise, communicating expectations concerning output, finances, resource procurement, and
much more in the form of production targets, or “norms” (Berliner 1957: 20). Construction of the
plan was based on the reported capacity of individual firms, statistics which were aggregated on
the way up and disaggregated on the way down. Unfortunately, information problems were
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inevitable when working with data in such massive quantities, particularly considering the
potential for unplanned exigencies (Montias and Rose-Ackerman 1981: 54). In order to account
for this somewhat and to be more responsive to local needs in general, there was some room for
negotiation of the plan’s targets by enterprise managers (Berliner 1957: 18-19). Nevertheless,
enterprises were plagued with issues of resource scarcity, which made it difficult to keep
production lines moving (Powell 1977). Priority sectors – which usually meant military
production – were always kept well-supplied, while those sectors of lowest priority – which
usually meant consumer goods – were left to fend for themselves using the informal norms
discussed in the next chapter.
Continued growth of the economy was strict and often presented problems for managers.
Economic expansion was ensured as a basic part of the plan, with every iteration seeing an
increase in targets in what was known as the “Ratchet Principle;” the actual fulfillment of these
targets was incentivized by monetary benefits in what was known as the “Micawber Principle”
(Dyker 1981). These monetary incentives were called “premiums,” and the most important one
was that which was rewarded based on the fulfillment or overfulfillment of the gross output
target. This economic mechanism quickly became a central cause of the many contradictory
behaviors and informal activities of factory management (Berliner 1957), the nature of which
will be discussed when informal enterprise behaviors are described. These problems did not go
unrecognized, so the premium system underwent some revision in later years through the
“Kosygin Reforms,” discussed below.
The enterprise may have been the lowest official entity in the official Soviet economic
plan, but technically the household was one more step below it. Because its input (consumption)
and output (labor) remained largely uncontrolled by the state, the household remained outside the
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purview of the plan; yet it was no less important to the plan’s proper functioning. Under Stalin’s
administration, labor control was quite harsh. This was because of the high rate of turnover
observed in the USSR, an issue which continued to plague the union throughout the length of its
existence. Absenteeism (and even changing jobs without permission) was deterred using severe
penalties in the early 1930s, while during the war and after it became a criminal offense. This
slackened considerably shortly after Khrushchev came to power. In fact, the state often had a
difficult time allocating labor, using material and moral incentives to drive workers to certain
places and regions that needed it more than others (e.g., Siberia). Some groups, such as prisoners
or party officials, were subject to more direct forms of allocation, though.
Consumption issues in the USSR are well-known: goods shortages, long lines, terrible
product quality, and the occasional surplus in random goods. Indeed, the Soviet economic system
was based on planner rather than consumer preferences, meaning production followed the targets
dictated by the plan and its planners rather than by market forces. Luckily for the population,
food rationing stopped after Khrushchev’s administration reformed the agricultural sector and
increased food imports so that another famine would not plague the USSR in the time after
Stalin. This did not necessarily mean that the average Soviet citizen was very well off. Only as
one rose in the ranks of the party and/or state hierarchies did one get access to special stores,
luxurious homes, state-owned dachas, privileged services, and servants of all kinds, in addition
to better quality products for lower prices (when cost was an issue) (Simis 1982: 38-47); still,
consumption did increase, overall, under Khrushchev, as mentioned further in the chapter
regarding “destalinization.”
Better quality goods were available to the general public (via formal channels), but the
prices were high and the legal context somewhat murky. The markets where these goods were
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available were called Kolkhoz Markets, where the products of private farming plots were sold at
prices set by the market. Indeed, they were named after collective farms (as opposed to state
farms, or sovkhoz) where workers were permitted to own small plots of private land on which
they cultivated their own produce and livestock. However, many rural citizens also owned land,
and this “concession,” which was made early in the Soviet period to overcome agricultural
problems, had a significant impact on the planned economy, such that private agriculture
accounted for more than one quarter of agricultural output in the USSR by the 1970s (Wädekin
1973). However, these plots were frequently cared for using resources pilfered from the state,
and the Kolkhoz Markets often provided locations for black market activity. These activities will
be discussed at greater length below.
One major aspect of the Soviet economy was that “the founders of the Soviet planning
system in the late 1920s and early 1930s would feel quite at home with the contemporary Soviet
economic system” (Gregory and Stuart 1990: vii), a sentiment which was expressed late in the
Soviet period. Indeed, the “planned, socialist” economy of the USSR had changed little in its
basic structure throughout its roughly 70-year existence; however, changes in priorities and
resource allocation did occur, most famously observed in the “destalinization” efforts of
Khrushchev’s regime, though this should not be construed with serious systemic reforms
(Hanson 2003). During this time, also known as “The Thaw,” the economy was shifted to place
less emphasis on the military sector while focusing efforts on consumers through various
housing projects, agriculture reform, greater development of foreign trade, more open discussion
of economic issues, etc.
Indeed, most reforms that occurred under a given administration were cosmetic,
organizational, or a matter of resource priority. For example, in Stalin’s post-war administration,
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the People’s Commissars were renamed to Ministries (a “bourgeois” word) and throughout his
tenure the responsibilities of Gosplan were continuously tinkered with (Hanson 2003: 40-41).
More significant was the Sovnarkhoz reform under Khrushchev, which attempted to regionalize
the planning process through the development of Sovnarkhozy and the abandonment of the
centralized ministries, though whose significance was diminished substantially by its
abolishment under Brezhnev. Potentially more substantial (and disappointing) than this simple
organizational reform was Brezhnev’s attempted decentralization of the economy, which serves
as a keen example of failed economic reform in the USSR.
Known as the Kosygin reforms (led by Brezhnev’s chief economic official, Alexei
Kosygin), it was the culmination of an economic debate that began under Khrushchev and was
left to Brezhnev’s administration to decide due to the former’s ouster (see Goldman 1967 for
discussion of the debate). Its spirit is summarized best by Kosygin’s own words during the
speech in 1965 wherein he announced the plans: “We must give up the habit of thinking that in
the relations between controlling economic authorities and enterprises, the former have nothing
but rights and the latter have nothing but obligations” (Hanson 2003: 102). The reforms covered
a lot of ground, proposing to do away with most of the targets for production, changing the
primary success indicator to sales (from gross output), deriving bonuses entirely and investment
partially from profits, leaving much trade and investment decisions to the discretion of
enterprises, and reforming the price of goods to a unit-cost-plus system, among other policies.
While some other reforms, such as the reinstatement of the ministerial system and a new interest
rate on capital, were intended to centralize and discipline the economy somewhat, the Kosygin
reforms were intended to give enterprise managers more control, reactivity to markets, and
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hopefully do away with some problems concerning labor productivity, product quality, and other
negative managerial behaviors.
The results were unimpressive, resulting in many of the old indicators being reinstated or
otherwise never incorporated because the problems they aimed to fix remained present, such as
the wholesale ignorance by managers of product quality, a lack of labor economizing, and the
continued negotiation by managers for easier production targets, all behaviors discussed in the
following chapter. Further, the planning bureaucracy was generally uninterested in relinquishing
its power, which restricted what enterprise managers could do as well as what goods were still
available for purchase using profits earmarked for investment (Hanson 2003: 106). Indeed, the
system tended towards conservatism (Grossman 1962), preferring instead to preserve the status
quo and maintain its unique yet shaky equilibrium based on informal coordination and shadow
markets.
Almost as quickly as it was rolled out, the reforms were rolled back, a result consistent
with previous attempts and therefore highly predictable, even at the time of observation
(Goldman 1967). Even so, there was a steady “treadmill of reforms” whereby leaders continued
seeking a perfect balance between the command economy and decentralized economic decisionmaking with the hope of making managers’ jobs easier, planning more accurate, and informal
behaviors less prevalent; instead, they tended to have the unfortunate effect of making plans
more impossible to fulfill while keeping the economy more or less the same (Linz 1988).
Perhaps the only substantive reforms that could be counted as “permanent” was Gorbachev’s
glasnost and perestroika policies, which were implemented at the end of Soviet Union and as
such were incapable of being rolled back.
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Summary
Throughout its history, Russia has often been considered backwards by Western
commentators, despite attempts by its leaders to formalize, modernize, and industrialize the state,
particularly Peter and Catherine the Great. The country would repeatedly fall victim to traditional
systems of kinship and patronage, consistently diverting funds that perhaps could have been
better allocated elsewhere. Meanwhile, the peasantry, particularly those on the geographic
periphery, were often left behind in the context of state political and economic advancements.
These people would often see government officials for the strict purpose of paying tribute to
their state machine, and saw little to no representation in governing bodies, such as the zemstvos.
This resulted in some very disparate cultural developments between the lowest and the highest
classes, of which the former did not see much substantive changes in its institutions over an
extensive period of time.
As industrialization pushed forward, Russia continued to be late to modernize, which
resulted in military failures and domestic tension with various political groups. Reforms were
typically implemented slowly and cautiously, or otherwise partially, which was unaided by
conservative-minded elites that pushed back against change. This is perhaps best embodied by
the attempt to liberate the serfs and abolish feudalism, which was incomplete at best and changed
little to nothing at worst. Indeed, some aspects of modernization were considered a challenge to
the crown’s power, and dissent was often met with censorship or other strong repression
measures.
Protests and movements increased in frequency by the early 20th century, which would
eventually overwhelm the crown, leading to the end of the imperial age and the start of the
Soviet age. Yet the Soviets would continue to perpetuate the hierarchical, centralized tendencies
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of the Tsars, appearing to find difficulty in abandoning conservative attitudes. Because the
economy was now firmly under the grasp of the center, these conservative tendencies could now
extend to the economy as well, in contrast to the runaway economic modernization experienced
in the late Imperial era; many of the reform efforts of the communist party apparatus were, as
stated above, often “cosmetic, organizational, or a matter of resource priority,” or otherwise
rolled back entirely. Further, dissent was often punished strongly, with no better example being
Stalin’s purges (though many of the victims were not always dissenters, often finding themselves
arbitrarily labeled an “enemy of the people”). Although the effects of the purges undoubtedly
had an overwhelming impact on trust in society, an argument can be made that peasant
institutions like krugovaia poruka persisted through the transition to communism (Ledeneva
2006: 99-114).
Indeed, the informal institutions of Imperial Russia would not likely vanish entirely in the
context of the critical juncture represented by the revolutions, wars, and systemic changes that
marked the conversion to communism. Evidence of patrimonialism, corruption, self-interested
giving, and group solidarity can be found throughout both the Imperial and Soviet eras. Although
formal structures may change, from a practical standpoint, hundreds of years’ worth of cultural
developments cannot be wiped away so easily. We will continue to see these institutions
embodied in the remainder of the project, whether implicitly or explicitly, although I will try to
be explicit when such opportunities arise.
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CHAPTER IV: SOVIET RUSSIA
As the first major period of interest in my project, Soviet Russia can be understood as the
petri dish where many of the informal institutions of capitalist Russia have seen their genesis.
The institutions of Imperial Russia (discussed in the previous chapter) provided the contextual
framework that helped condition the institutions discussed over the course of the following
pages. However, these Soviet institutions are ultimately what finds more direct translations into
Russia’s capitalist context. The conversion from Soviet to post-Soviet institution is not always a
difficult stretch, either; the second economy of the Soviet Union, where many informal
institutions were practiced, in many ways resembled a more capitalist structure, where prices of
highly desired goods (both consumer and commercial) were dictated by demand instead of being
set by a centralized authority.
The chapter has been organized linearly from the top-down, starting with Soviet elites,
then moving on to factories and other enterprises, and finishing with the informal behaviors of
the Soviet citizenry. This also reflects the three institutions of interest: Patrimonialism and State
Corruption, Enterprise Survival Through Schemes and Influence, and The Pervasiveness of Blat
and Bribery Throughout the System. Despite being organized separately, these informal
institutions are deeply interwoven, and should be taken in their entirety to gain a full picture of
Soviet informal behaviors.
The structure of this chapter relies on several core books, as mentioned in the
methodology. In the section “Patrimonialism and State Corruption,” I relied heavily on
Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class, by Michael Voslensky, and USSR: The Corrupt Society,
by Konstantin Simis. In the section “Enterprise Survival Through Schemes and Influence,” I
relied heavily on Factory and Manager in the USSR by Joseph S. Berliner, and USSR: The
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Corrupt Society, by Konstantin S. Simis. Finally, in the section “The Pervasiveness of Blat and
Bribery Throughout the System,” I relied heavily on USSR: The Corrupt Society again, in
addition to the book Public and Private Life of the Soviet People by Vladimir Shlapentokh. For a
brief treatment of these texts, please see the Appendix.

Patrimonialism and State Corruption
The patrimonial aspects of the USSR’s political economy, while at times overly played
out, has great significance to how the system operated, and as such cannot be ignored. Far from a
concession to overly top-down theorists, however, the examination of these forces is crucial to
understanding how the system ties together at all levels, from the top to the bottom. While elites
exerted strong control, they were also capable of being controlled, to an extent, by managers and
those with the means to ply strategic influence. This is due to a common language of rentseeking and complex relationship-building that was (and, as I demonstrate later, continues to be)
shared by all members of the upper echelons of society.

Elite Control
For the duration of its existence, the Soviet Union was controlled by the party elite,
which exercised its power through both formal and informal tools. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, the informal structure of the Soviet hierarchies was so tied up with the formal structure
it becomes challenging to disaggregate the two. Yet this is perhaps misleading; it would be better
to say that the structure was predominantly formal, while much of the process by which this
structure functioned and self-perpetuated was predominantly informal, as will become apparent
below. Despite this complication, many if not all Soviet citizens recognized the informal rules
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and were guided by them in their daily lives, whether dictating their actions or inactions: “ways
and means of governing the huge superpower, and the rights and duties of its citizens, are
defined not by a constitution or any other written laws but by a whole body of unwritten laws,
which, although not published anywhere, are perfectly well known to all Soviet citizens and are
obeyed by them.” (Simis 1982: 24). Formal processes were still no doubt an important method of
control; but these concerns largely fall outside the scope of the present investigation.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Soviet and the Party Congress were the governmental
bodies officially at the top of the state and party hierarchies (respectively), the de facto highest
power in the Soviet Union was the Central Committee of the CPSU. More specifically, supreme
power rested in the Politburo and the Secretariat, both of which were contained within the greater
Central Committee structure. Again, because the party hierarchy was more powerful than the
state hierarchy, these bodies were not only the most powerful in the party but also the entire
USSR. In fact, many members of these organizations held dual roles in both the state and party
hierarchies, and members of the Politburo and the Secretariat were even more powerful than the
broader Central Committee apparat. The General Secretary was the head of the Secretariat, the
large personalities that we hear so much about today and by whom we tend to structure Soviet
History: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, etc. However, while these individuals were the highest
authority, they couldn’t make all decisions as a matter of practicality, and so had to rely on the
Politburo and Secretariat to make many of the day-to-day decisions. Although the Politburo was
technically higher in the Party hierarchy than the secretariat, the latter was overwhelmingly in
charge of the levers of power and thus capable of acting in its own capacity. One of the more
well-known conflicts was over Khrushchev’s ouster, an incident successfully conducted by the
secretariat. Another good example was when Stalin, at a time when General Secretary wasn’t
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synonymous with supreme power, outmaneuvered Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and
Rykov, all members of the Politburo.
These elites, among other privileged members of the CPSU, constituted a class of their
own known as the nomenklatura. Voslensky (1984) joins others in referring to it as a class unto
itself; however, it can also be understood as a system, given that the word directly translates from
the Latin word for “list, [or] index of names” (1). It is an accurate description, given the fact that
literal lists of personnel were drafted and used to furnish thousands of government and party
positions (Monty 2012), a process discussed in more detail below. These professional
bureaucrats benefitted heavily from their administrative monopoly in the USSR, bringing in a
disproportionate share of material wealth and privileges than the rest of society (Djilas 1957).
This class was known well by Soviet citizens due to their vastly different lifestyles and
privileges; yet their existence outside the union was closely guarded, since antagonism between
ruling and ruled classes is antithetical to the spirit of Marxism. Indeed, despite Soviet
propaganda that argued the contrary, this class was rarely concerned with the well-being of the
populace:
“[The Nomenklatura] loudly declared that communism represented the radiant future of mankind,
but in reality nothing interested them less than a society in which everyone would give according
to his capacity and receive according to his needs. If they had ever been faced with the prospect of
such a thing, the world would have been able to enjoy the fascinating spectacle of seeing the
communist leaders manning the barricades to fight communism or seeking refuge from the danger
of it in Switzerland.” (Voslensky 1984: 63-64).

The class as a whole seemed very much preoccupied with their own wealth, careers, and
prestige.
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Example: Election Tactics
One example of this was the way in which elections were handled, which was quite
undemocratic despite claims to the opposite by propaganda sources. A few aspects were
democratic, such as universal franchise for everyone over 18, secret and direct elections,
elections by simple majority, and opportunities for involvement at all stages of the process;
nevertheless, elections lacked many of the basic features of a democracy, starting with the rare
occurrence of multiple candidates on a ticket, which risked exposing a “lack of confidence” in
the candidates or preventing consensus decisions, a powerful ideological/propaganda tool
(Jacobs 1970). The norm of placing individual members of the nomenklatura into important
positions also had important implications on centralizing and retaining power, a practice that
famously began with Joseph Stalin. If elections were more open, it would have been much harder
for higher officials to place friends and family in positions of power, which helped immensely in
consolidating and retaining power (Willerton 1987). But this practice clearly also had an impact
on the way elections were held, not to mention the effects of the undemocratic cultural context of
imperial Russia and the Bolsheviks (Rigby 1964).
Becoming an elected official was a process that emphasized career ambition and political
position over qualifications. Lists were assembled beforehand based on “recommendations” from
other officials, which were subsequently narrowed down by a small number of party officials
who all but picked the single candidate for a given position (Jacobs 1970; Rigby 1964;
Voslensky 1984: 75-81). Indeed, the election process more closely resembled a popularity
contest between officials competing for the favor of their superiors, who themselves discussed
their candidates widely with other officials in order to share the responsibility of his (they were
usually men) candidacy, particularly if he ended up being absorbed in scandal(s). This also
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opened the door for widespread nepotism (Shlapentokh 1989: 207-208), another keen example of
the importance of loyalty over the proper qualifications of a candidate. Although elections
democratized somewhat over the years, many of the “Instructions” given on running elections
were overwhelmingly cosmetic, and generally served the needs of the nomenklatura before being
rolled back shortly after implementation (if the Instructions were followed in the first place),
resulting in no real changes to the electoral system (Löwenhardt 1989; Rigby 1964). The fluidity
of this system must not be overstated, though; it was far from perfect, and the sheer number of
posts that had to be filled could be overwhelming, causing significant amounts of trouble for the
administration, particularly in the early days of its implementation (Monty 2012).
Alternatively, informal shortcuts existed that allowed very wealthy individuals to directly
purchase positions of power for considerable sums, which were set based on factors such as
prestige and any substantial returns it offered on one’s investment. Konstantin Simis (1982)
details a case where an underground millionaire named Babunashvili “ordered” the position of
Minister of Light Industry. These positions could be very expensive, costing up to several
hundred thousand rubles (Montias and Rose-Ackerman 1981: 58); but it often wasn’t enough to
simply pay a lump sum to a single individual. Those who succeeded in the bidding wars for the
post were the ones who opened their pockets to a web of various officials, with special favor
granted to relatives and other familiar faces (Staats 1972: 43). Of course, smaller positions much
further down the hierarchy were also sold for smaller amounts of rubles (in the realm of several
thousands), and any position sold could come with additional conditions, such as splitting illegal
income or ensuring the anonymity of the seller (Kramer 1977: 219).
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Informal Rules and Benefits
This pay-to-play aspect of the electoral system is only one small example of the unique
goods and services money could purchase in the Soviet Union. Because of the strong hold the
nomenklatura exerted on the economy in particular and the country in general, paying the right
officials, in both party and state hierarchies, the right amount of money could afford significant
economic advantages. This system of patronage and widespread corruption existed over the
entire duration of the Soviet Union. It was anything but new, held over from the age of imperial
rule and continuing through the revolution and New Economic Policy (NEP) (Pujals 2001). By
the time Stalin had died, a vast web of patron-client relationships in the Soviet Union had been
set in motion (Berliner 1957; Cohn 2013; Hanson 2003:43-45; Heinzen 2013) and which
remained in motion until its final years (Duhamel 2000, 2004; Willerton 1987), even intensifying
as the bureaucracy continued to age (Clark 1993: 27-28, 71; Millar 1985). The rules that
governed this system were naturally informal, circumventing the constitution and many of the
official decrees ordered by the higher party echelons. Schwartz (1979) attempts to codify some
of these rules, and he delineates a number of them, such as: party interests have supremacy over
legal interests; as long as it produces results, it is tolerated; taking personal property is more
acceptable than taking state property; and large, conspicuous gains risk falling into an illegal
form of corruption (430-431).
One application of these informal rules, and a keen example of patron-client
relationships, involves the practice by local Soviet leaders of extracting goods and services from
their jurisdictions, best characterized in the concept of official “mafias” (Shlapentokh 1989: 205207; Simis 1982: 65; Vaksberg 1991). In more metropolitan areas, elites had access to a wide
variety of formal benefits, such as private shops, hospitals, cafeterias, waiting rooms, schools,
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and transportation, as well as free dachas, servants, cars, enormous apartments, etc. In the case of
the former, goods and services were better and cost less than goods at non-elite stores, while in
the case of the latter, such assets were technically owned by the state and so were technically on
lease to officials. This resulted in significant “ruble-inequality” between the privileged elite and
common citizens (Guseva 2007: 338-339), and as one’s prestige increased, the benefits only got
better. Meanwhile, in less populous, rural areas, local elites needed to flex whatever power they
had in order to make up for the significant lack of goods and services. The resources available to
them depended entirely on what was produced in their locale, and included free food, cars,
clothing, labor and materials for their home/dacha, housework, restaurant visits, or even just cash
(Grossman 1983: 82-83). The number and complexity of these practices was limited only by the
ingenuity of officials, and permeated all levels of government (Vaksberg 1991). However,
official accounts of this mafia-like behavior tended to be scarce, as it was not taken seriously by
the party or government (Schwartz 1979: 436).
While there were risks involved in participating in corrupt acts like those described
above, officials could be quite confident that their behavior would not result in any serious
punishment. Initiatives and decrees existed that detailed what was considered unacceptable by
the party, yet these efforts were themselves limited by bribery, collusion, and the ability of the
politically powerful to place limits on the reach of the KGB and the court system (Kramer 1977:
221-223; Duhamel 2004), as well as the press (Vaksberg 1991). Indeed, officials were very well
protected, using solidarity and their myriad connections (quite in the spirit of the historical
institution of joint-responsibility (Ledeneva 1998: 43)) to freeze the justice system when it suited
their needs. Glasnost under Gorbachev was therefore a powerful force that broke up a number of
local official mafias, since the press was finally able to increase the volume of articles published
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on this kind of activity without facing reprimand or undue influence (Shlapentokh 1989: 206).
The party had their reasons for preventing public spectacles from reaching the public eye, such
as the protection of important individuals (e.g., factory managers, highly placed officials) or of
the general reputation of the party (Lampert 1985: 46-47), which resulted in the appearance of
lazy or intrusive party officials in court cases within their jurisdictions (Cohn 2013). In cases
where officials did face reprimand, as in those where they risked becoming full-scale scandals,
officials (and, in general, well-connected members of the party) often got off easily, in many
cases simply finding themselves reassigned to another district, province, or town. Corruption
charges could also be wielded as political weapons by adversaries, in which case the proceedings
played out like gang warfare. Indeed, “in a system where politics governs the law, the
nomenklatura will sacrifice one of their own not because a specific law requires it but only if the
balance of political forces at that particular moment does” (Vaksberg 1991: 48).
Many of these corrupt and mafia-like activities were undoubtedly driven by selfaggrandizement and greed; however, many of them also constituted a non-trivial part of the
Soviet informal economic system, or “second economy.” For one, officials often protected the
people who ran local factories and businesses who needed to circumvent the law in their efforts
to meet quotas set by GOSPLAN. In the case of local resource extraction, it can be argued that
the officials who partook in this were required to look the other way; if they did not, the missing
resources could not be accounted for, factories would fail to meet the figures set by GOSPLAN,
and the result would be penalties which would make it more difficult for officials to continue
taking what they needed. Of course, those who refused to hand over their “tribute” often met
with trouble; and in some cases, such as Simis’ example of the Romanov family and their control
over a small town’s timber operation (pp. 86-94), local elites could be categorically inimical. As
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such, it would be apt to describe these activities as racketeering or extortion, a term which all too
accurately accompanies the idea of local elites as part of a mafia. But aside from interacting with
enterprises, corruption frequently allowed average citizens to “grease the wheels” of the
bureaucracy and get things done that, if attempted according to formal protocol, might result in
severely long waits or otherwise the complete denial of certain permits, licenses, etc. These are
just a few of the ways in which this institution (or elite “corruption”) ties into the other
institutions of interest to my investigation.
This system of graft that kept economic actors of all kinds well supplied and protected
from punishment was important for efficiency and potentially even the continued existence of
the Soviet system. Yet simply calling it graft is perhaps misleading; from a more Western, hardline view, these activities are most certainly corruption of the highest level, as a “trusted” public
official is exploiting their office for personal gain. However, a subtler perspective reveals a series
of interconnected relationships that, while personally beneficial, represents an exchange that
aims to circumvent tedious bureaucratic red tape and cumbersome systems of distribution, thus
allowing a second economy to flourish, businesses and factories to keep afloat, and underground
millionaires to continue operating. The following sections will continue to build upon this theme,
revealing the pervasive importance of these personal ties and how they fit into the rest of the
informal system.

Enterprise Survival Through Schemes and Influence
Moving from the upper echelons of Soviet society to more meso-level operations,
enterprises and how they navigated the command economy becomes more relevant.
Understanding how elite informality functioned provides important context for appreciating the
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interplay between business and political interests; close informal cooperation between factory
managers and political elites was crucial for meeting the requirements of Gosplan, as I
demonstrate below. It also meant that managers were able to keep their jobs, and remain in the
good graces of the officials in charge of their corner of the economy. Further, it proves how the
Soviet economy was not a strictly top-down system. Informal negotiations with political elites
demonstrated the multi-polarity of the system, particularly in the case of increasingly illegal
operations. The right connections to the right people could create incredibly lucrative business
opportunities, but high returns came with high risks, such as prison or death.
Before presenting my research findings, it is important to begin this section by first
readdressing the historical point that the Soviet Union endured very little substantive change to
its economic system over the course of its existence. As discussed at the end of the final section
of the last chapter, any lasting “changes” effected on the economy by the country’s leaders could
be said to be of a nature more “technical rather than fundamental, involving such matters as new
success indicators or revised planning procedures” (Berliner 1988: 97). Previously, the Kosygin
reforms were mentioned, and how they were dialed back shortly after their partial
implementation, in addition to Khrushchev’s unpopular Sovnarkhozy. Other reforms endured
similar fates, such as the 1979 joint decree “On the Improvement of Planning and the
Strengthening of the Action of the Economic Mechanism on the Raising of Effectiveness of
Production and the Quality of Work” (Hanson 1983) and the “Large-Scale Experiment” of 1984
(Taga 1989). Even the introduction of computer-based information systems was unsuccessful,
despite their obvious benefits (McHenry and Goodman 1986). Smaller-scale reforms that
targeted the informal behaviors discussed below were never effective for too long either, as
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economic actors either regained their confidence or found ways around the new regulations (for
example, see Berliner 1957: 223).
Further support for this historical point is provided throughout the length of the section;
citations with later publication dates are favored over earlier ones, primarily because one of the
books on which this section is based (i.e., Berliner 1957) demonstrates quite overwhelmingly
that these institutions existed during Stalin’s tenure. Regardless, the historical argument is not
intended to demonstrate constant levels of these institutions’ enactment over the course of
history. The various informal norms and networks presented in this case likely underwent
changes based on transitions between - and perhaps within - particular administrations. Informal
behaviors were less likely under Stalin, due to mass repression and coercion, while it has been
described as reaching a zenith during Brezhnev’s tenure (Millar 1985; Shlapentokh 1989: 14).
Unfortunately, measuring precise changes in the use of these institutions falls outside the scope
of this project, and would likely require the rigorous use of primary resources such as newspaper
articles and police files from the Soviet archive in addition to secondary sources (see Harrison
2011 and Sokolov [1989] 2014 for examples of the difficulty of this research).
Another important point to address is that the informal behaviors and institutions
summarized below might not perfectly reflect behavior in all sectors of the economy. It is
understood that every enterprise was unique based on the products they produced, the ministry
that ran them, and the personalities that populated their offices and shops. Nevertheless, certain
patterns and themes emerged from the research conducted on Soviet enterprises, making it
possible to generalize somewhat and discuss their management at a broad level of analysis.
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Incentives for Breaking the Rules
Survival of the Soviet firm and the success of those who worked there quite thoroughly
depended on the illegal and semi-legal decisions of its managers. Those who refused to
participate seldom lasted long in business, barring exceptional circumstances. At the most basic
level, attempts to follow in full the overwhelming number of instructions ordered from higher
party organs would have been overly burdensome if not entirely impossible (Granick 1979: 156162). However, a better-known motive behind informal behavior was the notoriously inefficient
way in which materials were procured and orders were fulfilled, which in turn demanded a
secondary market for supplies when materials crucial to production were inevitably delayed or
never showed up (Powell 1977; Shleifer and Vishny 1992). A related concern was how planners
could not physically account for every possible production issue, such as machine breakdowns,
seasonal production considerations, employee turnover, etc. (Linz 1988: 54-55). The chronic
atmosphere of scarcity was only compounded by the priority placed on the military and industrial
over consumer goods (Hanson 2003; Kachmarsky 1987) as well as the imperfect transference of
information up and down the party-government hierarchy (Hanson 2003: 16-18; Montias and
Rose-Ackerman 1981: 54). Indeed, information problems were one of the significant weaknesses
of the Soviet Union, and the “Ratchet Principle,” which forced an increase in the targets of
consecutive plans, was one of the mechanisms that attempted to overcome this problem (Dyker
1981: 125). Another was the aggregation of information on the way up the hierarchy and the
subsequent disaggregation of information when plans made their way back down (Hanson 2003:
18).
Monetary incentives were also a strong factor in decisions to flout the law. Premiums
were rewarded based on the successful fulfillment of targets set by the plan, and made up a large
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portion of management’s income. The most money was rewarded for meeting or exceeding the
targets for gross output, whose measurement was based on anything from market value to
weight, quantity, etc. (Nove 1958: 4-5). Targets for other goals also existed, such as economy of
materials, goods assortment, profit margins, etc., and these allowed those officials placed lower
in the management hierarchy a chance to earn similar amounts as their superiors, whose
premiums were greater. Not meeting these goals, even by marginal amounts, meant completely
forgoing any specified premiums, which placed it in direct contradiction to the Ratchet Principle
until the former began reform in 1965 as part of the Kosygin reforms (Dyker 1981: 126). This is
because the premium system incentivized overfulfillment by offering more money for more
product, while the Ratchet Principle incentivized underfulfillment by offering lower targets for
the following year. Thus, before 1965, enterprise managers played a balancing game where they
tried to overfulfill their targets slightly so they might benefit from increased premiums, while
making sure not to go so far over that the next plan’s targets became impossible to achieve
(Dyker 1981; Gregory and Stuart 1990: 212). After 1965, overfulfillment was deemphasized
somewhat as planning officials reduced the amount of money available for paying out bonuses in
addition to enacting fines for plan overfulfillment on particular goods in certain sectors (Dyker
1981: 126).
Aside from a potentially severe pay cut, not meeting the gross output target had further
implications that made it the most important facet of the techpromfinplan. Failing to meet
production targets reflected poorly on the enterprise, since its fulfillment was generally used as a
gauge of success. And a manager who consistently underperformed risked termination,
potentially finding themselves making considerably less in a more terrible job, particularly if
they lacked party membership. Additionally, although the law relaxed considerably after
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Khrushchev came to power, failing to meet certain targets during Stalin’s tenure could mean
arrest and prison time (Berliner 1957: 155; Hosking 2011: 475; Lampert 1984: 369).
Nevertheless, the premium was the most powerful motivator in the Soviet enterprise, whose
pursuit arguably even subsumed other non-monetary goals, such as the desire for power,
prestige, or even the satisfaction of a job well done (see Berliner 1957, chapter 4 for more
details).

Management Behaviors
The previously mentioned contradiction between the Ratchet Principle and the premium
incentive resulted in a peculiar number of behaviors on the part of enterprise managers. Briefly
mentioned in the formal structure section in chapter 3 was the process by which managers
negotiated the targets of the plan, which had the benefit of making the plan more reactive to local
concerns. However, managers often took advantage of this system by deliberately understating
their enterprise’s productive capacity, thus giving them an advantage when bargaining for lower
targets that make the plan easier to fulfill (Harrison 2011: 51; Nove 1977: 99-108).
Berliner called this the “safety factor,” and it encompasses other behaviors as well. One
of these behaviors was the tendency for managers to over-inflate the amount of productive input
they need on their official “statements of requirements” (zaiavka) so that they might have extra
materials for when a shipment was delayed or lost, or for when unplanned exigencies arose (Linz
1988: 71-75). Another behavior was where enterprises accepted shipments of materials they did
not need in their production, hoping they could be substituted for missing inputs or at least traded
with other enterprises for materials they actually needed, or else simply sold off for extra cash
(Powell 1977: 63-64). These two behaviors often resulted in hoarding (Gregory and Stuart 1990:

85

213), and managers frequently kept these hidden reserves of supplies for such an extended period
of time that they rusted, deteriorated, or otherwise expired (Sokolov 2014 [1989]: 654). Indeed,
the Soviet economy could be very wasteful; but by ensuring they had a safe gap between the
firm’s productive capacity and the plan targets, managers could feel confident enough to
overfulfill their quotas or simply have the means to account for unplanned exigencies (Spulber
1962: 59-60).
Unfortunately, finding information about this behavior outside of Berliner’s treatment of
it proved difficult. This was possibly due in part to the decreasing prevalence of the practice
throughout the course of the Soviet period, or at least its stricter management over time by Soviet
officials looking to curb its use (Linz 1988: 71-75), thus keeping materials circulating through
the legal economy. More likely, it is because the practice was very effective and easily
concealed, resulting in very few reports and thus less coverage in Pravda, the national
newspaper, or records in Soviet archives (Harrison 2011: 51).
Obsession with the gross output target frequently resulted in several last-minute
“desperation” tactics being employed. Among the most infamous of these was the act of
“storming,” whereby managers would have employees work frantically in the final days before a
plan (typically the monthly plan) was expected to be met (Granick 1979: 267-270). While quite
benign considering the other strategies managers employed, the cost of keeping employees
overtime often placed a strain on budgets, in addition to sacrifices in the quality of goods,
unpredictable deliveries, etc. (Berliner 1956; Gregory and Stuart 1990: 213). More heavily
criticized was when managers would sacrifice other plan targets for the good of gross output,
which usually meant a serious decline in product quality (Gorlin 1981) or the assortment of
goods (Nove 1977: 93-96). For example, if the gross output target was measured based on
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weight, then it made logical sense for a manager to produce an excessive number of heavy
products; if a shoe factory was expected to make a certain number of different sizes, a manager
might instead opt to produce an abundance of shoes in only one size so the factory doesn’t have
to change machine specifications, which would result in production downtime. This behavior
could get managers into serious trouble if the products they were short-changing were intended
for high-profile customers in the case of formal inter-enterprise trading (for more details about
this formal practice, see Kroll 1988). In contracts with less important customers, this was
typically a beneficial tradeoff even if it resulted in a lawsuit or fines (Nove 1977: 109-110); but
if the customer was well-connected or otherwise politically important, the cheating manager
could find themselves swarmed with inspectors and high officials. Although it was a perpetual
risk, managers tended to have a shrewd nose for people who might get them in trouble as a
matter of occupational survival.
The most dangerous and illicit method by which a manager might have made up for lastminute product shortages was report falsification (pripiski). Because of the severe nature of this
economic crime, which could mean the death penalty or significant prison time in high quantities
and in certain sectors (see Feldbrugge 1984 for examples), it was usually employed when only
marginal quantities of goods were at stake. In other words, if the manager fulfilled up to 99% of
the gross output target, there was usually no problem fudging the number to simulate fulfillment,
making it a very tempting and thus quite widespread behavior (Shenfield 1983; Sokolov 2014
[1989]). In such cases, managers tried to make up for this deficit during the next planning period,
essentially borrowing output from the future or even making promises to buyers in contractual
obligations in what can be considered “work-in-progress” fraud (Harrison 2011: 51-52).
However, if a plant began to consistently lag or their falsification was too large, they could find
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themselves “chasing” the deficit, at which point they risked attracting the attention of authorities.
Aside from exaggerating fulfillment, though, a manager might have also sought to simulate
underfulfillment, perhaps for the purpose of receiving a lower target during the next planning
period (and thus ensuring a safety factor) (Kramer 1977: 218) or to draw suspicion away from a
manager in the event that their enterprise was performing too well. If enough people were
involved in a report falsification scheme, however, significantly larger deceptions were possible,
albeit with greater risks (Harrison 2011; Vaksberg 1991: 113-115).
All the above examples of pripiski share the nature of falsification of output; however,
input was also falsified, such as when managers needed extra materials for a particular task and
would shuffle their accounts to make it look like it went somewhere else. By cleverly
misrepresenting their inputs in such a way, managers could bypass budgetary restraints or meet
resource economizing targets. Labor and wages were the most frequent targets of this behavior,
allowing managers to cover overtime wages from storming or even using trucks and workers to
obtain resources (Powell 1977: 64), largely in ways described below. There was also the practice
of employing “dead souls,” fake workers that managers would put on the books in order to make
extra income for either personal reasons or as a safety factor (Katsenelinboigen and Levine 1977:
65; Shelley 1989: 17). Other examples tend to cross over with the practices involved in securing
a safety factor, such as the aforementioned use of overstated zaiavka.
Perhaps the most common strategy a manager could employ to answer the distribution
problems of the formal economy was to employ strategic influence (blat) or to obtain goods and
resources nalevo (lit. on the left, or under the table). Many of the behaviors described above
could not take place without ingratiating oneself with the proper authorities, although a mutual
interest in the fulfillment of the plan could also secure cooperation. Most if not all enterprises
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had some kind of party authority working directly within the confines of the enterprise (Nove
1977: 112-113), necessitating good intra-enterprise relationships. Of course, external
relationships were also important due to the implications they had in the procurement of material
input; a good relationship with the ministry came with a chance of receiving unplanned
materials, and could also mean lower targets when the next plan came in (Gregory 1990: 49-51;
Sampson 1987: 128). Good relations with other factories were also important, particularly large
ones that produced goods or raw materials the enterprise needed. While this point is somewhat
self-evident, larger factories were also better able to supply larger amounts of supplies without
being caught due to economies of scale, making a relationship between a large and a small firm
very crucial. Blat could even be employed to make sure a shipment showed up on time, in the
right quantity, or of the right quality (Nove 1977: 100-101). And if a manager received
competing bids for their products or raw materials, blat was often a deciding factor on who
received priority. In the event an enterprise couldn’t get what they needed through officials or
other enterprises, a final option was to obtain materials “on the market.” This wasn’t the most
desirable way to procure resources, since the goods were usually stolen (Grossman 1983: 82) and
thus very expensive, purchased at full market price and typically accompanied by a bribe.
Of course, if managers performed all the relational work themselves, they would have no
time to run their enterprise. One option was to send out various employees to make these deals,
usually the more charismatic ones in departments where they could make an extensive business
trip without being missed. The other option was to hire someone to do it, and these people were
known as tolkachi. A tolkach (lit. to push/jostle) spent most of their time out in the world looking
for supplies the manager of their hiring enterprise needed (Dyker 1981; Kachmarsky 1987: 3031). In some cases, they even had offices in places like Moscow or in large factories where they
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made frequent “transactions” (Kramer 1977: 217). They needed to be personable, good at
making deals with strangers, and skilled at holding their liquor. The job was risky but came with
significant benefits, such as the frequent opportunity to travel to nice places like Moscow in
addition to a fat paycheck (Fitzpatrick 2000: 175). Indeed, tolkachi usually held onto a large
wallet so they might grease palms and ply their influence whenever or wherever it was needed,
and hiding this stream of money was another important use of pripiski. The larger enterprises
were even capable of hiring their own veritable armies of tolkachi, who might themselves hire
their own underlings. The importance and ubiquity of this occupation could be observed in the
bottlenecks that occurred in popular locations, such as oil plants and supply warehouses, where a
glut of these agents could put stress on their daily operations.
Yet despite how useful the tolkachi and the various other informal behaviors were for
individual enterprises, it can be questioned whether their use was truly efficient in a centrallyadministered economy. Indeed, at a glance it might seem that in most cases the movement of
materials away from one buyer and towards another who has applied the appropriate blat would
be unbalancing to the already precarious techpromfinplan, particularly in the case of difficult
plan targets (Montias and Rose-Ackerman 1981: 56-57). In fact, more in-depth studies would tell
us that, while not all managerial activity always tended towards efficiency, and perfect efficiency
was very unlikely, actions taken by management never upset the economy in a way that was
disastrous; instead, these activities were more likely to keep allocative efficiency relatively high
or, at least, correct dangerous levels of misallocation in the plan (Ericson 1983; Powell 1977).
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Individually Corrupt Behaviors
Up to this point, we have seen that the various schemes that comprised the second
economy and informal enterprise behavior provided relief for many of the problems of the legal
economy - such as scarcity, taut planning, overbearing officials, etc. - while also contributing to
the efficiency of the legal economy. Thus, while the behaviors were still illegal per the rule of
law, economic officials typically tolerated them because they recognized these benefits. In many
cases, the more beneficial of the informal behaviors were even encouraged by higher party and
governmental officials who equally stood to benefit from the results (Feldbrugge 1984).
Regardless, more extensive activities involving a lot of money and people had more channels
through which information might leak, making larger operations more likely to end in arrest and
an article in Pravda, the state newspaper (Harrison 2011). Factors that mitigate the potential for
punishment include those behaviors which take place on a smaller scale, with better
connected/higher officials, and in republics with more extensive networks, most notably those
located in the Caucasus (Feldbrugge 1984; Scott 2016). Individuals could also find themselves
facing punishment on the grounds of informal economic behaviors if they invoked the ire of
party officials. Regardless of whether the incident was related to economic crime, compromising
information of the sort could be easily obtained and used against enterprise management who
stepped out of line and caused problems for local administrators (Simis 1982: 65-68).
Another aspect of these behaviors which determines whether officials decided on
punishment was the difference between individual and organizational/bureaucratic corruption.
Most, if not all, of the activities described in this section thus far were typically performed under
the umbrella of organizational corruption, which involves activities carried out for the sake of the
organization which the actor in question belongs to (Kramer 1977; Montias and Rose-Ackerman
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1981: 55-59). However, several of these organizationally-oriented behaviors could be turned
towards personal gain as well, such as the use of “dead souls” to line a manager’s pockets, which
serves as an example of the safety factor turned towards personal benefit (Katsenelinboigen and
Levine 1977: 65); or the use of one’s position in an important industry, such as automobile
manufacturing, to profit from excess demand via blat and other black market relations (Kramer
1977: 216).
There were also a number of economic crimes geared specifically towards individual
benefit, some of the most prominent being employee theft, speculation, underground factories,
and bribery. These crimes were considered some of the worst in the union per the rule of law,
and could even result in a death sentence if the misconduct was egregious enough (Kline 1965).
Indeed, while crimes that benefitted the legal economy were more often tolerated than punished,
the opposite could be said of those accused of crimes geared specifically towards personal gain
(Felbrugge 1984). Employee theft was incredibly widespread, as workers and managers alike
stole materials, food, tools, etc. that they used for their own personal gain or for sale on the black
market (Grossman 1983: 82). In the case of enterprise managers, the capacity for theft was
greater because of their ability to underreport output and divert the remainder for personal
consumption or sale on the black market (Shenfield 1983: 246). Speculation was essentially the
Soviet term for arbitrage, as it constituted the illegal trade of commodities for higher prices than
they were purchased for. This could entail anything from clothing to food, and even foreign
currency (Grossman 1983: 83).
Perhaps the most intricate and lucrative of the personal corruption behaviors was the
establishment of underground private factories. These factories were usually found hidden within
perfectly legal state-owned factories, which made for excellent cover (Sampson 1987: 129-130).
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However, the costs to start up these operations were prohibitive, capable of costing upwards of
150,000-200,000 rubles, unless the individual had personal connections that allowed for either an
inexpensive takeover or simply a position in a friend or family member’s business (Simis 1982).
If such an investment was manageable, then it was hardly a problem to make the money back
with significant profits. The products these factories sold were typically consumer goods in high
demand, such as clothing, CDs, pierogi, etc., (Grossman 1983: 83) and as such producers could
set their own prices, often very high to reflect the desirability of their wares. In fact, managers of
these factories were capable of making too much money, making it very hard to hide their
earnings from the DCMSP (Department to Combat the Misappropriation of Socialist Property),
resulting in clever schemes to buy winning lottery tickets, foreign currency, or simply hiding it in
the walls. These factories had their own informal rules, structures, and even arbitrated tribunals,
assuming enough trusted members of the underground factory network could be procured (for
more details, see Simis 1982, chapter 6).
The final form of individual corruption that was mentioned – bribery – is a more
complicated idea than it seems at first glance. Many authors use the word bribery to encompass a
wide range of phenomena, and thus appear to attach negative, western connotations to the subject
(for examples, see: Grossman 1983; Heinzen 2007; Montias and Rose-Ackerman 1981; Simis
1982). However, there has been resistance to this assumption amongst authors who discuss the
potential differences between bribery and blat. Berliner (1957: 191-197) was an early author in
the discussion of differences between the two, contrasting the impersonal, one-time, monetary
exchange of a bribe to the friendly, ongoing, and in-kind exchanges of blat. A bribe was
exceedingly dangerous in the USSR because of the severe criminal penalties it could engender.
Meanwhile, blat relationships were vaguer and difficult to punish because 1) they were not
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referenced in criminal law, 2) they typically took the form of a bartered exchange, involving a
“gift,” or service in-kind, and 3) it was defined by an ongoing relationship, even though it may
have been itself mediated through blat circles. Indeed, blat can even be said to mediate the (less
common) act of bribery, because it provides an avenue through which connections can be made,
trust can be established, and an appropriate bribe amount can be determined (Ledeneva 1998: 3942).
While there may have been some obvious moral issues concerning these individuallybased behaviors, and even concerning the organizationally-oriented ones, they were nonetheless
responses to the inefficiencies of the legal, planned, centrally-organized economy. Goods
pilfered from the state and produced by underground, private factories made up those that
managers and consumers alike found on the black market through speculators and other private
citizens. Meanwhile, underground factories were responding to shortages with their own
production, and they were also capable of being responsive to fashion trends, unlike the
bureaucratically administered state factories which were bound to plans that could not take into
account the fluctuations of taste. This, while considering how pervasive blat can be, would seem
to imply that the benefits of these arrangements created an air of moral ambiguity to the
functioning of the underground markets, making an interpretive issue out of charging individuals
with economic crimes. Another way of putting it may be to understand corruption as in the eye
of the beholder; what could be considered corruption by one individual could be considered a
matter of efficiency, problem-solving, or even survival. There was a legitimate tension, though,
between permitting a functioning second economy and the continued maintenance of socialist
ideology (Brezinski 1985). The various “markets” of the illegal and semi-legal underground
were quite capitalist in form and function (Katsenelinboigen 1977) and, as previously mentioned,
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quite efficient; yet its decentralized, autarkic structure was directly contradictory to the planned
and centrally commanded structure of the communist first economy.
As we arrive close to the conclusion of the Soviet Russian discussion, there is one more
institution to address in its own terms. Although I have already addressed the importance of blat
in both administration and industry, it is important to understand how it also pervades the
consumer culture of average Soviet citizens. This last step has strong theoretical implications
concerning the ubiquity of informal norms and the second economy, thus lending support to the
argument that the Soviet Union may not have just been beset by these behaviors; it can be said to
have been characterized by them.

The Pervasiveness of Blat and Bribery Throughout the System
Throughout the course of the project, I have conveyed many of the ways in which the
illegal and semi-legal activities that constituted Soviet informal behavior found expression.
Prospective officials cozied up to their superiors for nondemocratic promotions, while other
positions were sold off to the highest (and often friendliest) bidders; factory managers acquired
resources from shady sources and lied about their production numbers in order to earn their
premiums; and everything was cushioned by greasing the palms of the relevant officials, police,
and judges who looked the other way or otherwise already condoned these actions, either for the
good of the primary economy or because of the lucrative opportunities such informal contracts
bestowed. Yet these activities hardly broached the tip of the iceberg – every day, average Soviet
citizens had to pay bribes, make use of blat networks, and earn unofficial incomes in order to
make ends meet on an almost daily basis. This further supports my contention that power and
influence was more multi-polar than it may appear on the surface; all Soviet citizens had to flout
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the law at some point in order to make ends meet, and the resources of the state were often
employed in these endeavors.

Micro-Level Behaviors
The second economy of consumer goods in particular thrived because of the
distributional problems and scarcity that came with the broken planning system. Employees at
virtually every kind of store held the best and most highly sought after products either behind the
counter or in a back room, where only those who were willing to pay a specially “marked-up”
price were able to access them (Grossman 1983: 82-83; Shelley 1989: 15; Smith 1983: 87-88,
93-94). Knowing the employees at a store personally or through a friend made establishing
oneself as this kind of customer a lot simpler, though striking a delicate conversation was also
adequate for gaining access to these goods. Normal customers were often taken advantage of.
They could end up being forced to pay high-quality prices for low-quality goods, or paying more
for less where goods are sold by weight, such as meat and produce (Belikova and Shokhin 1989:
59). The latter case was made possible by tampering with scales so that measurements read
higher than they actually were, giving the appearance that the customer was getting the full
amount they were promised. Employees had little option but to engage in these practices; they
were often themselves extorted for money by their bosses, who had to pay bribes to all kinds of
people so that their business could simply function, such as delivery drivers, repairmen, supply
factories/depots, local party officials, etc. (Katsenelinboigen 1977: 76-77). Of course, however,
with so much money flowing through these channels, the temptation to take more than is
necessary and skim off the top for personal gain was overwhelming.
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Less formal routes were also available for certain goods. These goods could be found in
various kinds of markets, such as the Kolkhoz markets, where produce from individual personal
farming plots were sold (Grossman 1983: 80), in various informal “flea markets,” or even the
private homes of individual speculators (Katsenelinboigen 1977), though the locations where one
could purchase these goods nalevo varied drastically (Smith 1983: 94). At these locations, goods
were sold more or less at market equilibrium prices, as determined by the forces of supply and
demand plus the risk involved in procurement. In Irina Corten’s Vocabulary of Soviet Society
and Culture (1992), such black marketeers could be seen going by many different names. In
particular, there seem to be many words for those who plied their trade in clothing, like utiúg
(from late 1970s, a dealer of domestic clothing), firmách (from 1960s, foreign clothes dealers),
and mazhór (from 1970s, dealers in particular foreign country’s clothing). Other words for
different kinds of speculators include fartsóvshchik, who buy and sell illegal foreign goods,
valiútchik, which were foreign currency speculators, and gámshchik, who were adolescents that
sold souvenirs in exchange for small foreign-made goods like gum (from which the name is
derived), cigarettes, and ballpoint pens. Foreign-made goods of all kinds were usually either
obtained from tourists willing to part with their luggage or through Soviet citizens whose jobs
took them out of the country (Belikova and Shokhin 1989: 53-54). Domestic goods were most
often pilfered from factories, shops, farms, etc, although foreign goods could also be pilfered
from legal stores where they were sold.
Underground markets extended beyond just consumer goods. Services were rendered
differently in exchange for money or gifts, particularly in education and health care. Both were
supposed to be guaranteed to every citizen at no cost, but there is plenty of evidence that refusing
to pay extra could result in poor grades or withheld medicine. Being accepted into higher
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education institutions required paying off the right people, who would issue the results of
qualifying exams based on the highest bidders and most important people (Vaksberg 1991: 1516). And because of doctors’ busy schedules, they were not able to see patients for more than 15
minutes unless some extra incentive was offered (Simes 1975: 46-47). The health care sector was
so strapped for resources, that access to most medications was difficult, if not impossible, unless
influence was plied in the right direction. Simis (1982) described a story where his wife broke
her collarbone while on a business trip to another republic and had to rely on the poor services
there (223-225). When she finally got home and was able to see a doctor within her blat network,
he remarked that, had she waited another week, she might not have moved her arm ever again.
Indeed, there was hardly a good or service in the Soviet Union that remained untouched
by the second economy by the time the system collapsed, whether it was transportation, funeral
services, culture, or vacations: “It is impossible in one book to write about all facets of the life of
a Soviet citizen and all the situations in which he is compelled to resort to corrupt practices”
(Simis 1982: 247); and “the enormous variety and occasional complexity of illegal and semilegal
activities in production and distribution […] appear to be limited only by human ingenuity,
though, naturally, the most ingenious […] tend to escape identification by Soviet authorities and
detached observer alike” (Grossman 1983: 82).
It was not inexpensive to operate in the second economy. All of the gifts and tips that
were offered to the various purveyors of illegal goods and services were typically paid on top of
the official price, if not in kind with future illicit promises in the spirit of reciprocity. In order to
make up the difference - for the official wage was quite low - Soviet citizens who participated in
the second economy often used their jobs to make extra money on the side. Teachers tutored
(Smith 1983: 97), freelance construction workers took on extra contracts (shabashniki) (Shelley
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1989: 16; Simes 1975: 50), taxi drivers performed extra services beyond what was expected (and
allowed) of them (Millar 1985: 698), and employees of all stripes took whatever they could from
their workplace. Some of these extra-state jobs became acceptable under Brezhnev, like tutoring
and repair work, making it impossible for the administration to retreat from these practices later,
as Gorbachev attempted.
Special mention should be made of employee theft, which grew into a very serious
problem: “There is much evidence to suggest pilfering from Soviet enterprises and offices has
become a sort of national sport” (Shlapentokh 1989: 214). Stolen goods, as previously
mentioned, made up a significant part of the inventory of private speculators/black marketeers
(Grossman 1983). It was quite common for citizens to look for work in the Soviet Union based
on what they could take and what kind of benefits they could extract for use in the second
economy. If you could promise someone hard-to-get tickets to a show or another part of the
country, you could find yourself being compensated with rare or foreign gifts. There was very
little social stigma in stealing from the state, though it was considered morally abhorrent to steal
from individual people (Grossman 1983: 82), a rule which was quite the opposite of what guided
the Nomenklatura, as described in the first institution.

Evolution of Individual Informality
Of course, these practices and the common attitude towards them did not develop
overnight. Under Stalin, there was understandably far fewer cases of this happening due to the
oppressive system, though there is evidence that it occurred nonetheless (Fitzpatrick 2000;
Hanson 2003: 44-45; Kotkin 1995). Shlapentokh (1989) discusses how, starting with
Destalinization, the Soviet masses began to reengage with a sense of privacy that was lost in
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previous years; a combination of communal housing, violent oppression, and neighborly
informants forced people to “be on [sic] public all the time” (10). The relaxation of this
oppression (Guseva 2007), in addition to single-family housing, new technologies (like cameras,
tape recorders, etc.) (O’Hearn 1980: 220), and official encouragement of private acquisitiveness
(Millar 1985) provided individuals with the incentive and ability to retreat from the public sphere
and nurture individual goals instead of state goals. These developments are evidenced not only
by the growing intensity of the institutions I have discussed in this chapter, but also through
changes in art and culture. Early films and novels featured selfless Soviet heroes whose goals
aligned with those of the state while more personally-focused tales risked censure and its authors
risked being ostracized. Later productions reflected the evolving private attitude of the people, as
personal struggles, relationships, and philosophical introspection on topics such as life, religion,
etc. became popular and widely featured (see Shlapentokh 1989 for details).
As a result of “privatization,” personal relationships with family, friends, and lovers
became more important (Millar 1985: 703), as well as activity in the new, private civil society,
all of which served as outlets for personal beliefs and emotions as well as invaluable connections
to the second economy. These connections again engage the concept of blat, as favors performed
for each other were often done in-kind and in the spirit of cooperation. A careful treatment of
blat was already seen in the previous section; however, its practice cannot be overstated. Blat
networks lie at the heart of every institution that has been discussed in this project, and the role it
played in the lives of the common Soviet citizen was perhaps its most critical. In this instance, it
allowed consumers to obtain what they found necessary to function in daily life, and the sheer
number of connections one could make through friends and family ensured that most Soviet
citizens were capable of procuring what they needed. Those who chose not to engage in this
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practice found themselves struggling to keep afloat, whether it was because they didn’t have
enough income to make ends meet or because they were not able to keep their family healthy,
considering the chronic scarcity of quality produce.
Indeed, despite the ubiquity of these institutions, public opinion was somewhat mixed.
Opinions most noticeably varied by demography, such as by education level and career type, as
Shlapentokh (1989) explains. He goes on to discuss how the informal, private institutions that the
average citizen used to get by was praised by the economically liberal and the materialistic as an
efficient and necessary development in society; but it was abhorred by conservative officials and
ideological zealots who, among the latter, saw it as the waning of communist principles and,
among the former, as a threat to existing power structures. Meanwhile, the politically liberal and
the ideologues both considered official corruption terrible and unwanted, while (of course)
conservative officials enjoyed their privileges and the materialists found much of this activity
permissible. Demographically, the ideologues tended to be less educated, less wealthy, and older,
although a small number of party officials were also strictly bound to socialist principles. These
people were unrelenting in their view that “from each according to ability, each ability –
according to its contribution,” as dictated by the official ideology. Those of the opposite opinion,
the economic liberals, tended to be more socially active, tending to be members of the
intelligentsia, working professionals, and skilled laborers, though again some party officials also
advocated this position. This position saw more coverage and sympathy from state media
channels over time, though of course it continued to predominantly espouse the principles of
communism (as perceived by the party elite).
Nevertheless, among those who made more extensive use of these institutions, a sense of
survival and the spirit of cooperation often lay behind their enactment (Fitzpatrick 2000),
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eventually leading to a tacit acceptance of them by the people and the administration, particularly
under Brezhnev (Millar 1985). Many of these practices can appear to observers as acts of
extortion, as employees of various shops and service centers seemed to coerce extra money from
the masses by not doing their jobs properly, or even performing poorly, if no incentive (material
or monetary) was presented (Simis 1982). Yet it was very difficult at the time to operate in the
state without paying out numerous bribes, tips, gifts, etc. because of its limited resources; it was
as though a fee was being levied that, upon being paid, granted access to supplies that themselves
had to be obtained in morally ambiguous fashion. Ledeneva (1998) described these informal
practices as “the ‘reverse side’ of an overcontrolling centre, a reaction of ordinary people to the
structural constraints of the socialist system of distribution,” (3), at least in terms of blat.
Whether or not it represented moral decay on part of the population is not in the interest
of my investigation; what is important is that, by the time the Soviet Union collapsed and the
iron curtain was lifted, these behaviors had been set rigidly in the hearts and minds of the people
of Russia, which is said to have inherited, in full, the legacies of the USSR. The discussion of
post-Soviet Russia will seek to establish this point.

Summary
We have seen throughout the course of this chapter how informal norms and networks
had a heavy hand in the way the government and economy operated in Soviet Russia. While
none of these institutions remained free of self-aggrandizing actors seeking to make extra money
and consume luxuries not found in state stores, there was also a strong sense of solidarity among
those who sympathized with each other, whether they were officials out in the country who had
to ensure their own privileges, factory managers who struggled to keep their production lines
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running, or just a couple of people who couldn’t imagine living life without enjoying cultural
experiences untainted by the ideological biases of the state.
Members of the Nomenklatura exercised control over admission to their ranks through
controlled elections and pay-to-play schemes of selling off lucrative positions. Both mechanisms
favored friends and family, which had a direct impact on the social reproduction of the elites,
who favored loyalty over professional qualifications. Indeed, these officials were a class unto
themselves, a class which had the power to extract what they wanted from local economies like
feudal barons. They held an interest in covering their tracks to preserve the reputation of the
party and maintain their own images, which led to the control or subversion of institutions and
individuals via several means. Those lower in the hierarchy often faced political and economic
threats to deter whistleblowing, while horizontal and vertical relations within the party hierarchy
took the form of patron-client relations. When officials did get caught up in a publicly
recognized scandal, sentencing was rarely harsh, often ending in reassignment to a different
position somewhere else in the USSR.
Meanwhile, enterprise management was able to take advantage of the official climate of
patronage to engage in their own unique varieties of informal practices. These practices were
provoked into existence by the chronic scarcity that characterized the Soviet formal economy
and was incentivized by the system of premiums that rewarded clever schemes. Whether
managers were falsifying reports, bartering for scarce materials with other factories, or bribing
officials for a wide variety of goods and services, informal practices often contributed to the
efficiency of the formal economy, which saw officials looking the other way (assuming the
apparent success made them look good, or they got their cut of the profits). Attempts to fix this
system often ended in failure, though the conservative tendencies of officials did not help reform
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efforts; the economic rents and material benefits of working for the party administration were too
good to sacrifice for the sake of economic efficiency.
Finally, informal institutions were so deeply ingrained in society that the average Soviet
citizen found it overwhelmingly difficult to live properly without engaging in these practices
themselves. The best cuts of meat could only be found under the counter, free services were of
terrible quality unless strategic influence was plied, and doing favors for others could mean not
having to sully your hands with a “tip” to get your favorite goodies, such as imported liquors or
nice clothing that reflected the current trends and which were actually the correct size. Paying for
these niceties likewise required making a unique contribution to the informal system due to the
high financial costs, which included providing illegal services as well as selling company
property to consumers and producers alike. Markets for these goods thrived, and middlemen
engaging in illegal speculation were willing to take on the risk of selling illicit goods where
others weren’t.
The persistence, utility, and ubiquity of these institutions demonstrate undeniably their
importance to the character of the Soviet Union. Evidence from multiple sources show that
informal practices were in use during Stalin’s tenure, though widespread academic interest in it
was not piqued until they became more transparent under subsequent leaders, particularly
Brezhnev. Most authors, including those who vehemently decried corruption (Montias and RoseAckerman 1981), saw use in those institutions with vivid organizational and consumer benefits,
using it as evidence for liberalizing policy prescriptions where such suggestions were given. The
power of the ruble in obtaining scarce resources was widely acknowledged by the populace,
which had the effect of creating more markets, more middlemen, and more subversion of the
formal system. Indeed, the second economy was quite parasitic to the formal one; however, it
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capitalized on scarcity in a way that was arguably more efficient than the consumer distributional
tool of first-come, first-served and its production equivalent of priority sectors. As a result,
informal networks developed alongside the expansion of the formal economy until the former
became ubiquitous and the latter stagnated, with both becoming fully matured by the time
Brezhnev’s conservative administration struck an implicit deal to give these developments
official backing.
What we get is a set of strong, informal institutions that are presumably quite stable,
particularly considering the historical context from the imperial era. These same institutions
proved inimical to the efforts of Westernizing forces, tying up entrepreneurship and
industrialization in webs of patron-client relations and inclusive peasant communities. This was
unaided by the Tsar’s administration, which saw some aspects of modernization as a threat to its
power. In the Soviet era, we can see similar issues in the technological stagnation that was
provoked by risk-averse enterprise managers and officials who preferred to engage in practices
they knew would continue to furnish a steady paycheck, legal or otherwise. Reforms were often
too conservative, and failed miserably when the relevant actors found ways to continue their old
practices. Early on, Stalin used fear and oppression, as well as material incentives (Siegelbaum
1988), to force industrialization on the country, as well as the momentum gained from the NEP;
later administrations abandoned the coercive apparatus, leading the country towards stagnation
and eventual collapse in what appeared to be a retreat to the imperial mindset.
The ubiquitous presence of informal institutions appears to have a strong foundation in
the Soviet period. However, until I demonstrate further continuity into the post-Soviet era, my
task remains incomplete. The discussion of the post-Soviet period will cover exactly this issue.
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CHAPTER V: THE RUSSIAN TRANSITION
Russia’s transition from communism to capitalism was no minor event. The dissolution
of the USSR brought about significant global geopolitical change, and provided evidence to
economists around the world about the apparent dominance of capitalism. More particular to
Russia, however, is the changing institutional context that invariably influenced the behaviors of
political and economic actors. The transition to capitalism is often cited in academic literature as
a critical juncture event, representing a sea-change in how the country operates.
The main point of this project, however, is to demonstrate how there was continuity
between the two systems. While it cannot be denied that the transition from communism to
capitalism was massive, it cannot be understood as a total break. Institutions are, by their nature
persistent, and 80 years of conditioning cannot be wiped away over the course of a few.
Establishing the connection between the two systems, therefore, becomes an important aspect of
my argument. In particular, the consistency of the structure of the elite class in society, from
Nomenklatura to Oligarch, is highlighted by the process of privatization. However, the formal
context that is highlighted over the course of my discussion of the transition is also important for
framing the informal institutions discussed in the post-Soviet period.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union
The distinct cause of the Soviet Union’s dissolution remains debated to this day.
Researchers have argued that it was caused by any number of economic, political, or institutional
problems (Åslund 2011: 47), as well as historical (Hanson 2003), cultural (Kotkin 2008), or
global-economic (Lockwood 2000) trends. These accounts should not be considered mutually
exclusive; many of these issues worked together to facilitate the collapse. However, despite how
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interesting the subject continues to be, an evaluation of all possibilities lies outside the scope of
this project. What I can more concretely and succinctly discuss are the events leading up to the
early 1990s, the most important of which were Gorbachev’s reforms – specifically glasnost and
perestroika – and the coup led by Boris Yeltsin. Both developments inarguably had enormous
consequences on Russia’s secession from the Soviet Union, which removed its heart (as it were)
and forced its end.
Perestroika (or “restructuring”) was a series of economic and political reform measures
that sought to cure as many of the Union’s ailments as possible: economic stagnation,
inefficiency, and chronic shortages; self-interest and corruption in the party elite, as well as a
lack of accountability; problems in science, research, and development; declining morale and
morals among the people; etc. (Gorbachev 1987). The sheer number of policies produced by the
Soviet leadership are too great to list here; however, the intention behind economic restructuring
was to decentralize decision-making, legitimize many of the black market activities described in
above sections, and to open up trade and investment with “the outside world” (Hanson 2003:
192). Politically, Gorbachev wished to democratize the election of party elites and even had a
vision of reviving the informally and sporadically formed Soviet councils of the revolutionary
period (Kotkin 2008: 75-76). Glasnost (or “openness”) was a direct result of reform efforts,
because it was used to in part to communicate the aforementioned changes in the economy,
though also attempted to steer the common ideology towards being more individualistic and
meritocratic (Cooper 1991). However, it was “mostly a slogan” until 1986, when the Chernobyl
disaster demonstrated the risks of secrecy, as well as the difficulty behind keeping such an event
under wraps (Kotkin 2008: 67-68). The subsequent relaxation of censorship proved the party’s
seriousness to the masses.
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Of course, the picture of reform was not as simple as the one I have painted here. Other
general reforms also took place, such as aggressive military de-escalation and improved relations
with the West, which may or may not be included in the discussion of perestroika, but which
have been excluded due to relevance and an interest in largely domestic developments.
Additionally, there were earlier reform efforts that more closely mirrored the Kosygin reforms in
their conservative nature, slow/partial implementation, and centralizing effects. But when these
efforts failed to show results, Gorbachev took on a more alarmist position, seeing radical reform
as obligatory in avoiding crisis (Lockwood 2000: 109-111).
The reform efforts had devastating side effects. Perestroika was not implemented in a
coherent way, and so the union suffered food shortages, chaotic price changes, slowed growth,
currency convertibility issues, and so on (Hanson 1992). Most party elites were not able to keep
their offices in the wake of democratic elections; combined with Gorbachev’s reshuffling and
restructuring at the top (demonstrating that he did not wish to suffer the same fate as
Khrushchev), the party lost the ties of loyalty that kept the USSR unitary, thus setting the
political stage for republican secessions (Kotkin 2008). As Gorbachev began to realize this, he
began to move in a more conservative direction; but by then it was far too late. Meanwhile,
glasnost had the effect of increasing the outspokenness of complaints about the Soviet Union and
communist ideals in general (Cooper 1991). Indeed, economic debates concerning reform
quickly moved towards decrying the entire system as wholly ineffective, particularly when
compared to capitalism (Hanson 2003: 213). Revolutions and Soviet secessions started in 1990
with the Baltic states, and was followed shortly after by additional cries from other republics that
also desired independence, such as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

108

However, the most important secession by far was that conducted by Russia and its
leader, Boris Yeltsin. Originally the general secretary of the Russian Republic, his populist style
allowed for him to succeed in creating a Russian presidency through a referendum, giving him a
popular mandate to challenge Gorbachev. While his original intention may not have been to
undermine the Soviet Union, his actions would inevitably lead to this result (Kotkin 2008: 104105). He proceeded to create institutions which rivaled the Union-wide ones, subverting their
power and bringing party officials into his circle. His legitimacy was supported by a failed coup,
instigated by elite conservative hardliners who detained Gorbachev at his Crimean dacha and
sought to preserve the union by any means necessary. After a series of bumbling public failures
and timid military decisions, they released Gorbachev into a Soviet Union even less stable than
before. Subsequent developments, such as the recognition of independence in the Baltic states,
the Russian acquisition of Soviet economic institutions by Yegor Gaidar, and the formation of
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), led up to Gorbachev’s resignation and the total
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Restructuring Russia
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the unenviable task of rebuilding Russia in the
image of a modern capitalist country lay at Yeltsin’s feet. Like many other post-communist
countries, the West provided aid in forms both economic and intellectual, and the prevailing
advice was to act rapidly and get the process over with quickly, so the country could find a new
equilibrium. This style of transition had important effects on the durability of institutions
developed over the course of the Soviet Union: it appears that, in an atmosphere of crisis-level
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uncertainty, many Russians fell back on old habits to get them through this hectic period of the
country’s history.
The transformation of Russia’s economy, politics, and foreign relations happened on a
scale unprecedented since the formation of the USSR. However, it would be improper to
conceive of it as a revolution or even as a set of reforms, since revolutions are initiated by the
masses and reforms assume that the previous system is being retained to some degree. Yeltsin,
who became Russia’s first president, considered his Russia as a successor to the old Czarist one,
and so considered it more of a “restoration” or even a “natural continuation of the political cycle
began by the Russian Revolution of 1917” (Kagarlitsky 2002: 3). And yet much remained the
same as well, including the informal norms that previously dictated state and enterprise relations
under both the Soviet Union and the Tsardom. Of course, actors operated differently in a brand
new formal context that defined new rules for the economy; but if anything, it also became easier
for illicit dealings of all stripes to occur, thanks to the open market context, the traditionally
weak rule of law, and the half-baked efforts to bring the country’s economy and polity in line
with the West.
Yeltsin’s goal was to drag the country through the transition process as quickly as
possible, kicking and screaming if necessary. He was aware that the move towards a market
economy was going to be devastating; in public interviews after his presidency, he reportedly
saw himself and his administration (privately) as martyrs who were politically expendable in the
face of the painful transition process (Desai 2006). And indeed, his administration was not
terribly popular with the populace or the legislature after his program began, resulting in a
difficult political situation that is partly to blame for the frequent side-steps away from the
prescribed “shock therapy.”
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Shock therapy was the infamous program pursued by the Russian transition team,
initially headed by Yegor Gaidar. In short, shock therapy involved the rapid conversion of
Russia’s economic institutions to those of western free market capitalism, prioritizing such
changes as: fiscal and monetary austerity; a convertible currency; deregulation of prices;
demonopolization of the state sector; the removal of all barriers to international trade; full
liberalization of the private sector; the creation of new rules for the regulation of state
enterprises; tax reform; the implementation of unemployment insurance and job retraining; credit
allocation to entrepreneurs; and privatization (Murrell 1993). It was supported by the IMF and
the economic doctrines of the Western economies, though it was not followed strictly due to the
largely oppositional political situation. For example, price liberalization was uneven, and
privatization was a drawn-out process that encompassed multiple strategies of varying success
over multiple years. Yeltsin might have headed off these issues had he paid more attention to
building constituencies among the Russian people, but he instead involved himself in endless
games of “chicken” with the legislature (Hedlund 1999), which caused problems that came to a
head quickly in 1993 when Yeltsin ordered shells to be fired into the parliament building. Of
course, many other factors besides politics were at play that problematized the transition: the
government and the rule of law had little to no legitimacy, corruption and opportunism among
political and economic elites was rampant, the 89 regions of the Russian Federation were more
or less autonomous, and the central government had no effective authority over the central bank
(Hanson 2013).
The West did little itself to alleviate the situation. They started off on poor footing by
pursuing nuclear non-proliferation and assurances that the successive Russian government would
continue to service the Soviet foreign debt at a time when Russia was expressing a full-throated
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willingness to accept capitalism and democracy (Hedlund 1999). When they finally came
around, the IMF was used as the Western hand of aid and assistance despite their serious lack of
ability to handle such an endeavor, having only advised developing countries and not enormous
second-world transitions. As a result, there was an over-emphasis on features such as price
liberalization, trade liberalization, and privatization, while the role of the state and the process of
dismantling the previous communist system was taken for granted (Hare and Turley 2013). In
particular, the importance of institutions was almost entirely overlooked by mainstream
economists, culminating in sloppy reforms and an institutional vacuum that was filled by
violence and corruption (Hare 2013). Such basic institutions that lie at the heart of western
economies, such as private property and transaction facilitation, were also taken for granted.
Indeed, Russia has suffered from a number of institutional defects which had made the
transition process painful and very arduous. Philip Hanson (2013) describes some of the worst
offenders: the considerable formal and informal autonomy amongst the 89 regions of the Russian
Federation; a serious lack of control over the central bank; a combative parliament that was
hostile to reforms; and a weak rule of law, which bred significant amounts of corruption and
deprived the central government of effective authority (385). These institutions themselves
provoked a number of unique economic institutions, such as a soaring number of racketeering
rings (or “roofs”) which were maintained not only by criminal organizations but also local
police, politicians, and security firms (Humphrey 2002). Yet despite the implication, this
development was not purely criminal, and actually fulfilled the role that the government would
typically play in enforcing contracts amongst enterprises (were the rule of law not so weak).
Perhaps better understood as “violent entrepreneurism” (Volkov 1999), these “roofs” became a
common part of a firm’s transaction costs, ensuring that obligations were met (lest the problem
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be solved either peacefully or violently, in both cases arbitrated by the roof) and that roving
bandits and thieves stayed away from the companies they protected. Protection services even
became legalized in 1992, and by 1997 there were 10,200 registered private protection and
detective agencies employing 140,600 people (Volkov 1999: 749).
However, one institution in particular stands out in its salience to my project, and that is
the Russian “virtual economy.” A phrase which was coined by Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes
(1998), it was enterprises’ solution to a crisis of payment arears. Instead of using cash to make
payments for wages, resources, and even taxes, enterprises used barter and debt to finance their
operations, essentially maintaining the soft budget constraints used by the USSR. This activity
should sound familiar; my discussion of the Soviet period outlined many similar practices that
kept manufacturing afloat, and so it should come as no surprise that the use of such tactics
persisted. Unfortunately, while the practices of the virtual economy were beneficial to the
maintenance of communism, they hindered the progress of capitalism by preventing unsuccessful
enterprises from failing, which would have made room for newer ones with better business plans.
This, combined with high monetary and bureaucratic hurdles, made for a very inimical
environment to start-ups, and eventually led to a financial crisis in 1998 (Gaddy and Ickes 1998).
Observers can take solace in the effect it had on rural areas, though; oftentimes a single
manufacturing plant provided nearly everything for the residents of small towns. From wages to
housing to electricity to groceries, the soft budget constraints of the virtual economy kept local
economies (and populations) alive (Kotkin 2008).
Nevertheless, the transition was very hard for the general Russian masses. The ravages
associated with shock therapy were quite intense, as inflation and unemployment spread
throughout a nation with fixed prices and full state employment. However, the Russian people
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had to contend with other sources of economic uncertainty as well. For example, Caroline
Humphrey (2002) describes how the shortage of liquid capital led to widespread bartering, which
was also a solution to the arears crisis mentioned above. In fact, barter was usually preferred over
cash payments, since those in possession of rare goods found themselves in a position to ask for
rare goods in return. Payments from places of work might take the form of coupons or “orders,”
which were accepted at company stores, or perhaps simply the goods that were produced there,
often forcing workers to barter with others for things they actually needed. These companies
were massively important to a great deal of the population, such that regions they occupied could
be likened to feudal orders, or what Humphrey calls “suzerainties” (Humphrey 2002: 6). Those
who found themselves outside these systems, whether through migration, unemployment,
homelessness, military demobilization, or any myriad other reasons, find life overwhelmingly
difficult. Not only are they deprived of the income needed to buy groceries or pay rent, but they
also tend to find themselves without the official documents that would grant them government
entitlements that many depended on for survival, such as basic food staples.
Accurate statistical data is not possible for this period of time for a number of reasons.
Foremost among them was the decline in authority of the central government, which inherently
problematized the mere collection of data. Other problems included the arrears crisis, which
included wage arrears and made it difficult to quantify incomes; the problem of collecting
income data from those outside the system of “suzerainties” mentioned above; and the potential
issue of accurate reporting from enterprises, who may have carried over their tendencies from the
Soviet era to avoid government predation. Analyses that were conducted with this very flawed
data were undoubtedly taken with a grain of salt, if nothing else because it painted an unusually
rosy picture of an economy that was experiencing a massive recession; IMF reports from the
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time claimed that, “by June 1992 the relationship between the national average wage and
consumer prices was approximately the same as in 1987” (Koen and Phillips 1993), despite the
fact that later data shows all transition economies were doing quite poorly during this time
(Popov 2013). It is for this reason that descriptive data is more valuable in describing living
conditions during this time, despite the lack of generalizability that comes with this manner of
research.
I could easily continue discussing the transition for many more pages; scholars and
government agencies, among others, have already filled countless reports and books with such
information, making it a simple task for the curious reader to continue learning about the period.
For the time being, it is more beneficial (and within the scope of the thesis) to talk about the
aspect of the transition that most closely pertains to my current project: privatization.
Undoubtedly an important topic in and of itself, it also paints a picture of how Soviet managers
became Capitalist managers, taking with them the behaviors and mindsets they developed during
the Soviet period. Indeed, bridging the Soviet and Post-Soviet periods develops a far more
plausible argument for path dependence.

Transition in Practice: Privatization
Privatization was an endlessly complex and difficult process in not only Russia, but the
entire post-communist world; and the way Russian leaders handled it provided a clear route for
many Soviet elites to maintain their status in the new Capitalist context. Equitability and
efficiency in the distribution of ownership was not a simple process. Since not all firms were
viable in the new market, the average citizen had little material wealth with which to purchase
shares, and managers were at an advantageous position to manipulate and cheat others. Foreign
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buyers were often more attractive to governments for the purpose of filling state coffers, but
selling companies overseas was also politically unpopular and lent an air of illegitimacy to an
already delicate situation. Even the most successful of transition states, like East Germany,
encountered serious difficulty implementing privatization, requiring billions of dollars in
financial assistance while still undergoing massive recessions (Miller 2013).
Technically, the privatization process started immediately with the self-privatization of
enterprises by Soviet managers in 1991, which was decried by Yeltsin and his government, who
sought to do it more legally. However, due to the weakened state of the central government and
feasibility constraints, the man in charge of privatization, Anatoly Chubais, sought to
institutionalize the practice instead of outright banning it. This process consisted of several steps.
First, he delegated the process to regional and municipal governments, which made them
beneficiaries of the process and thus vested in its success. Then, he gave every man, woman, and
child in Russia tradeable vouchers that could be used to buy stakes in businesses through staterun auctions. Finally, he offered current management several options for selling off their stakes,
and they overwhelmingly accepted a single model that allowed management and workers to own
up to 51% of a company’s stock. It was hoped that all of this would result in a large number of
new stakeholders who were all invested in capitalism, as well as the prevention of cooperativelike groups of businesses colluding with each other (Kotkin 2008).
Unfortunately, the process was not as equitable in practice as it was in theory. Once
again, Russia’s weak rule of law translated into a similarly weak system of corporate governance
where the rights of stakeholders were frequently flouted, to the point that complaints for
strengthening private property laws reached a deafening roar. Meanwhile, most of the vouchers
ended up finding their way into the hands of enterprise managers at rock-bottom prices, allowing
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for mass consolidation into the hands of a wealthy few who stripped assets while ignoring
product and market development (Puffer and McCarthy 2003). These trends continued to build
into the mid-90’s, when a second wave of privatization occurred that continued to put economic
power in the hands of a small number of wealthy elites.
This second stage, which occurred between 1995 and 1998, involved the privatization of
strategic sectors, which until this time had remained largely nationalized. Gas and oil companies
were only partially privatized, though, so the state was able to continue drawing income from it,
helping immensely to keep the government funded. Privatization during this stage was enacted
by exchanging firms’ shares for private bank loans, thus “helping” to cover the government
deficit. This is known infamously as the “loans-for-shares” program, and it was rife with
problems of corruption. Auctions where shares were sold frequently only had a single bidder,
where foreign investors and even some domestic ones were disqualified or disallowed (Hedlund
1999). The loans that the government received were also overwhelmingly financed by privately
managed government funds, so the government was essentially borrowing money from itself.
Shares were undervalued, going for cheap to well-placed bank managers, which had the effect of
creating an economic elite centered around Yeltsin. Meanwhile, this scandalous process further
discredited privatization, which was already very unpopular with the general masses.
Indeed, privatization was often an excuse to prey on the government budget and cheap
corporate holdings. Majority state-owned companies were the target of pilfering by private
interests in schemes where managers would sell goods at low prices to their own private
businesses, typically through intermediaries that they arranged themselves. Other schemes
included the private handling of government cash receipts for high costs, favorable loans that
came from publicly held banks, etc..
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Perhaps ironically, even though privatization was implemented under the advisement of
Western professionals, it was still realized in a very Russian fashion. The process resulted in an
economic elite that formed very quickly, with clear parallels – and even direct relationships to –
the prior Soviet Nomenklatura. To an extent, the self-privatizations of the first privatization wave
imply this connection, as well as the predation by elite during the second wave. However, an
independent body of literature further backs the notion of elite continuity using unique
theoretical and empirical insights (Braguinsky 2009; Kryshtanovskaya and White 1996; van
Winden and de Wit 1993; Wasilewski 1995). These studies tend to examine the previous
occupations of post-communist elites, oligarchs, and business leaders to determine whether they
were members of the former Nomenklatura, or otherwise use various theories and behavioral
models to explain why such political-economic continuity is rational and expected. Although it
was found that not all the enterprise owners of the post-communist period came from distinct
Nomenklatura backgrounds, often coming into their assets through sheer talent or criminal
organization, they nevertheless adapted quickly to the informal rules of insiders who knew best
how to play the system (Braguinsky 2009).
It is important to stress, however, that these “elites” were not necessarily all-powerful or
totally in control of the economy. Indeed, the Soviet period showed us that the Nomenklatura
could be manipulated or subverted for the benefit of individual enterprises, and the post-Soviet
period will demonstrate that as well. More accurately understood as a class – and consistent with
Voslensky’s interpretation (1984) of these individuals – it is more important to stress the culture
and skills they brought with them into the Post-Soviet landscape (Lane 1997), which is at least
partly responsible for the continuation of behaviors from one political-economic system into the
other.
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To an extent, however, these connections are not arguably necessary. The discussion on
the Soviet Russian period demonstrated that practices such as blat, bribery, and the procurement
of scarce resources were pervasive throughout all levels of society. This might lead us to the
conclusion that almost any native Russian who is put into a managerial position will exhibit
some of the same behaviors observable in the Soviet managerial style. Yet some of the technical
details involved in dodging taxes, falsifying documents, and making deals based mostly on debt
were acquired through years of practice and passed around from previous managers to new ones,
who likely built on the skill set based on the evolving economic and institutional context. These
behaviors, and their smooth execution, were crucial for the survival of enterprises during the
tumultuous transition and are also - we will see - reflected in the financial gymnastics performed
during the following decade, once the economy settled down and Putin became leader of the
country.

Russian Capitalism and the Presidency of Vladimir Putin
While Yeltsin bore the brunt of implementing the transition to capitalism, Vladimir Putin
was responsible for a number of the reforms that characterize the Russian political-economic
landscape we see today. While many of Putin’s reforms sought to organize the messes created by
Yeltin’s chaotic administration, they also served the purpose of consolidating power, finalizing
an atmosphere where informality serves a strong purpose: as a reaction to an overcontrolling
center.
Yeltsin’s attempts to restructure Russia economically and politically were incomplete and
not aggressive enough at best, resulting in many problems for the state in general and Boris
Yeltsin in particular (Åslund 2011). The outcome of this was a falling GDP and a steadily

119

increasing unemployment rate throughout nearly the entire length of the 1990s, punctuated on
both ends by severe economic crises (Sancak and Karaman 2014). Yet despite the incredible
shock of change, Russia had done a pretty good job in reforming its economy, though the
political situation worsened considerably as Yeltsin’s regime slipped into authoritarianism
(Åslund 2009). Although elected democratically in 1991, Yeltsin was given full control of
Russia for a year in order to unilaterally make reforms, which he later refused to concede, and so
he illegally dissolved the short-lived congress by firing tank shells into the parliament building in
1993 (Hale 2006: 30). Throughout the course of his privatization campaign, he moved from one
scandal to another with alarming speed (Kagarlitsky 2002) until Vladimir Putin replaced him in
2000.
Putin’s regime can be accurately described as a kleptocracy (Dawisha 2014). Wintrobe
(1998: 131) defines these regimes as “models [where] dictators interfere with the economy only
to affect a redistribution of resources toward themselves and loyal supporters whom the regimes
wish to reward,” likening leaders to “stationary bandits.” Indeed, Putin has demonstrated his
willingness to reward his friends and punish his detractors. He has kept up a balancing act with a
tight circle of supporters at the head of some of Russia’s largest businesses, many of whom were
targets of the Western sanctions resulting from the Ukraine crisis (Dawisha 2014). These
include: Gennady Timchenko, Novatek’s largest shareholder, owner of Volga Group and
Stroytransgaz; Yuri Kovalchuk, Bank Rossiya’s largest shareholder; the gas companies Lukoil,
Gazprom, and Surgutneftegaz; and many more, including select contacts in the government and
military (BBC 2014). He has also been connected to the deaths of whistleblowers and activists,
such as the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko by Polonium, a radioactive substance, in 2006
(Gessen 2012: 199).
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Despite his flagrant abuses of power, Putin put through a number of beneficial market
reforms. Having written his dissertation on economics when he was studying at the St.
Petersburg Mining Institute in 1996, Putin espoused the benefits of a free market system, though
one where “the winners were those best at exploiting others’ vulnerabilities. Those
vulnerabilities were greed and an often flagrant disregard for legal niceties” (Hill and Gaddy
2015: 133). Some of the reforms Putin began in 2001 and 2003 included decreasing bureaucratic
interference in commercial activity and setting up self-regulating regulatory organizations
(Tompson 2007). However, as of 2008, 40-45% of the 400 largest companies in Russia were still
owned by the state, and the amount of GDP produced by the state sector actually increased from
30% to 35% from 1997 to 2010 (Cooper 2013: 58), raising questions as to how dedicated to
market reform Putin truly is. Yet his economic record has been quite positive, as Russia under
Putin has enjoyed a return to great power status in terms of economic performance; though how
much of this is thanks to gas and oil rents remains debatable (Appel 2008; Hill and Gaddy 2015:
134).
In addition to market reforms, Putin also implemented a wide range of
legislative/political reforms. Many of these reforms accounted for weaknesses in the legislative
structure of Yeltsin’s tenure, bringing about 5,800 out of 6,000 regional laws into harmony with
federal ones (Pomeranz 2019). However, Putin also swiftly implement plans to centralize the
government, altering the structure of government to suit a more top-down approach while also
taking control of various formal political institutions. This agenda is evidenced in the leaked
document Reform of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (Kommersant
2000), as demonstrated by Karen Dawisha (2014). Some of the main points of the document
include: coordinating/coopting politicians running for any office; stripping the Duma of politics
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and making it into a strictly lawmaking platform; stifling opposition (either politicians or media
outlets); creating a government media outlet; and putting security forces (FSB, FAPSI, etc.) in
charge at the Kremlin. Putin was wildly successful in implementing this agenda (Colton and
McFaul 2003; Åslund 2019), thus establishing the foundations of the soft authoritarian/hard
democratic structure we see in Russia today.
Another of these centralizing structures put into place by Putin was the infamous “power
vertical,” which had the effect of reducing regional autonomy in the country. The first step of
this vertical was the weakening of the Federation Council, a body composed of representatives
from each of Russia’s region, and a powerful check and balance to the power of the executive
(Colton and McFaul 2003). Russia was also split into seven federal districts that were overseen
by Putin appointees and superimposed upon the 89 units that existed at the time, thereby
undermining their individual autonomy (Pomeranz 2019). Further legislation was implemented
that allowed for far greater control of regional governors, although such control was no longer
necessary after the abolishment of gubernatorial elections in 2004 (Sharafutdinova 2010). In
sharp contrast to the significant autonomy enjoyed by Russian regions under Yeltsin, Putin’s
efforts had the effect of consolidating power, effectively bringing the regions under greater
control and eliminating a serious check on his power.

Summary
After Russia seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991, provoking the end of communism,
Boris Yeltsin was left with the unenviable role of taking Russia from centrally organized
political-economic systems to more decentralized ones, specifically capitalism and democracy.
Although the ultimate success of both is in question, once Vladimir Putin came to the presidency
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most of the loose ends would be tied up, and ultimately what we see is a Russian politicaleconomic system with a reasonable degree to stability, albeit centralized in governance and
without a market entirely free of government ownership.
The process of transition resulted in many former elites transitioning into new positions
as Russia’s most powerful. Whether through self-privatization or the disastrous loans-for-shares
program, elites had multiple ways of making the transition work for them. Further, successful
criminal enterprises (e.g., violent entrepreneurship) ensured that those with a strong sense for
informality and avoiding formal, centralized institutions were able to find themselves in
powerful private positions in the economy. Indeed, there were many possible routes for Soviet
informal institutions to make their way into the post-Soviet context. However, a sentiment from
the end of the imperial context chapter is also highly relevant: “The very completeness of the
destruction probably impelled people to seek security in familiar social patterns, not only
resuscitating but also reinforcing them as the only source of stability in a chaotic world”
(Hosking 2011: 416). The work of Caroline Humphrey (2002) particularly embodies this
sentiment and its applicability to the post-Soviet period.
Several informal institutions from the Soviet period already appeared to be resurging over
the course of the transition, as seen above. Indeed, post-Soviet formal and informal institutions
remain so closely intertwined, making it difficult to discuss one without also discussing the
other. This is another parallel we see from the Soviet period; for example, how difficult it was to
talk about the Soviet hierarchy without describing the difference between who had de facto vs.
de jure power over the system. In the chapter that follows, the informal institutions mentioned
above will be explained in greater detail, alongside other relevant institutions that interact with
them.

123

CHAPTER VI: POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
As we move into the post-Soviet period, many of the behaviors featured in this chapter
should appear familiar. Informal behaviors as practiced by elites, enterprises, and common
citizens are a regular feature of the modern economy; and, in light of the Soviet period, appear to
be a logical continuation of the trends that intensified into the late Soviet period. Rather than
supplanting informal activity, the introduction of capitalism merely altered the incentive
structure. Some behaviors that were considered strictly illegal under the USSR were even
legalized, as we saw in the previous chapter. Regardless, problems in the formal structure of the
state and economy continue to be subverted by informal techniques that allow elites to capture
rent streams, businesses to stay afloat, and workers to obtain what they need to survive in an
often-inimical institutional context.
It is difficult to discuss post-Soviet informal institutions without addressing the divide
between Yeltsin’s and Putin’s tenures. Even though the Yeltsin years can be understood as
predominantly characterized by the transition, it was an important incubator of informal
institutions as they developed under Putin. Both of these leaders displayed very different
methods of presiding over Russia, with Yeltsin’s administration being more politically
competitive and economically captured, and Putin’s administration being more politically
centralized and economically controlling. Yet despite who is in power, and how much control
they have, informality persists as a method of subverting contradictory formal frameworks and
overcontrolling centers.
This chapter has been organized in such a way that it parallels the fourth chapter, being
organized linearly from the top-down, starting with Russian elites/oligarchs, then moving on to
enterprise behaviors, and finishing with average citizens/workers. Again, despite being organized
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separately, these informal institutions are deeply interwoven, and should therefore be taken in
their entirety to gain a full picture of post-Soviet informal behaviors.
The structure of this chapter relies on several core books, as mentioned in the
methodology. In the section “Patrimonialism and State Corruption,” I relied heavily on Can
Russia Modernize? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance by Alena Ledeneva;
Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, by Karen Dawisha; and Political Consequences of
Crony Capitalism Inside Russia, by Gulnaz Sharafutdinova. In the section “Enterprise Survival
Through Schemes and Influence,” I relied heavily on How Russia Really Works: The Informal
Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business, by Alena Ledeneva; Networks in the
Russian Market Economy, by Markku Lonkila; and Russian Organized Corruption Networks and
Their International Trajectories, by Serguei Cheloukhine and M.R. Haberfeld. Finally, in the
section “The Pervasiveness of Blat and Bribery Throughout the System,” I relied heavily on
Social Networks and Everyday Practices in Russia, by Anna-Marie Salmi; Making Ends Meet in
Contemporary Russia, by Simon Clarke; and The Elephant in the Room: Corruption and
Cheating in Russian Universities, by Sergei Golunov. For a brief treatment of these texts, please
see the Appendix.

Patrimonialism and State Corruption
Any discussion of Russian informal institutions would be incomplete without discussing
the country’s infamous oligarchs. Thanks to their networks of powerful connections, this elite
class is capable of using their influence to execute corrupt schemes that readily cross into the
other institutions of interest, and often attract the attention of academics and journalists alike.
Indeed, the study of Russia’s wealthiest and most powerful businessmen and politicians (who are
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oftentimes one and the same) is the subject of a wide array of literature. Prior Varieties of
Capitalism studies with Russia as their subject are well acquainted with the top-down forms of
Russia’s economy (Buhr and Frankenberger 2014; Buzan and Lawson 2014), making a
comprehensive review of this literature unnecessary. As such, I have reviewed what is necessary
in order to demonstrate some of the most relevant mechanisms of interaction between the
informal behaviors exhibited by the Russian elite in the post-Soviet era and the other institutions
discussed over the course of this chapter.

Elite Control
At the outset, Russia’s government presents as a familiar democratic structure, with three
branches of government, a federal-regional structure, elections, and a national constitution.
However, the familiarities end at the formal structure; most of the power is consolidated in the
executive, as the courts and the Duma (Russia’s lower legislative body) are tightly controlled
through primarily informal means, as described below. During the 1990s, this was not entirely
the case; businesses were stronger during Yeltin’s tenure, and economic elites were far more
capable of directing the state (i.e., state capture) (Karklins 2002; Shlapentokh 2007; Yakovlev
2006). Elections, although heavily in favor of the incumbent, were oftentimes quite competitive,
resulting in vicious campaigns of blackmail, obfuscating tactics, and other political technologies:
“In crony capitalist systems the degree and character of political contestation is even more
intense due to the higher stakes involved in controlling state office. Political and economic
spheres under crony capitalism are tightly intertwined, so access to power means access to
property and vice versa.” (Sharafutdinova 2010: 4). The market for these aggressive political
tools, often referred to as “Black PR” (or Kompromat), was incredibly strong (Karklins 2002;
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Ledeneva 2006; Simon 2004), and research by Sharafutdinova (2010) suggests that the practice
may have left the Russian people with a very negative perception of democratic institutions.
The current reality in Russia is that public officials are more dominant, and enjoy a
tighter grip on the wealthiest citizens of the country (i.e., systematic corruption). This
rebalancing of the power structure can be credited to Putin, and was integral to his plans for
Russia since before he was elected, as is evidenced in the leaked document Reform of the
Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (Kommersant 2000). Putin is also well
known for creating a “power vertical” and reducing regional autonomy in the country (Åslund
2019; Colton and McFaul 2003; Petrov and Slider 2007; Pomeranz 2019), most famously by
eliminating gubernatorial elections. Russians overall seemed unphased by these restrictions on
their democratic rights, and it potentially even improved his approval ratings, thanks in part to
the aforementioned disillusionment with democracy facilitated by the cutthroat elections of the
1990s (Sharafutdinova 2010), as well as his manipulation of the media (Hale, McFaul and
Coulton 2004; Lipman 2019; McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008). Approval ratings may have also
remained high due to a strong domestic economic performance, though; between 2000 and 2008,
per capita GDP increased, on average, 7% per year, while wages increased 400% between 2004
and 2008 (Stoner and McFaul 2015). This contrasts with Putin’s low popularity in the post-2008
global financial crisis era, as (and after) he sought to return to the presidency after Medvedev’s
brief stint in office.

Example: Election Tactics
Although Russia’s electoral institutions formally constitute a functioning democracy, a
system of informal repression, cooptation, and manipulation underlies the system. This
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characteristic is what makes Russia an “electoral” or “competitive” authoritarian regime: it
retains the presence of formal systems of democracy and channels for opposition, but electoral
competition heavily favors the incumbent due to their ability to manipulate elections, control the
media, and generally create an uneven playing field thanks to privileged access to resources and
political influence (Levitsky and Way 2010).
One such example of this skewed manipulation of resources is Putin’s ability to control
the party system. Yeltsin’s 1993 constitution gave the president a significant amount of power,
amounting to a “superpresidential” system (Hale 2006: 31). With this amount of power, Putin
was able to amend the laws concerning participation of political parties in parliamentary
elections. While previously mentioned to have done well in consolidating the otherwise hectic
and unorganized system, this has also had the effect of reducing oppositional competition with
Putin’s former party, United Russia. One example of how this can be done is by simply raising
the electoral threshold, which can have the effect of squeezing out competition from smaller
parties (Gel’man 2008). United Russia has been able to, over time, form coalitions with most
other major parties, co-opt regional leaders, and generally edge out other parties to the point of
making elections almost negligible (Smyth, Lowry and Wilkening 2007). A related strategy is
the use of a secondary loyal party, Just Russia, in case the dominant one isn’t capable of securing
all the votes in the district (Gel’man 2008).
This doesn’t mean that all opposition is entirely excluded from political office. However,
victory is only usually conceded to legislative positions at the municipal level; whenever
executive level positions are won by the opposition, the winner is typically co-opted into the
client-based system and eventually change their political affiliation to match that of the dominant
party (Turovsky 2014). Of course, these are on levels below the regional executive, since after
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2004 all of those positions are directly appointed from above. Before the law making this legal
became realized, though, the Kremlin was under the assumption that they could control regional
executives via intimidation or the manipulation of elections and their relevant campaigns (Mitin
2008).

Informal Rules and Benefits
Webs of powerful networks permeate the system of governance, with Putin and his allies
occupying the highest echelons. These networks are both political and economic in nature, with
many individuals enjoying both public and private positions (Åslund 2019; Sakaeva 2019), the
latter of which is often granted as a reward for loyalty and service to the state. Although
patrimonial in many respects, Putin cannot have direct control over everything that happens in
the country; “Sistema benefits from hierarchical control but also relies on the strength of
networks, their flexibility, adaptability and capacity to self-configure, thus integrating both
hierarchical and non-hierarchical dimensions of power.” (Ledeneva 2013, 35). Regardless, many
important decisions do fall into Putin’s lap, and he often exercises a wide degree of “manual
control” over the country via heavy-handed involvement in the media, the justice system, etc.
Early centralization measures made it clear that too much control can backfire tremendously,
though. An event from the beginning of Putin’s tenure demonstrates this: the Russian submarine
Kursk sunk in a nationally televised tragedy, while Putin enjoyed himself on vacation in Sochi.
No sailors survived the event, even though it only took 30 minutes for Norway, who had offered
to help, to open the hatch, eight days into the episode (Moore 2002).
In order to understand the political networks at the top of the Russian hierarchy, it is
important to know who, or what, the oligarchs of the country are. Many researchers spend a great
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deal of time discussing these economic actors, culminating in a body of work known as “elite
studies” (e.g., Barnes 2003; Braguinsky; Klebnikov 2001; Kosal 2007; Steen 2003; Urban 2010;
Wedel 2003). References to Russian oligarchs in academic literature and popular media may
understand the group as either the few most powerful businessmen closest to the President, or as
a more general term for the upper business class. These individuals started out as the winners of
the “loans for shares” policy of the Yeltsin era, allowing wealthy and well-placed Russian
businessmen to shore up large portions of the economy and make inordinate amounts of money.
This new generation of elites are often called the “New Russians” (Lipovetsky 2003). Many of
them come directly from the nomenklatura class of the Soviet era. Whatever their background,
powerful connections are what allow the most dominant oligarchs to accumulate further while
maintaining significant protection over their stakes.
Putin started building out his network as soon as he won the presidency, beginning by coopting the previous oligarchs of Russia and arresting those he liked least, for reasons such as tax
evasion. By making early examples of multiple Yeltsin-era oligarchs, Putin was able to get all
but the most independent among them to cooperate with his regime (Åslund 2019). High on his
list was taking control of Gazprom (Barnes 2003), thereby securing the government a role in the
gas and oil sector, as well as eliminating the independence of the media (Hale, McFaul and
Coulton 2004); and when he could not control those at the top of these organizations he simply
replaced with them his own trusted contacts. Most of Putin’s most trustworthy connections were
developed during his early career, from his work as a KGB agent in East Germany to his role as
a deputy mayor of St. Petersburg (Åslund 2019; Gessen 2012), emphasizing the importance of
trust in these networks. Some contacts go all the way back to his childhood, as evidenced by the
great economic opportunities afforded to Putin’s old judo instructor (The Guardian 2021;
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2015). Appointing these people to positions
in the government is simple, while maneuvering them into elected roles and the heads of
businesses proves somewhat trickier. In the political arena, the electoral technologies of the
1990s are far more easily leveraged from a position of greater control, and the power of a strong
political party provides an invaluable lever for controlling membership in political institutions.
Many tools also exist to control businesses and place friends on Boards of Directors, which tie
into the various methods by which Russian leaders stand to benefit from their positions (Adachi
2006; Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2015; Estrin and Prevezer 2010;
Rutland 2010).
One of the more aggressive methods of extracting value from businesses is the corporate
takeover. Corporate raids in Russia differ significantly from those that characterized the United
States economy in the 1980s. In Russia, these raids are initiated by state actors, either to serve
their own purposes or in the service of private citizens who offer a well-priced kickback
(Shlapentokh 2007; Vasileva-Dienes 2019: 341-342). Often starting with a large, falsified tax
bill, the upper management of a company is arrested and replaced by raiders, who then take full
control and strip its assets (Volkov 2004). The raiders falsify registration documents, cook the
books, and conduct parallel shareholder meetings that give them the leverage to sell the business
multiple times or acquire assets, like real estate, directly (Gans-Morse 2012). Raiders also
purchase court decisions and use blackmail as necessary. By the time the owner(s) of a company
are released from jail, their company has been thoroughly plundered and may no longer exist,
particularly if the intention was to eliminate competition. Due to capital flight and overseas
money laundering, assets taken in this way are prohibitively difficult to recover (Brovkin 2001),
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although counter-raids are possible. The chances of being prosecuted for these activities are also
exceedingly slim, since law enforcement and other government officials are already involved.
The corporate takeovers of Russia demonstrate many valuable points. For one, it
demonstrates how government officials are able to leverage their position to acquire wealth
directly from businesses, in particular those that are unprotected (similar to a mafia-style racket)
or have broken the informal rules. In Russia, property rights are conditional, and can be revoked
at any time; if Putin decides that a business’ assets are better served belonging to the state, he
possesses the means to seize them (Markus 2015). The way these raids are handled by the elite
also demonstrates the mechanism by which responsibility for the schemes can be obfuscated, a
mechanism that is distantly reminiscent of the imperial institution of joint-responsibility
(Ledeneva 2006). The responsibility for the theft of corporate assets is shared evenly across
multiple individuals from multiple networks, ensuring maximum cooperation and decreasing the
likelihood that the actions will be punished. When people are held responsible for the takeovers,
it is more than likely because there is an inter-network conflict occurring, comparable to gang
warfare (for an example, see the Three Whales case (Meakins 2018)). A final point that the
corporate takeovers demonstrate is how ordinary businessmen, with the right connections and the
right amount of money, can take advantage of the power and greed of political officials to
accomplish their own goals in a system that often seems stacked against them.
Indeed, remaining loyal and following the fluid strictures of the informal code of conduct
can provide more than just monetary rewards, it can also provide valuable protection. As such,
mobilizing one’s network can provide a powerful means of getting out of trouble; for example, a
well-placed phone call by a court chair can help either commute a sentence or ensure it never
gets enforced (Hendley 2007; Karklins 2002; Ledeneva 2008). Another way officials are
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protected is by state awards and appointments to diplomatic positions; possessing state awards
can ensure maximum leniency from the Russian justice system, while a foreign consul position
can directly bestow diplomatic immunity (Åslund 2019). To some extent, however, protection in
this system can also mean protection from the system itself. If one’s loyalty is found to be in
question, any amount of blackmail, real or fabricated, can be produced, reinforcing loyalty to the
system and making an exit from it significantly more difficult.
Ultimately, Russia is run by a network of clans that vie and rely on each other, who
privatize the rewards of doing business while nationalizing the risks. It is often easier to discuss
this system using Putin’s network and the elites at the top as examples due to the plethora of
research conducted concerning the topmost elites in the system; but corruption occurs at all
levels, including, as we shall see, at the level of the average citizen, resulting in a kind of legal
nihilism in the country. And though the lines between political and economic actors in Russia
have blurred significantly, there is still a distinct space that both continue to occupy. In the next
section, I will discuss how more meso-level businesses are able to survive in this predatory
environment.

Enterprise Survival Through Schemes and Influence
Although modern Russian businesses no longer have the pressures of a centrally planned
economy to contend with, pressure from the top-down continues to persist in some form or
another, whether by overbearing taxation or the threat of corporate takeover. As such, informal
institutions continue to be useful for businesses that are trying to turn a profit in a hostile
economy. Perhaps more unique to the modern economic climate, however, is that threats come
from both powerful political elites as well as well-connected competitors. Indeed, the
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competitive business atmosphere brought on by capitalism has presented [] a new slate of
challenges, and the pressure coming from multiple fronts rewards those business-owners most
capable of strategically hiding their money and keeping a low profile.
As the subject of investigation moves from higher-level political-economic actors to
meso- and low-level actors, research proves to be more scarce, and these limitations bear
addressing at the outset. This is due in part to the overwhelming success of businesses hiding
their more illicit transactions. Identifying, let alone decoding, any single financial scheme can
take a significant amount of work, given the complicated chains of transactions undertaken by
and through companies in multiple sectors. The firms that participate in these transactions may
not even exist for more than a couple of days at a time, thanks to the practice of using shell
companies. The discussion in this section also refers often to economic behavior from the 1990s,
due in part to the greater wealth of information from this period as well as the observation that
many of the economic behaviors observed in post-transitional Russia found their establishment
during this period of time. Other factors with a more academic origin include an exodus of
western scholars from Russia under Putin (known as “brain drain”), and an overwhelming
research interest in the crimes and corrupt acts committed by state actors, particularly those
associated with the networks and clans of the Russian president.
It is also important to address the fact that economic schemes affect particular sectors of
the economy more than others. Specifically, economic crime disproportionately affects the
energy sector, banks and financial corporations, consumer goods, and foreign trade. Some
sectors, such as information technology, are not as heavily affected. Regardless, the behaviors
discussed below are more than likely practiced in all sectors of the economy to some extent,
which permits discussion in a more generalized manner.
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Incentives for Breaking the Rules
It is fair to say that one of the predominant reasons why Russian businesspersons engage
in semi-legal and illegal economic schemes is because of the contradictory system of laws and
decrees that govern its operations. At best, every Russian businessperson must break the law at
some point in order to succeed in business (Vasileva-Dienes 2019: 338); at worst, following
every letter of the law would mean “society would stop in its development, [and] the economy
would collapse.” (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011: 68) One possible explanation for this is to
make it easier for the government to control the populace (“rule by law” as opposed to “rule of
law”), as it exposes everyone in the country to potential kompromat (Raiklin 2009: 411-412).
Exercising the law in this context becomes a matter of political or commercial interest instead.
Whether or not this is the case, issuing bribes and exploiting legal loopholes can assist Russian
businesspersons to “grease the wheels” of bureaucracy, so to speak (Krylova 2017).
Another reason why Russian businesses engage in economic schemes is in order to avoid
an overbearing taxation system. Taxes are an effective vehicle of rent-seeking, so Russians who
want to keep their profits are better off trying to hide the full value of their assets (Dzarasov
2014; Gustafson 1999; Kosals 1999: 18; Shlapentokh 2007; United Nations 2001). One example,
per Ledeneva (2006), is a 1997 law that forced tax-indebted companies to set up a special “taxdebtor’s account” (schet nedoimshchika) where money could be taken immediately and added to
the state budget. Companies in this situation were not even able to take out loans, because any
funds that went to their account would be removed automatically. Having a strong business full
of valuable assets can also make an attractive target for multiple different kinds of hostility, such
as the corporate raids mentioned in the previous section. As such, hiding profitable transactions

135

and disguising the value of your company in Russia often becomes a matter of survival in the
market.
Other incentives to commit economic crime abound. At a more basic level, the
opportunity for great levels of personal enrichment can be too tempting to pass up. Many
competitive advantages are available if one is willing to cheat, such as lower costs, more
manageable competition, and favorable sentencing from judges. The normative atmosphere of
the Russian business environment is also very permissible; if everyone is engaging in illicit
behavior, it starts to come off as foolish not to also engage in it (Chepurenko 2018; Brovkin
2003). In a system where the law is too confusing and contradictory to follow, individual and
group moral standards predominate, and norms such as fairness and keeping promises come to
the forefront. Finally, informal economic practices can buoy businesses that might otherwise
have failed to continue operating in normal market conditions (Carlsson et al. 2001).

Management Behaviors
The most popular economic scheme of the late 1990s and early 2000s was the extensive
use of barter transactions (Woodruff 1999; Seabright 2000; Yakovlev 2000). During this time,
Russia’s “economy of arrears” was reaching its zenith; companies were in debt with the
government, each other, and financial institutions, the government was in debt to different
organizations and enterprises, and both the government and enterprises were in debt to workers,
who were not being paid properly (Gaddy and Ickes 2002). The solution to this was to trade
physical goods and surrogate financial instruments (like promissory notes) instead of cash or
credit (Carlsson et al. 2001; Humphrey 2000; Schweitzer 2000: 12-15), or to even use debt
forgiveness as an object of barter (Anderson 2000; Yakovlev 2000), which could result in long
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chains of debt shifting that spanned multiple sectors of the economy (for example, getting a
friend to pay off the debt you owe to a supplier, but then that friend gets another friend to pay off
your debt in exchange for their services, and so on ad nauseum). The most liquid assets in the
barter economy (after cash) were promissory notes, oil, gas, and even food. Barter transactions
were often mediated by third parties, who were able to match supplies and demands, as well as
provide any needed liquidity to the exchange. These deals could be very lucrative to the third
party, and some were known to take advantage of their position, sometimes making off with the
goods being exchanged and putting the companies performing the transaction in a tight spot
where everyone is upset and the intermediary’s company mysteriously dissolves (Vinogradova
2006).
Barter transactions could be very complicated, and served a wide variety of uses. As
described above, goods and promissory notes could be used to settle outstanding debts or pay for
more inputs. An example of settling a tax debt via barter, per a respondent from Ledeneva 2006,
involves an industrial equipment firm contributing buses to the city’s budget:
The deputy director of a Ural enterprise producing industrial equipment reports that his
firm owes taxes to the local budget. Oil and gas equipment is supplied to Urangoi, one of
the Gazprom deposits, which pays gas to the Chilliabinsk metal plant. The Chilliabinsk
metal plant supplies metal to the Novogorod automobile plant, which supplies chassis for
buses to the Ural bus plant. The latter now has a debt to the former, but instead they agree
that the output of the Ural bus plant – buses – is accepted by the city budget in payment
of local tax from Ural oil and gas equipment enterprise. (pp. 129-130)

Goods produced by a firm could also be used to pay employees, who could then either use the
goods or sell them themselves (Clarke 2000). This form of payment was more valuable
depending on the industry; working in the oil and gas sector would likely yield more liquid
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goods, as would food packaging plants and tool factories. Other companies, such as those that
produced furniture and clothing, provided goods that were much more difficult to sell and trade,
on the part of both the individual worker and the company as it tried to settle debts.
Although barter exchanges were ubiquitous in the late 1990s and early 2000s, evidence
suggests that their use slowly decreased in popularity throughout the 2000s (Lonkila 2011: 63;
Olsson 2008). In its place, bribes (which are discussed later) grew in popularity (Frye, Yakovlev
and Yasin 2009). This demonstrates an important point about financial schemes – that they
change and adapt based on the evolving legislative landscape, always seeking to take advantage
of new loopholes. These loopholes may be added on accident, but they could also be added due
to extensive lobbying efforts or by government representatives with deep-seated interests (Frye
2002).
The use of shell firms (also known as spin-off firms, scam firms, monkey firms, etc.) is
one of the most important tools of the Russian corporation today, whose infamy as a financial
scheme has even seen coverage in international news reports (Harding and Hopkins 2017; The
Moscow Times 2019; Roman Anin 2016). These schemes are particularly difficult to unravel due
to their complexity and opaqueness, and so are often discovered over the course of other
investigations that “follow the money” (such as those concerning particular oligarchs).
Enterprises looking to hide their transactions can set up multiple layers of these firms, which can
be likened in appearance to matrioshkas, or Russian nesting dolls. They may be best known for
their role in capital flight and money laundering schemes, which permits Russian businesspeople
to hide profits offshore (Brovkin 2001; Burger 2009; Bowen and Galeotti 2014). However, they
also serve to obfuscate both internal and external finances. When used internally, they can
minimize taxes, reduce profits, and otherwise confuse outsiders. When used externally, they can
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organize outgoing capital flows and be used in payments to other companies. Shell companies
are important in asset stripping efforts, permitting owners and rivals alike a method of stealing
capital (Brovkin 2001), or possibly offering a modicum of protection against such threats.
Many financial schemes begin and end with the strategic use of bribery. A kickback
(Otkat) is perhaps one of the most flexible tools in the Russian businessperson’s toolbox. A
properly administered kickback (or series of kickbacks) can serve a wide variety of uses, from
obtaining business licenses, to ensuring loans from a bank, to aiding in false reporting measures,
and even in ensuring that legislation is drafted favorably or that the state budget is administered
with bias (Karklins 2002; Lovell, Ledeneva and Rogachevskiı̆ 2000; Vasileva-Dienes 2019).
Indeed, many of the most popular financial schemes were only possible with the endorsement of
the state, and as long as state officials continue to benefit from the arrangements, they have no
reason to withdraw their endorsement (Shlapentokh 2007: 55). Multiple sources suggest that
bribery, or at least attention to it, has increased over the course of the 2000s (Frye, Yakovlev and
Yasin 2009; Lonkila 2011); however, giving any concrete numbers can be difficult due to a
variety of research limitations. For one, issuing bribes is a sensitive subject, and not something
people are readily willing to admit to. Further, corrupt government officials can receive
kickbacks in ways other than direct bribes, primarily by joining a network and gaining a direct
stake in the network’s profits, such as in cases where politicians “moonlight” in both public and
private roles (Sakaeva 2019).
The nature of bribery suggests a more sterile and economistic transaction, which stands in
stark contrast to the practices typically associated with blat. Blat relations in the post-Soviet
business context have changed, and many have observed that the practice has been slowly
decreasing in use, considering the economics of scarcity are not a feature of the new capitalist
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system (Ledeneva 1998). The economic costs of engaging in it are considered much differently
when profit margins are on the line – the CEO of a small company needs to deeply consider the
risks and benefits behind, for example, hiring someone’s child in exchange for a government
contract. The network-oriented nature of the Russian citizenry instead gives way to a more subtle
interpretation of blat, one where coworkers and colleagues rely on each other for
recommendations for anything business-related, such as office space, business ideas, jobs and
starting capital. While mediated contacts can provide avenues to engage in more illicit informal
economic practices as well, there is a brighter side to the role of networks, providing strong
interpersonal bonds between workers via mutual cooperation and friendly rituals, such as
birthday celebrations (Salmi 2006).
This behavior should sound familiar, and indeed it has many similarities to the kind of
networking that occurs all around the world (Mattson and Salmi 2013). The difference with this
practice in Russia, however, is how integral it is to the system, as well as potential differences in
the content of these relationships. Work is often seen as a “second home” for Russians, and they
are known to establish strong personal ties to bosses, coworkers, and places of work (Morris
2016: 267; Schleuning 1998; Spencer 2009). Additionally, a recommendation from a coworker
carries a significant amount of weight, ensuring for the inquirer that the resource can be trusted
and is of high quality. High levels of interpersonal trust are crucially important given the lowtrust environment of the Russian economy, and have helped facilitate the various informal
institutions discussed throughout both this section and the rest of the post-Soviet period (Mattson
and Salmi 2013; Puffer and McCarthy 2011).
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Criminal Enterprise
Of course, strong networking behavior by Russians is helpful for those businesspersons
looking to exploit the economy and the legal system. Due to the way the transition played out,
those who would be considered criminals at the end of the Soviet era found their underground
businesses legalized with the adoption of capitalist principals, in addition to capital provided by
joint ventures with foreign firms (Tomass 1998). Criminal enterprises also benefited significantly
from the privatization program during the transition (Galeotti 2004; Cheloukhine 2008), using
the wealth obtained through the Soviet second economy as the starting capital. Further, many
criminal groups benefitted heavily from the “violent entrepreneurism” of the 1990s, such as the
widespread racketeering schemes perpetrated on small businesses (called krishy, or “roofs”)
(Stephenson 2015; Tomass 1998; Volkov 2002; United Nations 2001).
What emerged from these trends was the penetration of the economy by criminal groups,
who organized into what Cheloukhine and Haberfeld (2011) describe as Organized Crime
Networks (OCNs). These networks often span multiple sectors of the economy in such a way
that banks, factories, etc. can feed into a single network, making economic schemes of many
different kinds far more simple and self-contained (Galeotti 2004). This gives all of the
businesses under the umbrella of a single OCN the protection afforded by judges, FSB officials,
and other law enforcement agencies that have been integrated into the network (Dubova and
Kosal 2013; Gustafson 1998; Kryshtanovskaia 1997; Stephenson 2015). Having judges in their
network ensures that any legal issues that have made their way into the courts are ruled in favor
of the OCN; FSB officers gather intelligence, assessing potential threats and using their
administrative power as it is needed; and the officials at other agencies grant favorable treatment
in transactions associated with customs, immigration, the labor department, etc. Although state
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officials can be incorporated into OCNs using bribes and other incentives (such as free services,
favorable financing, and low- or no-rent housing), members of the network might establish
themselves in state organs themselves as a way to access its resources (Sakaeva 2019).
When an OCN targets a business for inclusion into its network, there are multiple
different schemes that can serve to bring the business under control. Utilizing contacts in state
and law enforcement agencies is one such method, barraging the company with investigations
and potentially even forced bankruptcies (Adachi 2006). Methods involving the manipulation of
a corporation’s governance might include buying a controlling amount of shares in a particular
company, or replacing key leaders with OCN members, allowing them to steer the company or
just extract profits through the use of transactions with a shell company (Adachi 2006; Estrin and
Prevezer 2010). The use of extortion or the threat of violence is also a compelling method, if
perhaps more blunt than the aforementioned.
There are, without a doubt, problems with the ways these criminal networks operate;
however, the informal practices they utilize serve an important role in navigating the modern-day
Russian economy. Using corrupt government officials to co-opt or eliminate competition is
strongly anti-market behavior, weaponizing the rule of law instead of letting the market sort out
the strongest enterprises. Luckily, the same tactics being used by businesses to control other
businesses can provide defense against this kind of behavior, often making the use of these
practices a matter of survival in the business landscape (Sakaeva 2019; Yakovlev, Sobolev and
Kazun 2014). Indeed, whether the enterprise in question is attempting to evade predatory taxes or
avoid having their company stripped of assets, the tools of business are available to combat it.
This does, however, have severely negative implications for small- and medium-sized businesses
who may not have the budget or connections to operate successfully, making this environment
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particularly inimical to startup companies (Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz 2008). Some sectors,
such as information technology (which is harder to strip of assets), make for valuable exceptions
to this analysis.
Ultimately, it is impossible to deny the widespread presence of informal practices in the
Russian economy (McCann 2000; Puffer and McCarthy 2011; Vasileva-Dienes 2019). Enterprise
survival hinges on it, and maximizing profits requires underhanded techniques to destroy
competition and to acquire the capital to continue expanding (or to otherwise hide offshore in
international banks). The practices are both competitive and anti-competitive in the market; both
supportive and subversive of the system as a whole; and time will tell if Russia will be able to
attenuate some of the more self-destructive impulses of market actors.
In the next and final section of this chapter, I will look at how the average citizen uses
informal norms and practices to navigate in post-Soviet Russia, thereby demonstrating how
ubiquitous blat and bribery is throughout the entire system.

The Pervasiveness of Blat and Bribery Throughout the System
In the final section of the chapter, daily life in Russia again appears to be affected by the
pervasive norms of informality that permeate the country. Although most of the behaviors
described over the course of this section may not be illegal, or even morally questionable,
reliance on one’s personal networks demonstrates how important knowing the right people can
be in satisfying important needs, such as employment or medical treatment.
Similar to the previous section, there is difficulty in finding a wide variety of sources that
describe the informal behaviors of the average Russian citizen. We can again point to the exodus
of Western scholars, which leaves much of the research in native Russian, making it inaccessible
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to the current study (see the methodology section for details). As a result, much of the research in
this area tends to lean more heavily on practices that took place in the 1990s at the expense of
practices in the 2000s and 2010s, particularly in the case of my core sources (Salmi (2006) and
Clarke (2002); see the appendix for details). Despite this bias, practices form after the 1990s
period are still referenced, indicative in my discussions of the healthcare and educational sectors
(the latter of which is supported by my third core source, by Golunov (2014). There is benefit to
this, though – the prevalence of familiar practices during this time shows that many of the
institutions of interest were able to withstand the turbulence of the transition. As the economy
began to calm down after the economic crisis of the late 90s, and Vladimir Putin stabilized the
political situation by centralizing power, it appears highly likely that, if these institutions did not
disappear in the wake of an intense critical juncture, any change that would occur during a period
of relative normalcy would be more gradual, if change were to happen at all. Of course, this does
not mean that the presence of these informal institutions in the 90s are taken for granted; where
research could be located that supports these behaviors as persistent trends, they have been cited.
Taking these institutions for granted also risks underappreciating the role that modern contexts
have in shaping them, and as a result missing out on important details that help us understand the
unique variety of capitalism present in post-Soviet Russia (Humphrey 2002).

Micro-Level Behaviors
Many discussions of blat in the 1990s focus on whether or not the practice has been in
decline. Ledeneva (1998) herself makes this case, arguing that the economy of scarcity had
eliminated the need to use personal relationship networks to source difficult-to-find services and
commodities, as well as changes in attitudes towards “favors of access.” However, there is much
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evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, that shows how Russians have continued to use their
personal social networks in order to navigate the economy, as exemplified in this section. Blat
may have been observed as declining for a wide variety of reasons, such as the increased effects
of inequality (discussed below), or simply the decline in the use of the word, being replaced, for
example, with a preference for phrases like khoroshoe znakomstvo (a useful acquaintance)
(Busse 2001: 174). Ledeneva eventually backpedals on her initial conclusion, admitting in 2006
that scarcity in goods and services has been replaced with scarcity in money (Ledeneva 2006).
Indeed, one of the most common uses of Russian social networks is in finding work
(Gorisov 2005). Knowing someone can not only help acquire a job (Gerber and Mayorova 2010;
Morris 2011; Yakubovich 2005; Yakubovich and Kozina 2000), but it can also help find a
second job that can supplement meager incomes (Pavlovskaya 2004). It is a common sentiment
that, if presented with the opportunity for a second job, Russians will happily accept, and for a
wide variety of reasons. Already mentioned were the poor wages (and, in the arrears crisis of the
1990s and beyond, sometimes the complete lack of wages) and low numbers of hours that many
Russians suffer (Gerber 2006), but having a second job is also beneficial in the event that one
loses their primary job, providing an income stream that can be fallen back on. Many Russians
will also undertake secondary work in a skill they are well versed in, making small-scale
entrepreneurial activity not an uncommon activity (Williams and Round 2007). This takes some
very familiar forms, such as repair work, driving, street trading, etc (Busse 2001; Dubova and
Kosal 2013; Gorisov 2005; Mannila and Eremicheva 2018), and may also serve as a primary
source of income. This kind of work is very difficult to measure, however, since Russians would
rather not report economic activity that could be subject to taxation (Chepurenko 2018). Many
jobs in formal workplaces are also based on informal agreements, leading to lower tax bills and
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greater flexibility for both employers and employees, although it can readily lead to exploitative
situations for workers as well (Bizyukov 2016; Timofeyev 2013; Williams and Round 2007).
The scarcity of money in the economy also means that Russians have been reported
having relatively permissive attitudes regarding asking for loans from friends and family. Indeed,
studies have shown that Russians have demonstrated a willingness to even ask neighbors if they
can borrow money, allowing for the wide use of the social network in order to make up for
shortfalls. Particularly in the 1990s, when inflation was running rampant, loans could almost be
considered a gift exchange since the money returned at the end of the loan was unlikely to be
valued the same unless it was paid back in a short time period. The strength of such informal
channels also means that microfinance has very strong effects on levels of trust and even
corruption (Mosley et al. 2004).
Personal garden plots are another important aspect of Russian personal networks, and one
that is very well known outside of Russia. Russians are very fond of gardening, and the practice
is often attributed to their ability to survive in difficult times, such as severe economic downturns
(Ries 2009; Southworth 2009). However, these plots are not always a great way to save money
on groceries, given the produce being replaced was usually cheap (carrots, potatoes, etc.), the
large costs to getting started, and the need for transportation in order to get to the gardens, which
were often kept out at the dachas on the outskirts of towns (Rose and Tikhomirov 2013).
However, growing one’s own food (or sourcing it from a local farmer) reassured consumers who
have difficulty trusting the supply chain of foreign foods (Humphrey 2002; Gromasheva 2019).
Personal garden plots were also beneficial for keeping the gifting cycle going in Russian
networks. Home grown fruits and vegetables were a great gift to give members of one’s network,
and plots were often shared by relatives, friends, and close neighbors (Ries 2009; Zavisca 2003).
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Small lots are much more important in rural areas, where keeping such personal gardens could be
seen as a kind of secondary (or even primary) employment (Metzo 2001; Visser et al. 2015).
Indeed, the plots kept by residents of rural areas have even had some detrimental effect on
commercial farming, since the small plots are subsidized by the state, and commercial
agriculture is highly inefficient, leading to an imbalance in sources of agricultural products
(Prosterman et al 1997; Gromasheva 2019).
Networks were also very beneficial for sourcing a variety of services, in particular
education and health care. Knowing a doctor, or someone who knew a doctor, was a boon for
Russians. Access to doctors could be used by those who had trouble trusting the public health
system, or who felt cheated after paying out of pocket for a private clinic (per the previous
section, recommendations from those in one’s network is seen as an assurance of high quality
and reliability) (Rivkin-Fish 2005). Doctors could also be used to obtain access to expensive and
difficult-to-source medications. While certain medications, such as insulin, are technically
available for free to the public, they are typically reserved for more vulnerable populations, such
as the elderly, or those willing to pay a premium. Doctors had far more freedom in their ability to
access medication, and according to Salmi (2006), could be a huge boon for members of their
networks; those with relatives in the more rural areas can also extend their access to family who
might not otherwise be able to find it, or at least not be able to afford it in less developed areas.
Finally, doctors could take VIPs into their clinics for free services.
Indeed, knowing a doctor, or someone who knows a doctor, can be highly beneficial.
Regardless, most Russians tend to pay for their healthcare in some form or another, as patients
need to provide some kind of informal payment in the form of bribes or a gift (Aarva et al. 2009;
Antonova 2016; Fotaki 2009). This is despite the fact that Russia has universal healthcare
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(Danishevski at al. 2006). Patients who could not afford the informal payments often disregarded
the advice of their doctors (Antonova 2016), perhaps because they did not trust their doctor’s
advice when no payments were issued. The problems this creates cannot be understated;
Russians have low life expectancy (which has been decreasing since the 1960s) and high
incidence of diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis (Shishkin and Vlassov 2009).
Healthcare is not the only service that has seen its fair share of bribes; the university
system in Russia is replete with corruption and cheating. Students and their parents have made
extensive use of bribes in order to pass classes and finish their degree without much fuss, and
teachers have been more than happy to comply (Osipian 2012; Shevchenko and Gavrilov 2007).
Teachers are very poorly paid in Russia, making as much as janitors and shop assistants, and
they are also seriously overworked, which does not permit them much time to accurately grade
students’ efforts (Gel’man 2015; Gerber 2018; Hare and Lugachev 1999). Teachers also face
various pressures from school administrations to not fail students, due to a focus on statistics and
efficiency, while also assuring that the income that students bring is not stymied by them being
removed from their programs. Poor salaries can be further supplemented by embezzling grants
and other funds, and the answers to exams can also be sold for profit. Outside of bribery,
teachers have been known to give good marks to relatives and the children of network
acquaintances, and pressure from university administration sees the students of powerful
politicians and businesspersons through the university system very quickly (Osipian 2012;
Shevchenko and Gavrilov 2007).
There are other ways to cheat in the Russian university system, such as plagiarism and
“cribbing.” Plagiarism is a serious problem in Russian academia (Chawla 2020; Gel’man 2015;
Makarova 2017). Not only are research papers plagiarized, but teachers may plagiarize in order
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to fill out their lectures (given their aforementioned time constraints). Laws governing
plagiarizing make it very tricky to call out plagiarism, since the plagiarism must be literal,
allowing offenders to rewrite works in such a way that they keep all of the original meaning but
with different wording. Further, if the accusation of plagiarism is not borne out, the accuser
could face charges of libel. Students from undergraduate to graduate studies may pay to have
ghost writers do their work for them, writing anything from term papers to full-blown original
research projects, the cost scaling with the amount of work required, which also requires writers
with the proper credentials to produce the works of more serious papers. Ghost writing is not
terribly expensive because of the fierce competition in the field; however, skimping on the
payment for these services can still have its drawbacks, because ghost writers are not above
plagiarism, either. Finally, students have many ways of cheating on exams (cribbing) (Makarova
2017), particularly with the proliferation of internet access. Some university bookstores may
even sell brochures full of exam answers.
There are many more examples of different kinds of resources that are transmitted
through Russian informal network practices. Various goods, like groceries and foreign
commodities, as well as services, like childcare and house-sitting, are also sourced from friends,
family, and the workplace (Pavlovskaya 2004; Williams and Round 2007). Goods and services
may also be paid in kind; for example, a teacher paying a doctor friend for medicine by offering
to tutor the child(ren) of the doctor (Lonkila 1998). Recall from the previous section the
observation that many incomes during the arrears crisis were also paid in kind. In certain
situations, because payments in-kind do not involve the exchange of money, it can be far more
difficult to see and prosecute the exchange as a bribe (Polese 2008). Finally, informal payments,
either in cash or in kind, were made to grease any number of other services (aside from the
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examples of healthcare and education discussed above) provided by state officials, in particular
those services that were supposed to be guaranteed as free by Russian law (Humphrey 2002;
Shlapentokh 2007: 45).

Modern Trends of Individual Informality
One persistent theme that can be identified in literature on Russian personal social
networks is the role that inequality has played in the above institutions and their practices. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the social guarantees of the communist system, such as
full employment and housing, went with it, while others were skewed by corruption, like the
health and educational institutions discussed above. The aforementioned observation that
networks seemed to be declining in use may also be because the networks appeared to shrink
considerably in the post-Soviet period, a trend no doubt exacerbated by shifting social
stratification; “Social networks have become less accessible to the lower classes, but has
ballooned in volume for the upper classes” (Ledeneva 2013: 8). Russians tend to keep networks
within the same social class, a behavior which is mediated in part by norms of reciprocity; it is
difficult to exchange gifts with someone who cannot give something of similar value in return.
Unfortunately, inequality in social networks reproduces inequality, as the lower classes cannot
suggest well-paying jobs to each other that could alleviate their circumstances, or to provide
money loans that can do more than temporarily stave off financial ruin (Gerber 2018). Social
networks for the lower classes are, as such, far more central to solving problems on a regular
basis (Busse 2001; Pavlovskaya 2004) or even as a means of survival (Stephenson 2001).
Many of the behaviors regarding education in Russia also demonstrate the unequal access
to particular goods and services. Those from higher income brackets are more easily able to

150

afford the high price tag that comes with systematically cheating (Shevchenko and Gavrilov
2007). Those in the higher echelons are even able to purchase multiple degrees, collecting them
as a sign of prestige, regardless whether or not they were earned honestly (and there are typically
few illusions that they were). Some institutions in Russia are known for producing degrees with
little attendance from the students pursuing them, earning these universities the reputation of a
“degree mill.” Those with less money need to make do with studying honestly, doing their own
cheating on the internet, or making use of teachers in their personal networks.

Summary
The culture of informality clearly continues to persist in Russia well after the transition
from communism to capitalism. Strong interpersonal networks form the bedrock of many of the
behaviors described in this chapter, demonstrating the high value of trust in politics, the
economy, and everyday life. Corruption also gives strong foundations to many of these
behaviors, permitting corporations and individuals alike to use powerful government officials for
their own ends. Although the specific practices may differ based on the group in question and the
level of analysis, ubiquitous disregard of formal institutions represents a common theme, in
effect taking the entire playing field into the informal arena.
The corrupt actions of Russian elites in the post-Soviet era are well understood and often
reported on, thanks to the interest of investigative journalism and academic studies. However,
there are some observable differences between the presidencies of Yeltsin and Putin that bear
mentioning. For one, Yeltsin’s administration was more so under the control of business
interests, while under Putin the most powerful business interests are more or less centralized
around him. Further, elections were more competitive under Yeltsin, often being very cutthroat

151

and corrupted by kompromat campaigns, while under Putin the political system is far more
centralized and under stricter control. Regardless, elites under either presidency exercised their
power and connections to win elections, seize capital, and avoid scrutiny. The corporate takeover
is perhaps the most excessive example of property’s conditional nature, where officials have the
power to strip companies of their assets using dubious regulatory actions to nationalize entire
companies, or otherwise leave them bankrupt. Less excessive is elite participation in revenue
streams from private businesses, an activity that blurs the line between the public and the private
sector. Those unlucky enough to fall under the scrutiny of the law or the press are usually given
greater leniency if they know the right person(s).
Many Russian businesses make good use of this corrupt political-economic environment
in order to further their own private gains, or to simply survive in the context of an inimical
marketplace. Whether due to the contradictory legal system, oppressive taxation/rent-seeking, or
simply because there is good money to be made by being dishonest, most businesses in Russia
need to break the law at some point in order to remain solvent. Popular tactics include bartering,
bribing, co-opting government officials, and the extensive use of shell companies. These tactics
become all the more threatening when wielded by an enterprise (or series of enterprises) that
have origins in the criminal underworld, a development that was facilitated by the privatization
process. On the positive side, networking behaviors by Russians have also resulted in strong
work relationships, as well as a valuable tool for combatting the low trust market environment.
Indeed, relationships continue to be an important theme throughout all levels of the
economy. Despite the debate on whether or not blat continues to exist in the post-Soviet world,
many micro-level interactions continue to be driven by personal networks. These networks act as
a valuable resource for finding work, healthcare, and education, although higher quality services
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can still be obtained using gifts or bribes. Powerful connections can also be a personal boon,
making it easier to obtain a degree or permitting highly personalized attention at the polyclinic.
This unfortunately translates into severe inequality issues, which are exacerbated by the nowmissing social safety net that the Soviet Union used to provide, like guaranteed work and
housing.
The informal practices of the Soviet period, as retooled to fit the modern capitalist
context, may appear to outsiders as a failure of capitalism and democracy; however, their
presence is understandable given the historical context provided by the Soviet period. Perhaps a
more charitable explanation is that what we see in Russia is a localized version of capitalism
whose competition is driven by the strength of one’s power and connections, and with a tendency
for conflicts to become readily lopsided thanks to the government’s ability (and oftentimes
eagerness) to intervene. Alternatively, problems with the transition, the corruption of the
country’s leaders, and the contradictory legal system also provide reasonable explanations for
some of the excesses of this particular variety of Slavic capitalism.
Having discussed both Soviet and post-Soviet periods, I am now in a position to compare
and contrast the two. The historical continuity between them, as well as the ubiquity of informal
institutions, already has clear implications on analyses of authoritarian Varieties of Capitalism.
However, I will more clearly define what these implications are over the course of the next and
final chapter of this project.
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CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION
Now that both Soviet and post-Soviet periods have been discussed, comparison between
these two periods is now possible. Although some comparison has already taken place naturally
and periodically over the course of this paper, it is here that I will go into detail about how the
two Russian economic systems are so similar. The following section is divided in the same way
as the two major periods of interest have been: by institution. Specifically, Patrimonialism and
State Corruption, Enterprise Survival Through Schemes and Influence, and The Pervasiveness of
Blat and Bribery Throughout the System.
The institutions discussed in the following comparative analysis have strong implications
on my discussion of the theoretical implications of my work. The exploration of corruption,
informality, and meso-/micro-level economic coordination can assist in modifying current
theories of authoritarian capitalist variety, as well as provide ideas for future research agendas. In
the absence of an analysis of at least one other authoritarian country, my ability to construct a
unique framework for understanding authoritarian capitalist variety is impeded. Regardless, the
insights derived from this project provide valuable considerations regarding how capitalism can
form, and persist, under a centralized political structure. This theoretical discussion is expounded
upon in detail after my comparative analysis.

Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia in Comparison
Despite having completely different formal economic structures, Soviet and post-Soviet
Russia demonstrate a remarkable degree of similarity due to the informal means by which most
actors operate. This informality has proven not just useful over time, but in many ways is also
necessary in order to thrive and survive in a politically centralized and formally contradictory
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institutional context. What these informal institutions look like in their particularity may have
changed due to the vastly different circumstances embodied by the transition from communism
to capitalism, and even from imperialism to communism; however, the basic functionality
remains the same, and demonstrates the strong trajectory of these behaviors over the course of
Russian history.

Patrimonialism and State Corruption
Institutional behaviors by Russia’s elite class, whether the Nomenklatura or the
Oligarchs, demonstrate the patrimonial, top-down power relations in the country. Here, I will
compare and contrast these behaviors between the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.
The inextricable links between formal structures and informal processes is thematic
throughout both major historical periods. Although formal laws and institutions were not entirely
inapplicable, most of them could be circumvented by well-placed elites who benefitted from
protection by the state. This resulted in a significant number of benefits to their positions, such as
the ability to extract rents from multiple different sources, to manipulate the results of elections,
and to spread the benefits to one’s personal network of friends and family. The use of official
positions to benefit from one’s office is one of the stronger Russian institutions; during the time
of Imperial Russia, those who served the Tsars use their office to supplement their incomes by
collecting patronage, giving the practice a degree of long-term historical precedence. Property
rights during both Soviet and post-Soviet time periods were also precarious and readily subject to
being appropriated by the state, serving as another avenue of enrichment for elites. However, in
the event that a more powerful or well-connected elite is crossed during any of these informal
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activities, state protection can be placed in jeopardy, resulting in publicly-acknowledged
scandals or conflicts that were not unlike gang warfare in some instances.
Indeed, power could be taken away from elites just as easily as it was given. Networkfriendly behaviors permeated all of the institutions of interest, and prevented individuals from
making waves that could harm the interests of their colleagues and co-conspirators. Informal
rules also constricted the most reckless elites; large and conspicuous gains were risky, as it
opened up the possibility of bad press and the tarnishing of the reputation of those surrounding
the offender. It was also improper in both time periods to take from one’s benefactor. In Soviet
Russia this was the state, whereas in Post-Soviet Russia it is the executive’s (i.e., Putin’s)
network. Loyalty was an important characteristic for the powerful in Russia, and proving to be
disloyal came with harsh consequences. It is possible that this cooperative behavior was inherited
from the Imperial era through the institution of joint-responsibility (Ledeneva 2006); though by
the post-Soviet period, the institution would have been filtered through, combined with, and
changed by those of the Soviet period to the point where drawing a direct line becomes
somewhat tenuous.
Besides being capable of pursuing their own interests, elites were also capable of being
influenced by those without the same privileges given a strategic alignment of interests.
Corruption/patronage permitted citizens of many different backgrounds to influence their way
into the pockets of Russia’s most powerful. In both Soviet and post-Soviet contexts, these
behaviors facilitated economic activity that was otherwise hampered by the backwards systems
of both time periods. In the case of Soviet Russia, the operation of the second economy was a
crucial source of redistribution in an economic model that was otherwise inflexible and
inefficient. In post-Soviet Russia, informality also greases the wheels of bureaucracy, so to
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speak, in a system of governance that is contradictory and over-centralized, and a politicaleconomic system that is very lacking in trust. Admittedly, the argument in favor of informal
practices appears far stronger for the Soviet system than the post-Soviet; however, the argument
is not that informal institutions make sense in post-Soviet Russia, but that they possess a strong
institutional trajectory. Indeed, going back as far as the Imperial age, strategic influence could be
used to avoid more burdensome taxation efforts, as well as mandatory military service, lending
further strength to the practice’s apparent inertia.
A key difference in the practice of informal institutions in Soviet vs. post-Soviet Russia is
their overall visibility. Progress in information technologies like the internet and cellular phones
has made it easier than ever to track the movements of bad actors in Russia. Additionally,
previously difficult-to-penetrate geographic boundaries, i.e., the lifting of the “Iron Curtain,” has
further aided the flow of information. This has made it significantly easier for researchers to
study Russia from within, even despite the “brain drain” that occurred during Putin’s tenure. The
absence of the Iron Curtain has also made it easier for Russians to know more about their own
leaders from multiple sources, in addition to knowing more about what is going on in other parts
of the world, taking down disparities in information consumption in general. Putin has made his
best efforts to counteract this by tightly controlling media in the country; regardless, the options
that Russians have to consume media is still far greater than it was in the past, particularly with
newer and increasingly accessible technologies such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).

Enterprise Survival Through Schemes and Influence
Meso-level actors, such as factory managers and business owners, have often had to forge
their own informal institutions in opposition to an overcontrolling centralized government. While
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these actors are sometimes elite members of society, not all of them are so privileged,
necessitating a set of strategies that enable them to keep their businesses afloat. Here, I will
compare and contrast these behaviors between the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.
The subjects of economic analysis varies to some extent between the Soviet and postSoviet periods. Factories in general, whether in the military-industrial complex, raw materials, or
consumer goods, received the lion’s share of the attention in the Soviet period, whereas energy
and finance receives more attention in post-Soviet Russia. The reason for this is pretty clear;
factories and production in general were at the core of Gosplan and the Soviet ideology, whereas
after the USSR dissolved, the economy was opened up to the productive capacity of the rest of
the world, making them far less relevant in the post-Soviet context. As such, factories were
rarely mentioned throughout my research for the post-Soviet period, and instead those sectors
that see the greatest volume of wealth, as well as those most tampered with by the state and the
associated elite, were covered the most. Despite this difference in research subjects, however, the
two major periods of interest are still very similar when looking at informal institutions.
Russia has a history of governance defined by “rule by law,” in contrast to the “rule of
law.” Over the course of both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian history, businesses have found it
necessary to violate the formal rules in order to operate successfully. While this technically
opens up these businesses to the possibility of punishment, the benefits of these practices
overwhelmingly outweigh the risks. Soviet-era managers were able to meet the goals set by
Gosplan and, if they were lucky, receive a bonus. Post-Soviet managers were able to keep
turning a profit and retain control of their own business in the context of a predatory state and
high levels of taxation. Both time periods benefitted from greasing the wheels of a bureaucratic
system that was inefficient and contradictory, either by cooking their books or plying strategic
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influence. Officials who worked closely with businesses were incentivized to turn a blind eye to
more illicit behaviors, which aided in the success of these schemes. In the Soviet context in
particular, having good-looking official numbers reflected well on these officials, making it look
like they were doing well at managing their corner of the economy. In both time periods, though,
keeping rent streams flowing was a strong incentive to remain willfully ignorant or compliant.
Trust played a deeply important part in these activities, again bringing to the forefront the
networking behaviors of Russians. In a business context, knowing someone you can trust, who is
in a position that stands to benefit you and your firm, is invaluable. Key to this is the gifting
cycle, a key element of blat, which kept a smooth relationship going where exchanging favors,
both goods and services, allowed both parties to benefit from the position of the other. This
practice has seen an interesting evolution since the Soviet era, where it was integral to fulfilling
the terms of Gosplan; however, “self-interested giving” was also not an uncommon practice
during the Imperial era. In the transition period, debt was commonly traded, propping up the
“virtual economy” as described by Gaddy and Ickes. After Putin came to power, however,
bartering practices started to lose popularity, and appeared to be replaced by bribe transactions.
Blat in post-Soviet business contexts appeared to be increasingly about making and keeping
professional relationships, although important business activities, such as sourcing starting
capital and business ideas, can still be sourced through these close relationships. Regardless,
placing family and friends in important business positions (e.g., a board of directors) continues to
be practiced, particularly in those companies that can afford to hire someone that might not be
qualified for the job, and when the request is made by someone of high importance in the
network, and who can be hard to refuse.
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Criminal enterprise has also taken on an evolving status going into the post-Soviet period.
Soviet underground factories were difficult and complicated to get started, requiring a significant
amount of capital and just the right connections in order to pull off. The transition to capitalism,
through the loans-for-shares program and the legalization of private businesses, served as an
entry for the leaders of organized crime groups to enter business in a more official capacity. This,
as well as the business opportunities afforded by the violent entrepreneurism of the 1990s. PostSoviet Russia is, as a result, more deeply penetrated by criminal groups that form their own
networks of influence across both public and private domains.

The Pervasiveness of Blat and Bribery Throughout the System
Everyday life in Russia has often been regarded as difficult; however, informal
institutions have been shown to play a part in the Russian people’s survival strategies over the
course of history. Here, I will compare and contrast these behaviors between the Soviet and postSoviet periods.
Mentioned in the previous section was the changing notion of the term blat, and how it
has evolved in the post-Soviet business context. Indeed, this point also has a strong impact on the
operation of micro levels of informal institutional practice. Because goods are no longer scarce,
is there any reason for post-Soviet Russians to engage with informal institutions? As it turns out,
these institutions are indeed still dominated by informality, except instead of a scarcity of
commodities, Russia instead has a scarcity of money. This seems to be a logical extension of the
scarcity experienced under the USSR, due to the difficulty inherent in acquiring high quality
goods for reasonable prices, although the issue is possibly exacerbated by income inequality and
the lack of state-sponsored benefits that came with the transition to capitalism. Monetary scarcity
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in post-Soviet Russia means that jobs are in great demand, and opportunities for secondary work
are greatly appreciated. Meanwhile, rare goods such as foreign commodities, high quality
foods/alcohol, and opportunities for personal enrichment (e.g., concert tickets or vacation
opportunities) were more sought after in Soviet Russia. Personal networks were important
sources during both time periods, which, for a third time, brings up the topic of trust and the
value in having well-placed friends and family.
Trends in education and healthcare have largely stayed consistent across time periods. In
both instances, blat or bribery is thought to ensure high quality services in both sectors, and an
inability or refusable to pay is seen as disadvantageous. Despite these services being guaranteed
by the state, refusing to pay extra for healthcare translates to the patient having difficulty trusting
the doctor’s opinion, exacerbated by the high workload of medical professionals, resulting in
short visits and an incentive to value quantity over quality. Medicine under both time periods
was also unusually hard to source for the average citizen. All of these factors make having a
doctor in one’s personal network a very serious benefit, with likely direct effects on the length
and quality of life. Education also values supplemental payments for very similar reasons:
teachers, like health professionals, are also overburdened with high workloads, and often find
themselves underpaid, even as university faculty. These professionals typically have good
intentions, and want desperately to help their patients/students, but find it hard to do so given the
tight constraints of their economic/political/historical contexts.
This appears to be an opportune time to discuss a personal anecdote that supports this
discussion. My wife and I went on a trip to the Baltic states in the summer of 2016, and one of
the things my mother-in-law made sure to pack us with were various gifts from the US, such as
chocolate and alcohol. These gifts were to go to my wife’s grandparents, who live on the
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Lithuanian/Polish border, and who would use the foreign goods in their trips to the doctor. My
mother-in-law is also known to bring flowers to her doctors in the United States. Having grown
up under the USSR, these practices have stuck with her, and demonstrates how deeply ingrained
they are, even persisting into places like the United States, where these practices are not nearly as
common.
Outside of strictly utilitarian understandings of blat, it was also a valuable mechanism in
maintaining friendships. Gifting cycles, while maintaining obvious economic benefits,
strengthened relationships with friends, family, and neighbors in a valuable show of trust. It is, in
many ways, reminiscent of the early institutions of joint-responsibility and self-interested giving
that kept individuals afloat by relying on members of the community. Exchanges in both Soviet
and post-Soviet contexts could be as simple as one person babysitting someone else’s bird while
they’re away on vacation, and repaying the favor with fresh produce from a personal garden.
However, it could also take the form of lending money to a family member who is in dire straits.
The practices seem simple and not unusual on the surface, but problems of trust in Russia make
these interactions far more integral to the everyday life of the average Russia citizen. They rely
on many different economies, both formal and informal, in order to properly manage their
household (Pavlovskaya 2004).
Scarcity in the post-Soviet context is exacerbated by increasing levels of inequality.
Under the USSR, Russians had access to a wide variety of guaranteed services and commodities,
even if some of them may have operated more effectively with the use of bribes or gifts. These
social guarantees have largely vanished in post-Soviet Russia. Privatization during the 1990s
also helped to consolidate wealth, as well as the disastrous effects of the arrears crisis. This again
places deeper importance on personal networks and blat-like interactions, although inequality
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has also appeared to negatively effect the size of these networks, as post-Soviet Russians tend to
make friends with those more closely aligned to their own socio-economic strata. This has
further barriers to the movement of wealth from the upper classes to the lower classes.

Russian Informal Institutions and Capitalist Variety
The similarities between Soviet and post-Soviet Russia are very readily apparent. Their
striking informal institutions have sustained a strong momentum that has been building since the
fall of Imperial Russia, and which have seen evolution through both communism and capitalism.
But what do these institutions mean for building a new theory of authoritarian capitalist variety?
Russia’s robust configuration of informal institutions offers many different insights into
conceptualizations of capitalist varieties. However, it bears addressing that, due to the singlecase diachronic structure of this research project, the proper construction of a new theory in its
entirety becomes a painfully difficult task without a similar analysis of another authoritarian
state. A more productive task would be to use these insights to build on and critique prior
conceptualizations of authoritarian capitalisms, as well as suggest future research agendas.
As such, in this final section, I will begin by reflecting on the role of corruption in
Russia’s economy and how that impacts conceptualizations of authoritarian capitalisms. Next, I
will comment on how my research can improve on previous models of authoritarian capitalisms.
Finally, I will discuss future research agendas and how we might continue to develop a more
holistic model of authoritarian capitalisms.
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Capitalism and Corruption
As I stated in the introduction, the Varieties of Capitalism literature does not have a
strong appreciation of the role of informal institutions, and this research project has shown that
practices such as corruption and clientelism have a significant impact on the economic
coordination of various kinds of actors in Russia. Meanwhile, my findings also support a more
anthropological understanding of corruption due to the role that such practices have in
facilitating economic coordination. What follows is a discussion of these observations in detail.
The rent-seeking behavior of Russian officials is an institution that has been identified
throughout Russian history. Whether perpetrated by members of the Tsar’s administration, the
Soviet Nomenklatura, or the post-Soviet Oligarchs, Russian elites have used their station to
supplement their incomes and assist those close to them. While this practice is oftentimes
exploitative, other informal institutions, such as blat, have also permitted two-way relationships
to form that result in mutual benefits, allowing Soviet-era managers to keep up with the terms of
Gosplan and protecting post-Soviet businessmen from more predatory actors. It has also given
rise to an environment where “petty corruption,” such as bribing police officers, has been
allowed to increase in prevalence. This gives informal institutions a systemic quality, making it
exceedingly difficult to describe the Russian economy without also discussing informal
institutions.
Indeed, the intrinsic nature and evolving character of blat relations in particular has been
a source of contention throughout many of the works cited in this research project. This issue is
of chief concern to scholars such as Alena Ledeneva who argues from a soft-line perspective on
corruption and patron-client relations. She argues, in contrast to authors like Konstantin Simis
and in agreement with Joseph Berliner, that blat is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon that is
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undeserving of the stigmatization brought on it by Western legal biases. It has been used as a
way of circumventing the problems of bureaucratic red tape and scarcity issues throughout both
Soviet and post-Soviet periods, and is practiced by more than just the political elite. Even so, it is
important to note that the public did not always appreciate the protectionism that blat facilitated
amongst the administration, particularly when they were being manipulated and stolen from. Yet
these citizens who complained about the behavior of elites engaged in economic crimes
themselves, which required solidarity and reciprocal relations to manage. Perhaps, then, this
antagonism doesn’t reflect public opinion on corruption as much as it reflects the conflict
between Russian elites and the rest of the population, as described by Michael Voslensky (1984).
Evidence of this fact lies in the differing informal rules that dictated each class under the USSR;
for example, the elite discouraged theft from the state, while Soviet workers encouraged it.
Therefore, it might be more appropriate to not equate blat with corruption, but instead to
understand it as a social mechanism. But what kind of social mechanism is it? Scholars of the
Soviet second economy saw blat as an economic exchange, while anthropologists saw it as a
celebration of reciprocity and solidarity. The latter has presented empirical proof of individuals
criticizing blat’s characterization as a rational economic mechanism through interviews, where
respondents preferred to think of blat as engaging in a spirit of cooperation, survival, and
friendship (at least, whenever they describe the way they personally practice it). Meanwhile, the
former has hit on a very important point concerning blat, which is its serious economic
implications. The role of informal networks came to have an outsized effect on the economy,
particularly when more recognizable forms of underground exchange were considered. Yet to
what degree did people use reciprocity and solidarity to justify their actions and resolve cognitive
dissonances? The informal system tended to weed out “honest” people or else force them into its
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practices, which were possibly resolved psychologically through pro-social intentions. And to
what degree were scholars of the Soviet second economy ignoring the importance of these
intentions in favor of a more sterile and economistic explanation?
Post-Soviet understandings of blat are complicated by the declining use of the word and
the subsequent evolution of its practice. Although blat is no longer strictly necessary as a
mechanism of bringing ambiguity to bribery, it remains difficult to disaggregate the economistic
implications of blat relations, seeing as it still translates to favorable treatment at places like the
polyclinic, or in sourcing valuable opportunities, like work and vacation. Blat also continues to
carry negative implications even after the fall of the Soviet Union, as is evidenced in various
works, such as Markku Lonkila (2011), who lumps illicit network behaviors into the category of
blat. This tendency to equate blat with illicit behaviors may also exacerbate the “misrecognition
game” described by Alena Ledeneva, where one’s own blat activity is not recognized as such,
but when others do it, it is more readily recognized as blat. As such, acts of nepotism and other
more patrimonial/clientelistic behaviors may be more easily recognized as blat, whereas
acquiring work or asking your doctor for medical advice after-hours may not be readily
recognized as such.
My understanding of the subject leads me to see blat as a substitute for formal
mechanisms, and which are dictated by social contracts instead of legal contracts. With the
absence of an independent third party to mediate exchanges, a weak and often contradictory
system of laws, and a climate of scarcity, people turned to institutions that were familiar and
easier to understand. This kind of exchange looks very similar to earlier economies, where
individuals sought to protect social assets and exchanged goods with each other based on
principles of reciprocity and redistribution (Polanyi 2001: 45-58). In the context of the transition
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and the resulting mass upheaval of society, the persistence of this institution into the post-Soviet
period seems inevitable based on this interpretation of blat.
This interpretation, however, does not intend to downplay the important role that blat
plays in developing and maintaining relationships. These relationships are all the more important
in a low-trust environment that characterizes Russia’s political-economic system, and which
necessitates the use of networks to communicate resources of many different kinds. The fact that
blat networks revolve around close friends and family members only strengthens how central
relationship dynamics are, particularly in the face of arbitrary patrimonial structures and criminal
activity that can ruin lives if the wrong feet are stepped upon, so to speak. The trust that lies
behind these relationships is invaluable in the Russian context, and was one of the many
institutions taken for granted during the transition to capitalism.
The concept of blat, then, flips traditional conceptualizations of corruption on its head.
Yet the dark side of Russian corruption is still palpable; not only does the system generate
significant amounts of wealth inequality, but it may even have strong negative impacts on the
health and birth rate of the average Russian. The impacts on business are particularly salient:
“Preferential treatment of some firms over others and some sectors over others makes market
entry for new firms more difficult, suppresses the desire or need for innovation as a way of
gaining market share, and reinforces the tendency to invest in traditional and economically
‘reliable’ sectors over other sectors that might promote the country’s modernization but only in
the long run” (Dawisha 2014, 323). This research project is by no means intended to be an
endorsement of Russian corruption; however, its practice is crucial to understanding the logic of
Russian business activity, and is also an important consideration for any modernization agenda
that is undertaken in Russia in the future.
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Ultimately, blat, bribery, and corruption presents as a mechanism of economic
coordination that cannot be ignored by scholars of Varieties of Capitalism who are interested in
categorizing Russia’s economy. But how has this been treated in the literature to date, and how
can this research project improve upon current conceptualizations?

Reflecting on Russian Capitalist Variety
What have other theorists said about Russian capitalist variety? Several works were the
subject of discussion in the literature review of this research project; however, it was noted that
what has been published is disorganized and idiosyncratic. Regardless, a few studies in particular
stand out that can help structure the present discussion.
Perhaps the most robust model detailing an international comparison of authoritarian
capitalisms is the one offered by Buhr and Frakenberger (2014). These authors propose a new
dichotomous typology in the style of a sliding scale, reminiscent of the scale between Liberal
Market Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) originally posited by
Hall and Soskice (2001). The ideal types in the authoritarian model instead contrasts two
different kinds of “Incorporated Capitalisms”: Bureaucratic Market Economies (BMEs) and
Patrimonial Market Economies (PMEs). Incorporated capitalism remarks on the role of the state
as an actor in the economy, with the two different varieties describing the mechanisms by which
the state applies its influence. BMEs are more formally oriented, primarily using state agencies,
unions, and other formal structures to exert control over the economy. The paradigmatic cases
are China and Singapore. PMEs, by contrast, as more informally oriented, using personal
networks, clientelism, and other informal structures to exert control over the economy. The
paradigmatic cases are Russia and Saudi Arabia.
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There are several things that this study correctly identifies as characteristic of Russia’s
political economy. The patrimonial structure present under the authority of president Vladimir
Putin is indeed very controlling, a top-down method of interaction with the economy that is
operated through the use of close-knit networks of elites. While not quite as family-oriented as
Buhr and Frankenberger describe (unless they intended to use the term “family” more loosely),
close acquaintances and those who demonstrate unwavering loyalty are installed in positions that
offer strong control of particular sectors of the economy, such as banking and energy. Property
rights are conditional, as the state uses the law to crack down on those who have broken the
informal code, or have otherwise proven to be more valuable to the state; and select elites enjoy
immunity from prosecution thanks to their myriad connections in business, politics, and the legal
system. Clearly, the state exercises strong control over the population, as well as a heavy hand in
the operation of the economy.
Missing from their analysis, though, is a recognition of the operation of meso- and microlevel actors in the economy. This research project has shown how managers have used informal
strategies to circumvent the state, and to even use the state’s greed and ambitions to their
advantage. This institutional practice has evolved over the course of many years, as have the
methods of scheming, although they have evolved with the changes in the organization of the
economic, i.e., in the transition from communism to capitalism. State officials have shown to be
corruptible, and this corruption is a two-way street; the power wielded by state officials can be
used to eliminate private competition, circumvent official procedure, and provide insulation from
the law. Organized criminal enterprises in particular have demonstrated a strong talent for
incorporating state officials into their own personal networks, introducing these officials to
valuable sources of rent extraction with distinct mutual benefits to all parties. Even regular
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citizens make use of corruptible state actors to receive benefits such as better healthcare and
grades in school. This influence-from-below is so strong, that diving deeper into these
institutions can blur the lines of patrimonialism, raising questions regarding whether control over
the economy is strictly top-down, bottom-up, or even multipolar. Cheloukhine and Haberfeld
(2011) themselves remark on this dynamic, quoting the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma
Security Committee D. Ilyukhin in suggesting that “organized crime through corruption has
infiltrated ‘all corridors of government’ and that sometimes it is difficult to differentiate where
the real power is and where the organized crime that controls this power is.” (104).
This oversight is also apparent when historical analysis is considered. By ignoring
Russia’s political-economic history, Buhr and Frankenberger fail to notice the fluid relationship
between business and the state over time. During Yeltin’s time as president, business interests
arguably had greater control of the state, and were far more capable of directing the state due to
how crucial their economic support was for politicians to remain in power. If we look further
back in time, Stalin’s overcontrolling rule was eventually replaced by increasingly weaker
leaders. During the time of the USSR, this trend culminated in an institutional arrangement under
Brezhnev where informal institutions were at their most pervasive. This leads us to an interesting
question: once Putin is no longer capable of running the state, will he elect a weaker leader than
him? And what will happen to the state’s dominance over the economy? Will Russia move once
more towards a system of state capture as successive leaders find themselves increasingly
beholden to private interests?
Ultimately, my critique of the Buhr and Frankenberger model of BMEs vs. PMEs, as well
as other state control-oriented models of authoritarian capitalisms, can be understood succinctly
as a vivid disagreement with the conceptualization of these economies as predominantly state-
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controlled, top-down, patrimonial, etc. While the concept is readily leveraged, and simple to
apply across multiple world economies, it is a form of theorization that has often seen overuse by
other authors of authoritarian economies, making their heavy reliance on it for their model
somewhat cliché. There are more to these economies than understanding how the state intervenes
in the coordination of business activities, and using this to typologize authoritarian capitalisms is
a painfully obvious choice. The problem is, more elaborate typologies of authoritarian capitalism
requires intensive qualitative case study to tease out the many other differences. This research
project does not even scratch the surface of the different aspects of Russian economic
coordination, choosing instead to concentrate on the mechanisms of informal coordination as an
avenue of critique for those models that are overly top-heavy.
Indeed, taking on the perspective of a less privileged firm in post-Soviet Russia leads to a
very different perspective of the national economy. The Russian economy for SMEs (and even
some large companies) often seems like an arms race: when new laws are created to prevent
certain kinds of tax avoidance/evasion, actors come up with new ways to circumvent these laws.
The new laws may also come with pre-fabricated loopholes, put in place by clever lobbyists. In
this way, government and business work hand in hand to both thwart and support government
and business; or, in Ledeneva’s words, the system is both self-replicating as well as selfsubversive. While many deals play out on paper, many others are also made on nothing more
than a handshake, which makes uncovering and decoding these deals all the more difficult. The
overwhelming reason why deals are made may be to dodge taxes, but personal gain is a strong
motivator as well. Informal norms dictate how far you can take your scheme before you get
called out and your business potentially seized; but there are ways to prevent yourself from
losing everything in a raid as well.
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Such an adverse environment for business has translated to a low-trust environment,
which places a great deal of importance on personal networks. This is another aspect of the
Russian economy that other models astutely identify. However, it is exceedingly important to
recognize that networking is not a privilege enjoyed only by Russia’s elite. Personal networks
permeate nearly every stratum of society, an organizing principle that facilitates the distribution
of resources at all levels, although the usefulness of these networks scale, to some extent, based
on the effects of inequality. Indeed, with the absence of an independent third party to mediate
exchanges, a weak and often contradictory system of laws, and a climate of scarcity, networking
brings an element of trust to transactions. This trust becomes all the more important when the
health and well-being of one’s firm or family is on the line. As such, the risk involved when
making such transactions with unfamiliar actors can be too difficult to manage without a
mediating contact at the very least. It is for this reason that any attempts to “modernize” Russia’s
economy will need to develop alongside these institutions, and not in opposition to them.
The problems inherent to top-down models of authoritarian capitalist variety should be
clear, based on the above analysis. However, now that I have addressed the problems in the state
of the literature, are there any identifiable solutions? And how can this inform a future theory of
authoritarian capitalism?

Towards a New Model of Authoritarian Capitalism
The lessons learned over the course of this research project leaves ample space for future
research with the goal of bringing us closer to a multi-faceted theory of authoritarian variety.
Again, one of the greatest limitations to this project is its organization as a single case study,
leaving open the possibility of replication in the context of another country, such as China.
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Research has shown that China also has informal institutions that are similar in some respects to
Russia’s blat (known as guanxi) (Ledeneva 2008). Further extensions could also see
comparatives performed on certain Latin American or Middle Eastern countries.
Due to the subject of my research project, informal institutions in Russia, I am in the best
position to consider a future typology that relies on an analysis of this mechanism of
coordination. Understanding the degree of penetration of informal institutions in various national
economies could provide us with a scale of authoritarian capitalisms based on informality.
Russia then becomes paradigmatic of such a model, since their economy is so deeply penetrated
by informality, networks, and ambiguous exchanges (i.e., blat). This typology brings us back
towards agreement with Buhr and Frankenberger’s model. Although I spent most of the last
section critiquing this model, it is still a very effective way of understanding the coordinating
mechanisms of authoritarian economies. However, if we instead reevaluate it without centering
the analysis around an over-appreciation of the state as an economic actor, then countries such as
China may actually fall closer on the scale to countries like Russia. Further, understanding the
role of informal institutions in various state economies might even give us a way to more readily
compare authoritarian and democratic forms of capitalism.
Considering the penetration of informal institutions in economic coordination also sheds
light on other aspects of the economy, specifically issues that affect trust. For example, is the
presence of strong informal institutions a result of weak legal institutions? If a country wields the
letter of the law similarly to the way it is done in Russia, then the risk of being apprehended by
authorities comes to have an outsized impact on economic activity, necessitating strong
discretion in activity of all kinds. This risk increases depending on the interests of the state and
the subject of the activity. What if the presence of strong informal institutions is a result of
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powerful, organized criminal enterprise? Similar problems to an overbearing central authority
present themselves, with the exception that the authority is not centralized. In cases where
criminal enterprise and the state overlap, however, the problem is only compounded, and the
result is low levels of trust similar to what is experienced under Russia’s kleptocratic regime.
Russia also raises other interesting questions regarding the nature of authoritarian
capitalisms. Previously, I mentioned that Russia may have a multi-polar power structure that
shifts depending on who is ruling the country; under Yeltsin the country experienced a greater
degree of state capture by businesses, whereas under Putin the political-economic dynamic was
more patrimonial. Does this same dynamic apply to other authoritarian capitalisms? Given that
authoritarian states are organized centrally and often around particular leaders, as well as their
trusted networks who have their own personalities and ways of ruling, do changes in leadership
also translate into more or less fluid types of capitalism? Does this mean we are able to
understand authoritarian capitalisms without also taking into account the historical development
of their institutions? All countries inevitably experience some degree of institutional drift, and
the leaders of these countries also rotate in and out of power due to electoral processes. Future
research could compare changes in economic institutions between leaders of both democratic and
autocratic countries to see if this has any impact on how we might classify their respective
economies.
Various problems exist when trying to fit different varieties of capitalism onto a sliding
scale. “Moving” from one side of the scale to the other becomes complicated when there are
several overlapping features between each variety, making such a movement problematic in
certain cases. This is a common problem identified in the Hall and Soskice model of capitalist
variety. One of the options we are left with is a consideration of the different ways we can
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distinctly categorize these capitalisms. Russia has multiple possibilities in this respect; we can
call Russia a post-communist variety of authoritarian capitalism, which could put it in the same
category as countries such as China and (arguably) Cuba. We can also call Russia a petro-state
capitalism, and explore the impact that an oversized energy sector has on economic coordination,
placing it in the same category as countries such as Saudi Arabia. We can also try to consider
differences geographically. There are many possibilities, and each provide an interesting avenue
for future research.
Without a doubt, there are other possibilities that cannot be conceptualized until more
research and more comparative is performed that examines the peculiarities of different
authoritarian national economies, in similar ways to Witt and Redding’s (2014) categorization of
Asian business systems that finds itself incompatible with the Varieties of Capitalism typological
system. Indeed, much like Witt and Redding’s investigation, mine also seems to place Russia in
a situation where it does not neatly fit into the VoC framework. By missing out on informal
institutions, VoC researchers miss out on a crucial understanding of the way national economies
de facto operate, which carries the implication that neat categorization is more complicated than
proponents of so-called “elegant” modeling might choose to believe. Informal institutions are no
doubt in operation in economies all over the world, both democratic and authoritarian, which
raises serious questions about how these economies actually operate in practice, consequently
making room for studies built on more sociological/anthropological methods that rely on thick
description, such as participant-observation. These issues are further compounded by economies
that are heavily reliant on informal institutions, given the difficulty of identifying these practices
and trying to track their evolution. Indeed, due to their informal nature, these practices are far
more fluid and responsive to changes in the formal environment. Add to this the issues
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mentioned above regarding the potentially fluid nature of authoritarian capitalism, and the VoC
model appears to be quite weak when trying to describe non-western, non-OECD countries.

Conclusion
I have argued that there is more to authoritarian capitalism than intervention by the state
in the economy. Although this is no doubt a very prominent feature of these economies, there is
much more going on when we bring our attention to meso- and micro-levels of economic
coordination. In the case of Russia, corruption may have deeply negative effects on the economy,
but there are ways to overcome some of the most detrimental of them, although perhaps at the
expense of resources that may be more efficiently allocated elsewhere. Regardless, it has
produced a stable form of capitalism (if perhaps not always consistent through time) that
deserves proper consideration in the literature; whether or not the system is sustainable in the
long term, however, is another question entirely.
There is far more room in the Varieties of Capitalism literature for investigations of
authoritarian capitalisms and informal institutions. Political centralization undoubtedly has a
profound impact on how these economies coordinate, and understanding what mechanisms drive
this coordination becomes increasingly important as autocratic countries attain more influence on
the world’s economy. Shedding light on how these states operate not only facilitates interactions
with them, but also guides our awareness of the impact they have on the international economy.
Further, informal institutions provide a unique understanding of how national economies operate
in practice, which may be completely different from how they operate on paper, and/or in formal
spheres. Considering how globalization has continued to shrink the effective size of the world,
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there is a strong incentive to build such awareness so we do not remain ignorant of our global
neighbors.
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APPENDIX
Chapter 3 Major Sources
Imperial Russia: Formal Context & From Imperialism to Communism
The historical narrative in this section was structured based on what was ascertained from
two books: Russia and the Russians by Geoffrey Hosking (2011) and A Concise History of
Russia by Paul Bushkovitch (2012). Both books served as excellent primers for Russia’s
historical narrative and development, although Hosking’s work provides substantially more
analytical/sociological material, whereas Bushkovitch focused on a more narrative history. For
this reason, the analytical aspects of this section were structured differently, using several
sources and noting them where they are used, including instances of Hosking’s work. Otherwise,
no references are made within any part of this section where the history is more linear, as it can
be assumed that any of its content comes from either (or both) books.

Basic Structure of the Soviet Economy and State
Unless otherwise noted, the information from this section is largely derived from Gregory
and Stuart’s (1990) Soviet Economic Structure and Performance: Fourth Edition. An economics
textbook on the workings of the Soviet Economy, this primer offers a very detailed
understanding of how it operated in the late 1980s under Gorbachev, essentially the final
iteration of the economy before the eventual collapse of the USSR. Additionally, while the text
provides a very descriptive historical context for understanding the economy, it spares little time
on the description of the economy as it developed under the tenure of the various leaders of the
USSR. This is understandable; as the authors themselves acknowledge in the preface, “the
founders of the soviet planning system in the late 1920s and early 1930s would feel quite at
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home with the contemporary Soviet economic system” (vii), which is an aspect of the economy
that is discussed in this section. Information obtained from this book was also frequently checked
against other sources for accuracy, the most relied upon being Philip Hanson’s (2003) The Rise
and Fall of the Soviet Economy.

Chapter 4 Major Sources
Patrimonialism and State Corruption
The information presented in this section is largely derived and structured on two books
written by Soviet insiders: Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class, by Michael Voslensky, and
USSR: The Corrupt Society, by Konstantin Simis. The former was written by a prominent Soviet
historian who occupied various academic positions and government appointments while in the
USSR and was the director of the Institute of Contemporary Soviet Research in Munich after
being expatriated. The latter was predominantly a lawyer and a government research assistant
whose book gives the bold impression of being an act of dissent, primarily because it was mostly
written while he lived there and was published after it was discovered by the KGB, an event that
resulted in his expatriation (with his other option made explicit: internment at a labor camp).
These accounts are infinitely useful as first-hand evidence of the operation of the Soviet Union
and its elite by professional scholars. However, it is also possible (particularly in the latter case)
that they are heavily tinged with dissident bias. Therefore, while the two books confirm each
other’s accounts, they are supplemented with cross-referencing from further sources in order to
increase their validity.
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Enterprise Survival Through Schemes and Influence
The information presented in this section is largely derived and structured on two books:
Factory and Manager in the USSR by Joseph S. Berliner, and USSR: The Corrupt Society, by
Konstantin S. Simis. The latter book has already received an introduction in the previous section,
and will be used again because of its wide-ranging topics and Soviet insider perspective. The
former book, by Joseph Berliner, deals specifically with Soviet enterprise and the
actions/incentives of those in charge of it. Berliner was an American economist who is credited
with influencing the way in which the CIA appraised the Soviet economy (Pace 2001), a strong
indication of his expertise on the subject. His (1957) study was personally described as
interdisciplinary, although it was conducted using distinctly anthropological/sociological
methodology, reflected in his interview-based findings. His informants were refugees (likely
from World War II) who identified as managerial officials, and who decided not to return home
after being displaced. This preference might betray an attitude of dissent in the sample; however,
the author assures his readers that the information he obtained from the surveys was diligently
cross-referenced with existing literature to ensure its validity.
The information in this section was treated a little differently than the previous one. In
this case, Berliner is a much more significant voice in the field of research concerning this
particular institution, and so the presentation of the information here is structured primarily on
his book. I nevertheless continued to make use of both books out of a desire to keep the structure
of citations the same, namely the use of books as my main sources and articles/other books as
cross-reference material to substantiate the claims made by the main sources. Additionally, Simis
provided a more hard-line perspective that was beneficial for ensuring a more equal distribution
of sources from different perspectives. A more significant benefit that arose from using Simis’
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book was that the discussion on “individual corruption” was well addressed, while the same
topic found little discussion in Berliner’s book. As such, most of Simis’ work can be found
reflected later in the section, although state enterprise activity still finds some adequate coverage,
as in the case of extra-legal materials procurement and the bribing of officials. As a direct result
of this situation, Simis will be cited more often than Berliner to make it more obvious when his
work is being put into use.

The Pervasiveness of Blat and Bribery Throughout the System
This section once again makes use of Konstantin Simis’ (1982) book USSR: The Corrupt
Society, in addition to the book Public and Private Life of the Soviet People by Vladimir
Shlapentokh. The importance of the former book cannot be understated; Simis did an excellent
job at pointing to corruption in nearly every sector of society, himself demonstrating the ubiquity
of semi-legal and illegal activity, whether it was performed by high-ranking officials or lowly
Soviet farmers. Several of the topics he addressed could not be described in detail in this paper
due to issues of scope and schedule - such as corruption in the police and judicial system - as
well as due to irrelevance - such as prostitution. This work, whose citations span all three
institutions, has made an outsized contribution to my paper.
The other work, by Shlapentokh, was chosen because of the subject matter – which is
concerned about the activities of average citizens – as well as the professional opinions of the
writer. Shlapentokh is somewhat peripheral to the discussion of informal norms and illegal
behaviors in the USSR, as his work tends to focus more specifically on matters of ideology and
public opinion. Nevertheless, he ranks among the foremost Soviet sociologists, which had
inevitably exposed him to the various informal and corrupt practices of the USSR, despite his
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inability to write about it in his own publications for much of his professional life. Additionally,
his methodological rigor is particularly noteworthy:
Scholars, historians, economists, and sociologists who study soviet society should take a lesson
from the herpetologist and conduct their analysis without placing moral judgements on the subject.
As scientists, they should drop the terms “good” and “bad” from their professional lexicon. […]
Our goal as scientists is to understand the anatomy and physiology of the subject, not to anchor
our understanding in the endless circle of moral comparison. (Shlapentokh 2001: xii)

In the same introduction, he presents himself as a dissident, yet promises not to let his opinions
get in the way of his work. This research philosophy is consistent with that (hopefully) being
presented in this paper: by siding with anthropologists and cultural relativists, I have attempted
to convey a more objective understanding of the system with the intention of fitting it properly
into the varieties of capitalism framework. Whether this is adequately accomplished is up to the
reader.

Chapter 5 Major Sources
Transition in Practice: Privatization
The structure of this section of this chapter was predominantly structured using Stephen
Kotkin’s Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000. The remaining sections of the
chapter made use of a wide variety of sources, and as such did not rely for their structure on a set
of books. In this way, this chapter was written more like a traditional literature review.

214

Chapter 6 Major Sources
Patrimonialism and State Corruption
The information presented in this section is largely derived and structured on three books.
Three books were used instead of the typical two because of the narrower focus they all possess.
It is recognized that studying the current Russian administration is a difficult task due to its
informality and secrecy, giving a distinct benefit to utilizing extra resources. The books are: Can
Russia Modernize? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance by Alena Ledeneva;
Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, by Karen Dawisha; and Political Consequences of
Crony Capitalism Inside Russia, by Gulnaz Sharafutdinova.
Ledeneva’s book was selected due to her role as one of the foremost experts on Russia
coming from the anthropological perspective, as well as being one of the major inspirations
behind writing this thesis. Her book discusses networks in great detail, and is valuable for
understanding how networks operate on all levels of the hierarchy. Dawisha’s book was selected
because of her clear and strong opposing perspective to Ledeneva’s, presenting as the hard-line
case to Ledeneva’s soft-line, as well as bringing keen insight into the behaviors that can be found
at the top of Russia’s hierarchy of networks. She also received significant critical acclaim for the
book, and it came highly recommended by several of my peers. Finally, Sharafutdinova’s book
was selected because of its focus on the electoral mechanisms in Russia, which, combined with
its recognition that Russia is run by networks and its comparison between the Putin/Yeltsin eras,
ties into the rest of the selections well.
Although Sharafutdinova appears at first to be writing from a similar perspective to mine,
that of historical-institutionalism, her view of institutions comes off as somewhat limited. She
appears to overweigh the impact of the fall of the USSR as a critical juncture, believing that
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giving too much credit to soviet and imperial Russian “culture” (i.e., institutions) is path
dependent to the point of being almost deterministic, which risks letting Russian elites “off the
hook” for their behavior. However, her model barely seems historical at all, making use of events
too close to the modern day without giving proper justice to the full weight of history; it makes
too much of the power of critical junctures to reorganize society without appreciation for the way
institutions truly evolve. Albeit the fall of communism was a huge change, to insist that soviet
managers dropped all of their previous strategic predilections and started strategizing purely in
terms of the new context is not only ahistorical but also lacks appreciation for the salience, or
”stickiness,” of institutions. Rather than discredit her, however, the conflict between our
perspectives strengthens the case to make use of her work because my methodology attempts to
bring together the voices of multiple different perspectives to lend strength to my argument. Her
book also makes excellent use of mixed methods, incorporating both comparative, qualitative
case studies as well as survey data to present a strong argument.

Enterprise Survival Through Schemes and Influence
The information presented in this section is largely derived and structured on three books.
Three books were used instead of the typical two because of the narrower focus they all possess.
It is recognized that studying the current Russian administration is a difficult task due to its
informality and secrecy, giving a distinct benefit to utilizing extra resources. The books are: How
Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business, by
Alena Ledeneva; Networks in the Russian Market Economy, by Markku Lonkila; and Russian
Organized Corruption Networks and Their International Trajectories, by Serguei Cheloukhine
and M.R. Haberfeld.
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Because Ledeneva is such a central author to this literature, the continued use of her work
was considered a necessity. Her book How Russia Really Works provided an excellent
foundation for the work in this section, describing in great detail many of the different practices
performed by businesses and politicians alike, although the business practices were the subject of
interest for this section. Because the practices discussed in this book were mostly from work
conducted in the 90s, it was necessary to find other books published later in time to support her
findings.
Lonkila’s book, published in 2011, was selected because of the interesting perspective on
network relations, the use of a thoroughly modern economic sector, and the differing perspective
taken on blat and informal practices. Lonkila takes a harder-line stance than he perhaps intended,
using strong moral judgments when discussing informal institutions and blat. Throughout the
book, it appears that he makes the mistake inherent to the “misrecognition game” described in
Ledeneva’s works; that is, when I’m performing blat it’s not blat, but when others do it, it is
most certainly blat. He does this when he sections off blat as a distinctly economic and immoral
behavior, used extra-legally to succeed in the economy, while demarcating the primary focus of
his study as the opposite. However, where this book shines is in making sense of the evolving
network ethos of the Russian people, and how blat becomes increasingly less economic and
more so an expression of reciprocation, painting Russia as more collectivistic than other scholars
might assume. In doing so, the author softens and humanizes blat. However, rather than setting
the networking tendency apart from blat, I see both as two sides of the same coin, so to speak:
the reciprocity inherent to blat relations is quite often without moral questionability, but
sometimes one needs to ask their friend to help them with a sketchy favor. And per the Russian
ethos of mutual aid, it can be difficult to say no.
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The final book, by Cheloukhine and Haberfeld, was primarily chosen because of the
strong criminal justice perspective it provides, rounding out my main sources for the section with
a distinctly hard-line perspective. However, their network perspective also fits well with my
other sources, demonstrating blat relationships without ever explicitly mentioning them.
According to the authors, Russia is dominated by intersecting organized crime circles, competing
with each other and subsuming businesses under its umbrella in a bid to diversify into both legal
and illegal forms of wealth generation. Although the criminal origins of certain business leaders
cannot be ignored, it can be hard to believe that criminal organizations have such a widespread
grasp on the economy, particularly given Ledeneva’s treatment of the material that heavily
suggests that informal practices are a survival mechanism. It begs the question whether or not
Cheloukhine and Haberfeld are overgeneralizing about the pervasiveness of criminal penetration
of the economy, and are lumping together actual criminals with those businesspersons simply
trying to get by in a contradictory legal environment. Regardless, their research is extensive,
making use of multiple research methodologies, and even mentions (albeit in passing) the central
theme of this thesis project, namely that Russia’s economy is not strictly patrimonial but also has
more grassroots power as well: “Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Security Committee D.
Ilyukhin indicated that organized crime through corruption has infiltrated ‘all corridors of
government’ and that sometimes it is difficult to differentiate where the real power is and where
the organized crime that controls this power is.” (pg. 104)

The Pervasiveness of Blat and Bribery Throughout the System
The information presented in this section is largely derived and structured on three books.
Three books were used instead of the typical two because of the narrower focus they all possess.
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It is recognized that studying the current Russian administration is a difficult task due to its
informality and secrecy, giving a distinct benefit to utilizing extra resources. In particular to this
section, there was difficulty in finding books that discussed the appropriate institutions during
the 2000s, after Putin came to power. In order to counteract this bias, the articles that support this
section were very carefully selected in order to ensure that the institutions of interest could be
properly represented as enduring beyond the transition period of the 1990s. The books used in
this section are: Social Networks and Everyday Practices in Russia, by Anna-Marie Salmi;
Making Ends Meet in Contemporary Russia, by Simon Clarke; and The Elephant in the Room:
Corruption and Cheating in Russian Universities, by Sergei Golunov.
Salmi’s book is partly a collection of her works, and partly a synthesis of those works,
which is presented in a very lengthy introduction. Her work makes use of qualitative methods
from a social networking perspective, a welcome perspective given the extensive mention of
social networks in the analyses of other authors who often neglect the particular ways these
social networks function and reproduce. While not easily generalizable outside of St. Petersburg,
where her studies took place, it nevertheless identified important behaviors that could be borne
out further through the use of articles and the other texts in this section. It is well complemented
by Clarke’s work, which makes use of quantitative methods.
Although Clarke is dealing more particularly with how Russians survive in the harsh
context of their country, he has important points to make about the sub-institutions of secondary
work, gardening on personal plots, and the role of personal networks in supplementing income.
His work makes use of multiple different survey studies, which proves difficult to discuss given
the different ways questions from each survey are phrased and the different methods by which
the surveys are carried out. Although his work is supplemented by qualitative studies, most of his
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discussions are based on the summary statistics and more complex regression modeling he
performs in order to draw his conclusions. I have left numbers out of my discussions that make
use of his findings due to concerns I have previously addressed about the accuracy of official
data and the conflict of interest inherent to the collectors of said data (in this case, it is from
Goskomstat, the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research, and the Comparative Labour
Relations Research). There are also problems regarding the informants in the surveys, who have
incentives to underreport behaviors that could be of interest to the state. Nevertheless, Clarke is
vividly aware of the limitations of his data, and takes care to try and avoid any bold assumptions,
using the variety of sources to try and overcome biases.
The final book, by Golunov, was primarily selected because it was published far after the
other two. The first two books primarily discuss institutions as they were in the 1990s. Finding
books on blat and bribery by the common citizenry proved very difficult, making the supporting
articles in this section particularly important. Because Golunov’s book was published in 2014, it
helps to serve as at least one point of historical continuity between the first two books (which
collected data in the 1990s) and the 2000s. Unfortunately, the content of Golunov’s book did not
overlap significantly with the previous two; regardless, it provided a great case study on how blat
and bribery have had such an outsized impact on the university system. The widespread presence
of these behaviors in the educational system only supports the idea that these behaviors were also
widespread in other institutions. It bears repeating that this section was heavily supported with
article research in order to make sure that historical continuity was observed in their practice.
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